[1] Life prefixed to the American edition of the Works of Jonathan Edwards, 1830.

[2] Appendix. No. I.

[3] As he entered college at twelve years of age, this was probably when he was sever or eight.

[4] The place where the booth was built is known at East Windsor

[5] For a specimen of the early papers of Jonathan Edwards, see Appendix, No. IV.

[6] The first twenty-one were written at once; as were the next ten, at a subsequent sitting. The rest were written occasionally. They are all on two detached pieces of paper.

[7] He mentions, Jan. 14, his making the book, and annexing the loose reports to it.

[8] Dwight

[9] He refers to slips of paper on which the first part of the Diary is written; as far as Jan. 15, at night.

[10] Perhaps the preparation of a public exercise for the college commencement, when ye received his Master’s degree.

[11] I use spiritual here in its original and most appropriate sense, as opposed to material.

[12] The Rev. Dr. Erskine, the warm friend and the correspondent of Mr. Edwards, being desirous of procuring a correct portrait , both of him and his wife, and hearing that a respectable English painter was in Boston , forwarded to his agent in that town, the sum requisite, not only for the portraits, but for the expenses of the journey. They were taken in 1740; and after the death of Dr. Erskine, were very kindly transmitted by his executor to Dr. Edwards.

[13] Hopkin’s Life of Edwards. Dr. H. resided in the family a considerable time.

[14] This last was published.

[15] Among those who opposed Mr. Edwards on this occasion, were several members of a family, in a neighbouring town, nearly connected with his own, and possessing, from its numbers, wealth, and respectability, a considerable share of influence. Their religious sentiments differed widely from his, and their opposition to him, in the course which he now pursued, became direct and violent. As his defence of his own opinions was regarded as triumphant, they appear to have felt, in some degree, the shame and mortification of a defeat; and their opposition to Mr. Edwards, though he resorted to every honourable method of conciliation, became, on their part, a settled personal hostility. It is probable, that their advice to Mr. Edwards, to refrain from the controversy, and particularly, not to publish his sentiments with regard to it, was given somewhat categorically, and with a full expectation that he, young as he was, would comply with it. His refusal so to do, was an offence not to be forgiven. We shall have occasion to recur to this subject again.

[16] Of the conversion of this child, whose name was Phebe Bartlett, a most minute and interesting account is given in the “Narrative of Surprising Conversions.” Dr. Edwards, under date of March 30, 1789, in a letter to Dr. Ryland, says, “In answer to your inquiry, in a former letter, concerning Phebe Bartlett, I have to inform you, that she is yet living, and has uniformly maintained the character of a true convert.

[17] I have discovered no papers or letters of the family, of a date near this, and no mention of this young lady, except on her tombstone.

[18] Our author does not say, that he had more wickedness, and badness of heart, since his conversion, the he had before; but that he had a greater sense thereof. Thus a blind man may have his garden full of noxious weeds, and yet not see or be sensible of them. But should the garden be is great part cleared of these, and furnished with many beautiful and salutary plants; and supposing the owner now to have the power of discriminating objects of sight; in this case, he would have less, but he see and have a sense of more. And thus it was that St. Paul, though greatly freed from sin, yet saw and felt himself as “the chief of sinners.” To which may be added, that the better the organ, and clearer the light may be, the stronger will be the sense excited by sin or holiness.

[19] Mr. Bellamy was settled at Bethlem in the spring of 1740, in the midst of a general attention to religion, on the part of the people of that place.

[20] This is a very common mistake. The woman here mentioned was not Mary Magdalen.

[21] The superscription and date are gone from the MS. but having Mr. Edwards’s hand-writing on the back, I suppose the letter to have been written to him.

[22] Afterwards the Rev. Samuel Hopkins, D. D. of Newport, author of the System of Divinity

[23] Mr. Hopkins continued to pursue his studies with Mr. Edwards, until the next autumn, and again for a short period in the spring, after which he was settled at Housatonnuck, then a part of Stockbridge, now called Great Barrington.

[24] Probably the 91st Hymn of the 2d Book, beginning with “O the delights, the heavenly joys, The glories of the place.”

[25] As examples of this nature, the reader is referred to the writings of Flavel, L. Baxter, and Brainerd, and of Mr. Edwards himself.

[26] See vol. i. pp. 258, 259.

[27] It was postponed to the time of the children of the generation here referred to.

[28] Kaunaumeek was an Indian settlement, about five miles N. W. from New Lebanon, on the main road from that village to Albany. The place is now called Brainerd’s Bridge, and is a village of a few houses, on the Kayaderosseras creek, where that road crosses it. It was thus named, not after the missionary, but after a relative of his of the name of Brainerd, who some years since planted himself in this spot, and built the bridge across the creek, now a toll bridge. The mountain, about a mile N. W. of the bridge, still bears the name of Kaunaumeek. The creek winds beautifully in the valley beneath, and forms a delightful meadow. In 1823, I found an aged negro on the spot, about one hundred years of age, who had passed his life in the vicinity. He was about twenty-one years old when Brainerd resided at Kaunaumeek, but never saw him. He told me that the house which Brainerd built here stood on the first little knowl, or hillock on the left of the road, and on the W. or N. W. side of the creek immediately after passing the bridge; and that the Indian settlement was down in the meadow, at some distance below the bridge. On following the stream, I discovered an old Indian orchard, the trees of an Indian burying ground, and the ruins of several buildings of long standing. He also informed me, that the Indians had often told him, that Mr. Brainerd was “a very holy man,” and that he resided at Kaunaumeek but a short time.

[29] This, and several other Scotticisms, I do not feel at liberty to alter.

[30] He was 66 years old the 8th day of January last.

[31] This Mr. Robinson was a young minister of eminent gifts and graces: I think, belonging to Pennsylvania, but had some time preached, with great success, in Virginia, in various parts; but died a few years ago in his youth.

[32] Afterwards Mrs. Dwight, of Northampton.

[33] See page cxxxvii

[34] This is evident by many passages of Scripture: as, Lev. xxvi. 40-42. Deut. xxxii. 36-39. 1 King viii. 21, 22; i. 4-8. .Ezek. xx. 35, 36, 37. Hos. v. 15; vi. 1-3. xii. 9, 10; xiv..throughout.

[35] What an awful warning to all professors, and especially to young people! Behold, how great a matter a little fire kindleth! Little do the giddy and the gay think how their levitics operate, and what seeds of distress and sorrow they are sowing for themselves and others. Woe unto you that thus laugh now, for ye shall mourn and weep! How desirable it should be penitentially here, and not despairingly hereafter.―Dr. Williams.

[36] For the letter itself see page cli.

[37] This vote appears to have been passed in the latter part of November, a few weeks only before Mr. Edwards received proposals of settlement, which he ultimately accepted.

[38] The father of Mr. Hawley married Rebekah, the fifth daughter of the Rev. Mr. Stoddard, the sister of Mr. Edwards’s mother.

[39] The common language of all the Indians in New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, except the Iroquois.

[40] This part of the letter must have been written in July, as the installation took place in August.

[41] In 1734-35.

[42] I regret that the length of this interesting letter renders its insertion impracticable.

[43] Mrs. Backus, the fifth sister of Mr. Edwards, was now a widow. Her husband the Rev. Simon Backus of Newington (Wethersfield) was designated by the Connecticut legislature, as chaplain to the troops sent to Louisburg in 1746, to prevent its recapture by the French. He died there soon after his arrival. The vessel, containing his effect, and a considerable sum contributed by the gentlemen of the army for his family, was cast away on its return: and the family were left in very indigent circumstances.

[44] I suppose that this means £2000 old tenor as it was then called; the value of which continually varied, but has been estimated at 6s. 8d. sterling to the pound.

[45] So severe was this pressure, for a considerable time, that Mr. Edwards found himself necessitated to practise the most rigid economy, in everything─even the article of paper. Much of what he know wrote, for his for his own use, was written in the margins of useless phamphlets, the covers of letters, and the remnants of the silk used in making fans.

[46] A representation having been made to the legislature , in pursuance of this recommendation, three trustees or commissioners were appointed on behalf of the province.

[47] That is, provided the commissioners, in Boston, approved of the appointment.

[48] With reluctance I have yielded to the necessity of this minuteness of detail; but the fact, that Mr. Edwards had no very marked success in the Stockbridge mission, cannot not otherwise be explained; and the failure of the Iroquois establishment at Stockbridge cannot otherwise be accounted for. Unhappily the Indians at that place, like all other Indians in the vicinity of whites, were exposed to the impositions, the seductions and the oppressions, of their civilized neighbors. In these counteracting causes, both the friends and the enemies of the Indian missions may learn, why it is so difficult to reform and christianize savages.

[49] I have regarded the use of antonousasia as correct in this and some other quotations.

[50] It was not published until November.

[51] This excellent letter, omitted here for want of room, will be found in vol. i. pp. 529-231, and should be read in this place.

[52] The copy designed for Mr. Hawley was enclosed in the letter to Mr. Edwards. Probably a similar vote was forwarded directly to Mr. Woodbridge, as that gentleman always enjoyed their fullest confidence.

[53] Lay patronage was wholly rejected by the Scottish reformers, and was not introduced by law until 1711. For a long period the law was regarded as a public grievance, but is now submitted to.

[54] “Mr. Gillespie died, Jan. 19th, 1774, in serenity of mind, and good hope through grace.”

[55] This letter is too long for insertion.

[56] Sir Henry Moncrieff Wellwood, who had the MS. Letters of Mr. Edwards to Dr. Erskine in possession, while writing his Life of the latter, observes, “It was not, however, till the month of July, 1752, that he [Mr. Edwards] appears to have resumed his studies, on the subject of Free Will; for, on the 7th of that month, he writes Dr. Erskine, that he hoped soon to be at leisure, to resume his design.” He then adds, “Whatever opinion may be held, with regard to Mr. Edwards argument, it must appear astonishing to those, who are capable of appreciating the difficulty of his subject, that, in nine months from the date of his letter (on the 14th of April, 1753) he could write Dr. Erskine, that he had almost finished the first draught of what he originally intended.” The passage, in Mr. Edwards’s letter of Nov. 23, 1752, announcing, that he began to write in August, but was soon broke off; and had not, from that time, been able to put pen to paper, about the matter: and that he hoped, that God, in his providence, would favour him with an opportunity to prosecute the design; obviously escaped Sir Henry’s notice. If he regarded it as astonishing, that Mr. Edwards should have been able to write the work in nine months: what would have been his view of the subject, if, after first reading the details of the Stockbridge controversy, he had then discovered, that it was not written, not in nine months, but in four and a half.

[57] The directors, knowing the characters of the respective individuals residing in these places, whom they designated; and perceiving, from an inspection of the map, that Stockbridge was nearly central to most of the places mentioned; appear to have supposed, that they might all meet there, without inconvenience.

[58] On this account only, is the plan worthy of being mentioned here.

[59] Many benevolent men, on being surprized of such a wanton and shameful perversion of the funds, appropriated by themselves to a given charity, would, at once, have wholly discontinued their benefactions; but the benevolence of Mr. Hollis, like a living and copious fountain, could neither be dried up, nor obstructed.

[60] These children of the Mohawks, and the children of the Onohquaugas, constituted, from this time, the male Iroquois boarding-school at Stockbridge. How long it was continued I have not been able to ascertain; but suppose it was removed to Onohquauga, soon after the establishment of the mission of Mr. Hawley at that place.

[61] See appendix IV. In several of the articles under the head of Excellency, the reader will find, if I may mistake not, as striking specimens of powerful metaphysical reasoning, as any to be found in the essay on the Freedom of the Will.

[62] Bishop Butler has left a “Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue,” which the curious reader will do well to examine in connexion with Mr. Edwards’s “Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue:” if he wishes to compare the powers of these twp distinguished men, when endeavouring to grasp the same subject.

[63] Afterwards the Rev. Jonathan Edwards, D. D. President of Union College, Schenectady. He was familiarly acquainted with the Housatonnuck and the Iroquois; in early life, more so than with the English.

[64] The subjects treated in this volume were, Attachments to objects of Distress. Law of Nature. Law of Necessity. Belief. Personal Identity. Authority of our Senses. Idea of Power, Knowledge of Future Events. Dread of Supernatural Powers in the Dark. Our Knowledge of the Deity.

[65] Soon after created a lord of session, with the title of Lord Kaimes.

[66] See vol. I. pp. 89-98. Lord Kaimes had a much higher reputation, as a writer, fifty years ago than at present. The perusal of his Essay on Liberty and Necessity, and of the remarks upon it, in the letter of Mr. Edwards, here referred to, will inevitably lead to the conviction, that, as a metaphysician, he was neither accurate nor profound.

[67] See Vol. 1. pp. 89-98

[68] Essays on the principles of Morality and Natural Religion, by Lord Kaimes

[69] See the letter in Vol.1. pp. 8.

[70] In the autumn of 1756, or early in 1757, the college was removed to Princeton.

[71] Unfortunately this letter is lost.

[72] When Mr. Edwards wrote the letter to which she refers, he did not think of going to Princeton till spring: but afterward he determined otherwise.

[73] I have ascertained the names of only three of the members of the council—-Mr. Bellamy, Mr. Brinsmade, and Mr. Hopkins. This date is right, though it differs from that mentioned in the letter to Mr. Bellamy.

[74] The agents of the college were Rev. Messrs. Caleb Smith and John Brainerd.

[75] The council, at the request both the English and Indian congregation at Stockbridge, addressed a letter to the commissioners in Boston, requesting that Mr. John Brainerd might be appointed Mr. Edward’s successor;—-the Housatonnucks offering land for a settlement to the Indian congregation at Cranberry, New Jersey, if they would remove to Stockbridge.—-and another letter to the trustees of the college, requesting that they would use their collective and individual influence, to procure the appointment of Mr. Brainerd, and his removal to Stockbridge.

[76] The first sermon, which he preached at Princeton, was on the Unchangeableness of Christ, in Vol. II. p. 9-19. It was upwards of two hours in the delivery; but is said to have been listened to with such profound attention, and deep interest, by the audience, that they were unconscious of the lapse of time, and surprised that it closed so soon.

[77] President Burr ordered, on his death-bed, should not be attended with pomp and cost; that nothing should be expended but what was agreeable to the dictates of christian decency; and that the sum which must be expended at a fashionable funeral, above the necessary cost of a decent one, should be given to the poor, out of his estate.

[78] See Appendix, No. 5.

[79] The last article under this head, is obviously the foundation of the author’s subsequent Treatise on the Nature of True Virtue.

[80] On a preceding page it is stated, on the authority of Dr. Hopkins, that he regularly spent thirteen hours, every day, in close study, After receiving his invitation to Princeton, he told his eldest son, that he had for many years spent fourteen hours a day in study: and mentioned the necessity of giving up a part of this time to other pursuits, as one of his chief objections against accepting the office of president.

[81] “As both the giver, and the object of his charity, are dead, and all the ends of the proposed secrecy are answered; it is thought not inconsistent with the above-mentioned promise, to make known the fact, as it is here related.”

[82] His height was about six feet one inch.

[83] See Preface to Five Sermons, vol. i. p. 621.

[84] Sir Charles Grandison. I had this anecdote through his eldest son.

[85] The treatise on Affections, and on United Extraordinary Prayer, are the most incorrect of all his works, published by himself. In his sermons, published in his life-time, somewhat of the linae labor is discernable. The works published by his son, Dr. Edwards, in this country, are but little altered from the rough draught, but those first published in Edinburgh, are generally more so. The History of Redemption was considerably corrected by my father, and afterwards thrown in the form of a treatise by Dr. Erskine. The Sermons published by Dr. Hopkins, are the least correct of all his works.

[86] I suppose the writer referred to here, and in various other places, to have been Dr. Finley.

[87] For many of the remarks on the character of Mr. Edwards, as a preacher and writer, I am indebted to a well written review of the Worchester edition of his works, in the Christian Spectator; but they are usually so blended with my own, that it is impossible to designate the passages.

[88] “Though, as has been observed,” says Dr. Hopkins, “he was wont to read so considerable a part of what he delivered, yet was far from thinking this the best way of preaching in general; and looking up on using his notes, so much as he did, a deficiency and infirmity, and in the latter part of his life, he was inclined to think it had been better, if he had never been accustomed to use his notes at all. It appeared to him, that preaching wholly without notes, agreeable to the custom in most protestant countries, and in what seems evidently to have been the manner of the apostles and primitive ministers of the gospel, was by far the more natural way, and had the greatest tendency, on the whole, to answer the end of preaching; and supposed that no one, who had talents, equal to the work of the ministry, was incapable of speaking momoriter, if he took suitable pains for this attainment from his youth. He would have the young preacher write all his sermons, or at least most of them, out, at large; and, instead of reading them to his hearers, take pains to commit them to memory; which, though it would require a great deal of labour at first, yet would soon become easier by use, and help him to speak more correctly and freely, and be of great service to him all his days.”

[89] Few men have possessed a greater fund of genuine wit, than Mr. Edwards. In early life, he found it difficult to restrain it. The clear reductio ad absurdum, to which he subjects every scheme and argument of his antagonists, in the Freedom of the Will, is usually a brilliant example of true logical wit. The Answer to Williams abounds with it. I doubt whether the annals of metaphysics can show a finer specimen of it, than the following; which is the conclusion of his exposure of the metaphysical notion of an action or act, as defined by Chubb, and his associates: “So that, according to their notion of an act, considered with regard to its consequences, these following things are all essential to it: viz. That it should be necessary and yet not necessary; that it should be from a cause and yet from no cause; that it should be the fruit of choice and design, and yet not the fruit of choice and design; that it should be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet consequent on previous exertion; that it should be before it is; that it should spring immediately out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of preponderation; that it should be self-originated, and also have its original from something else; that it is what the mind causes itself of its own will, and can produce or prevent according to its choice or pleasure, and yet what the mind has no power to prevent, precluding all previous choice in the affair. “So that an act according to their metaphysical notion of it, is something of which there is no idea; it is nothing but a confusion of the mind, excited by words without any distinct meaning, and is an absolute nonentity; and that in two respects: 1 There is nothing in the world that ever was, is, or can be, to answer the things which must belong to its description, according to what they suppose to be essential to it. And, 2. There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, any notion or idea to answer the word as they use and explain it. For if we should suppose any such notion, it would many ways destroy itself. But it is impossible that any idea or notion should subsist in the mind, whose very nature and essence, which constitutes it, destroys it. — If some learned philosopher, who has been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should say, ’ He has been in Terra del Fuego, and there had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth himself, and yet had a sire and dam distinct from himself: that he had an appetite, and was hungry, before he had a being: that his master, who led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was always governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased: that when he moved, he always took a step before the first step: that he went with his head first, and yet always went tail foremost, and this, though he had neither head nor tail:’ it would be no impudence at all to tell such a traveller, though a man of profound learning, that he himself had no idea of such an animal as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever would have.”

[90] Dugald Stewart, alluding to it in conversation, is said, on good authority, to have spoken of it thus:—“Edwards on the Will, a work which never was answered, and which never will be answered.”

[91] It is proper to remark, that the above statement is not altogether correct. The same views of the atonement appear in Bates on the Harmony of the Divine Attributes in Redemption; in the writings of Howe, Baxter, and some other eminent divines of the seventeenth century.

[92] The whole difficulty is removed by reflecting that disinterested is the converse of selfish; and uninterested, the converse of interested.

[93] For a Catalogue of the works of Mr. Edwards, published previous to this edition, see Appendix, No. VI.

[94] Dr. Finley

[95] 2 Cor. i. 4

[96] See Appendix, No. II.

[97] Mr. Mather was ordained June 18, 1661, and died July 24, 1669.

[98] The Rev. John Warham was originally one of the ministers of Exeter. “He was distinguished for piety and the strictest morals; yet at times was subject to great religious melancholy. Such were his doubts and fears, at some times, that when he administered the Lord’s supper to his brethren, he did not participate with them, fearing that the seals of the covenant did not belong to him. It is said he was the first minister in New England who used notes in preaching; yet he was applauded by his hearers, as one of the most animated and energetic preachers of the day. He was considered as one of the principal fathers and pillars of the churches of Connecticut.” Trumbull’s Hist. of Connecticut. I. 467.

[99] The following is a list of the publications of the Rev. Mr. Stoddard 1. The trial of Assurance 1696. 2. The Doctrine of Instituted Churches 1700. 3. The Necessity of acknowledging Offences 1801. 4. The Danger of Degeneracy 1702. 5. Election Sermon 1703. 6. A Sermon on the Lord’s Supper, Ex. xii. 47, 48 1707. 7. A Sermon at the Ordination of the Rev. Joseph Willard of Swampfield 1708. 8. The Inexcusableness of Neglecting the Worship of God 1708. 9. The Falseness of the Hopes of many Professors 1708. 10. An Appeal to the Learned on the Lord’s Supper 1709. 11. A plea for Tythes: Divine Teachings rende, Persons blessed 1712. 12. A Guide to Christ 1714. 13. Three Sermons: The Virtue of Christ’s Blood: Natural Men under the Government of Self-love: The Gospel the Means of Conversion: and a fourth to stir up young men and maidens 1717. 14. Sermon at the Ordination of Mr. Thomas Cheney 1718. 15. Treatise concerning Conversion 1719. 16. Answer to Cases of Conscience 1722. 17. Inquiry whether God is not angry with the Country! 1723. 18. Safety of appearing in the Righteousness of Christ

[100] See Appendix. No. III.

[101] From the letter of an excellent lady in Middletown, in whose family she resided several years.

[102] In August, 1711

[103] The preceding articles were set down from time to time at the close of the work, in two series; the first ending with No. 26.

[104] This article, and the numbers following, viz. 62, 63. &c. are inserted in the manuscript distinctly from the rest, and were written probably at a somewhat later period of life.

[105] Human Understanding. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 197

[106] Hum. Und. vol. i. p203, 204

[107] This appears to be the author’s meaning, in order to preserve a consistency with his professed sentiment of divine influence. He believed that a real Christian’s mind is born of the Spirit; and that such a state of mind induces one choice rather than another. But he could not maintain that divine influences, which is a subjective cause of one volition rather than another, must be “in the view or apprehension of the of the understanding.” For “the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, wither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit.” Beside, the most proper acceptation of the term “motive” seems to plead in favor of the restriction suggested in the text by the word “objectively;” and the use of this distinction may appear more fully hereafter. W.

[108] I say not only doing, but conducting; because a voluntary forebearing to do, sitting still, keeping silence, &c. are instances of persons’ conduct, about which Liberty is exercised; though they are not so properly called doing.

[109] To the inquirer after the truth it may here be recommended, as a matter of some consequence, to keep in mind the precise difference between an argument a priori and one a posteriori, a distinction of considerable use, as well as of long standing, among divines, metaphysicians, and logical writers. An argument from either of these, when legitimately applied, may amount to a demonstration, when used for instance, relatively to the being and perfections of God; but the one should be confined to the existence of Deity, while the other is applicable to his perfections. By the argument a posteriori we rise from the effect to the cause, from the stream to the fountain, from what is posterior to what is prior; in other words, from what is contingent to what is absolute, from number to unity; that is, from the manifestation of God to his existence. By the argument a priori we descend from the cause to the effect, from the fountain to the stream, from what is prior to what is posterior; that is, from the necessary existence of God we safely infer certain properties and perfections. To attempt a demonstration of the existence of a first cause, or the Being of God, a priori, would be most absurd; for it would be an attempt to prove a prior ground or cause of existence of a first cause; or, that there is some cause before the very first. The argument a priori, therefore, is not applicable to prove the divine existence. For this end, the argument a posteriori alone is legitimate; and its conclusiveness rests on this axiom, that “there can be no effect without a cause.”–The absurdity of denying this axiom is abundantly demonstrated by our author.—W.

[110] In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. P. 350,351, 358.

[111] Ibid. p. 325, 326.

[112] Ibid. p. 342.

[113] Ibid. p 360.

[114] In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. P. 363

[115] Ibid. p. 369, 370.

[116] I have elsewhere observed, what that is which is vulgarly called accident; that it is nothing akin to the Arminian metaphysical notion of contingence, or something not connected with any thing foregoing; but that it is something that comes to pass in the course of things, unforeseen by men, and not owing to their design.

[117] The reader is particularly requested to give due attention to these two remarks, especially the former, as being of the utmost importance in the controversy. If he be pleased to examine, with this view, the most popular advocates for the liberty of indifference, he will find them continually confounding the objects of choice, and the acts of choice. When they have shown, with much plausibility, that there is no perceivable difference, or ground of choice, in the objects, they hastily infer the same indifferences as applicable to the acts of choice. —W.

[118] Dr. Whitby, and some other Arminians, make a distinction of different kinds of freedom; one of God, and perfect spirits above; another of persons in a state of trial. The former Dr. Whitby allows to consist with necessity; the latter he holds to be without necessity; and this latter he supposes to be requisite to our being the subject of praise or dispraise, rewards or punishments, precepts and prohibitions, promises and threats, exhortations and dehortations, and a covenant treaty. And to this freedom he supposes Indifference to be requisite. In his Discourse on the five points, )p. 299, 300.) he says; “It is a freedom, (speaking of a freedom not only from co-action, but from necessity) requisite, as we conceive, to render us capable of trial or probation, and to render our actions worthy of praise or dispraise, and our persons of rewards or punishments.” Excellent to this purpose, are the words of Mr Thorndake: We say not, that Indifference is requisite to all freedom, but to the freedom of man alone in this state of treveil and preficience; the ground of which is God’s tender of a treaty, and conditions of peace and reconcilement to fallen man, together with those precepts and prohibitions, those promises and threats, those exhortations and dehortations, it is enforced with.”

[119] There is a little intricacy in this mode of expression. It may be thus illustrated. Suppose it were asserted. “That it is impossible for the Will to be otherwise at any one given time, than that way to which it tends.” Such a proposition one might think, none who understood the terms would controvert; for it would be to controvert this proposition, “The Will is as its tendency.” And yet, the advocates for a self-determining power must assert a liberty which denies this plain proposition.—W.

[120] Second Edit. P. 211, 212, 213.

[121] Edit. VI. p. 93.

[122] 2 Kings viii. 13.

[123] This distinction is of great importance in the present controversy; and the want of attending to the true ground on which it stands, has been, we presume, the principal cause of Dr. Whitby’s objections, and those of most, if not all, other Arminian writers. They seem to consider, in this argument, no other necessity but the decretive, as maintained by their opponents; and therefore infer, that to allow any kind of necessity, is the same as to allow an infallible decree. From this view the transition is easy to another conclusion, viz. that if any thing is foreknown because it is decreed, every thing is foreknown on the same ground, of for the same reason.—And then, this proving too much —the decretive appointment of all the evil in the universe, which they are sure is incompatible with the divine character, and therefore impossible—they reject the whole doctrine of necessity as a ground of foreknowledge; and suppose that, though they cannot clearly disprove what is advanced against them, they infer that there is somehow a sophism in the reasoning of their opponents, or some false principle assumed were they but happy enough to detect it. But our author, in this reasoning, does not maintain, that the connexion by which every event is evidently certain, and therefore necessary, is so because decreed. The truth is, that some events are foreknown to be certain because foreordained; and others, because of the tendency there is in the nature of things themselves.—Should any, in the way of objection, assert, that the nature of things is itself derived from the divine will, or decree; we apprehend there is no evidence to support such an assertion. For instance, is it owing to a decree that the nature of any created being is dependent on the first cause? That a creature, however exalted, is not infinite? That any relation should subsist between the Creator and a creature? Or that, if equal quantities be taken from equal quantities, the remainders will be equal? Is there any room, in thought, for a supposition of nay decree in the case? Nay more, does it appear possible for a decree to have made such things otherwise? Let it be observed, however, that God is the almighty Sovereign over nature—not indeed so far as to alter the nature of things, which in reality is no object of power, any more than to make spirit to be the same thing as matter, and vice versa, or the working of contradictions is an object of power, but—by the position of antecedents, and establishing premises. To illustrate this, let it be supposed, if God create a world, that world must depend upon him, as a necessary consequence. To deny this, is to deny the nature and identity of things. For what is it to create, but for an independent cause to impart, ad extra, a dependent existence? So that to deny dependence, is to deny creation. But though the consequences be necessary, if the antecedent be established; yet the antecedent itself is not necessary, except from the decree; for there is not, in the nature of things, any antecedent necessity that a world be created. That is, to suppose its non-existence implies no contradiction, it being evidently the effect of sovereign pleasure. Hence to deny the consequence, on supposition of the antecedent, is to deny the nature of things, and to assert a contradiction, thought the antecedent itself be not necessary. And hence also in the instance now specified among others innumerable, the antecedent is an object of decree, but not the consequence. It is as absurd to say, that God decreed the dependence of the world upon himself, as it is to say, he decreed that two and two shall be equal to four, rather than to five. These remarks, duly considered in their just consequences, will abundantly show, that some things are necessary because decreed,—as the creation, the preservation, and the government of the world; the redemption, the purification, and the salvation of the church:—and that other things—as all imperfections, dependence, relations, and especially moral evils—come to be necessary, and so capable of being foreknown, only by connexion, of consequence. That is, if the antecedent, which is under the control of the Almighty Sovereign, be admitted, the consequence follows infallibly from the nature of things. But if another antecedent be established, another consequence will follow, with equal certainty, also from the nature of things. For instance: if holiness be given and continued to a redeemed creature, as an antecedent; excellence, honour, and happiness are the necessary consequences. But if sin operate without control, as the antecedent, dishonour and misery must be the necessary consequence from the same cause.—W.

[124] In these two sections our author has abundantly demonstrated, that foreknowledge infers necessity; such a necessity as exists in the connexion of a consequent with its antecedent; and has represented, in various lights, how the most contradictory and absurd conclusions follow from the opposite hypothesis. But as his argument, strictly speaking, did not require a further explanation or distinction of the principles on which it rested, which yet are important, it may not be improper in this place briefly to inquire into the rationale of those principles; by which his reasoning may appear with additional evidence, and the radical principles themselves confirmed by their connexion with others. As these remarks are presented in the form of a series analytically disposed, we shall prefix to them the corresponding ordinal numbers. 1. Any kind of necessity is a sufficient ground of foreknowledge, in the view of omniscience; but as is the kind of necessity, or the nature of the connexion between cause and effect, so is the nature of the foreknowledge. But this difference in the nature of the connexion affects—not the certainty of the event, but the mode of causation; or from what cause the certainty arises. 2. All necessity, or certainty of connexion between antecedent and consequent, must arise form one of these two cources, viz. the nature of things, or, the decree of god. Chance is nothing; and nothing has no properties, consequently has no causal influence. 3. The necessity which arises from the nature of things, is either absolute or hypothetical. absolute necessity belongs only to the first cause, or God. He exists absolutely; and to suppose him not to exist, or not to have exited, is a contradiction. For the supposition itself is made by a confessedly contingent being; but a contingent being necessarily implies an absolute being, with as much certainty as an effect implies a cause; and consequently a first cause. 4. The first cause excepted, every other being, or mode of being, or nay event whatever, is only of hypothetical necessity. Any event is necessary, only on account of its relation to the first cause. This relation, or necessary connexion, between an event and the first cause, is either in the way of contrast, or in the way of dependence. 5. There are two things necessarily related to the first cause by way of contrast; passive power, which is a natural evil—if limited existence, dependence, and insufficiency, in their necessary tendency, may be so called—and sin, which is a moral evil; or something which, in point of obligation, ought not to be. 6. The other mode of necessary relation to the first cause, arising from the nature of things, is a that of dependence. Every contingent being and event must necessarily depend upon god, as an effect depends upon its cause. Nor is it conceivable without involving the grossest contradiction and absurdity, that any contingent being should continue to exist, any more that begin to exist, independent of the first cause. Sublata causa, tollitur effectus, is justly entitled to be called an axiom in metaphysical science. 7. It was before observed, that all necessity must arise either from the nature of things, or from the decree of God. What arises from the nature of things, as a consequence, has for its antecedent, either an efficient of a deficient cause. 8. A defect, no less that active efficiency, may be an antecedent, as founded in the nature of things, from whence a corresponding consequence must follow; but there is no defect in any antecedent but may be counteracted by a decree; so far counteracted, as that the defect shall not be an operative cause. 9. The purposes of God are a series of antecedents, from whence follow, by the very nature of things, corresponding good consequences, and good only; but the defect which is inseparable from created existence, considered in itself, is also a cause in the sense of an antecedent; otherwise a created existence would be as indefectible as the creating of first cause, which involves the most absurd consequences. 10. Defect is either natural or moral; and each arises from the nature of things, as contradistinguished to decree, but in a different manner. natural defect arises from the nature of things in the way of contrast to God’s natural perfections; which contrast forms the primary difference between creator and creature. 11. This natural defect is different from defectibility; for defectibility expresses, in strictness, an effect not a cause; a liableness to defection. But the question returns, what renders a creature liable to defect? To say, Its liableness to defect, or its defectibility, assigns no true cause: for the question returns as before, what makes it liable, what makes it defectible? 12. Perhaps there is no term less exceptionable, in order to prevent circumlocution, that PASSIVE POWER, to express that natural defect, which exists in a created nature as a contrast to the natural (not the moral) perfections of God. 13. Passive power is as inapplicable to God, as it is applicable to a creature; for natural perfection is as applicable to him, as natural imperfection is to us.—Therefore to say, that a creature is not he subject of passive power, is the same as to say, that it is perfect and indefectible in its nature as God is: which is the grossest pantheism—the deification of every creature, of every atom that exists. 14. All antecedents originate in either passive power or the divine decrees. From the former proceed, according to the nature of things, all evil consequences; from the latter, all good. 15. moral defect, is a contrast to the moral perfections, excellence, or holiness of God; and arises, as a necessary consequence—not from the divine decree as its antecedent, but —from the hypothetical nature of things; that is, passive power, IF not aided by a decretive interposition, and IF also united to liberty of choice in an accountable being. 16. The removal of the antecedent is the prerogative of the supreme Lord of nature: but IF the antecedent be not removed, that is, altered from what it was as to its causal influence, the consequences can no more be prevented, than the nature of things can be changed. 17. That nature of things, or that necessity of consequence, whereby the effect is infallibly connected with its cause, is nothing else but the essence of truth, emanating from the first cause, the god of truth, or the true god. 18. We now observe, that an event may be necessarily connected with its cause by a divine decree. If the divine will contemplate an end, and decree accordingly, it necessarily implies that the means, or the antecedents to this consequence, are decreed. 19. Hence, an event may be necessary, either because virtually determined by the divine will, be a series of antecedents; or because the nature of things operates without being affected, as to their causal influence, by decretive antecedents. 20. To suppose any sort, of any degree of defect, to be decreed, is absurd in different ways. It is contrary to an established axiom, that from good nothing but good can proceed - and it is absurd to impute that to a divine decree, which antecedently arises from the nature of things. 21. In reality, divine decrees (as before hinted) are nothing else than a wonderful chain or series of positions, which are so many antecedents, counteracting defects arising from the hypothetical nature of things. Whence it necessarily follows, that if there were no passive powers there could be no divine decrees. For if good, and only good, arose from the nature of things; the decree, which has good only for its object, would be superfluous, and therefore unworthy of divine volition. 22. Hence also, whatever event is in itself good, is an object of divine decree in its antecedent; and the event itself is connected with the decretive position by the very essence of truth. But whatever is in itself evil arises from the hypothetical nature of things not counteracted by decretive positions. 23. In God, his absolutely necessary, eternal, infinite, and unchangeable nature, is to be regarded as an antecedent; from which all possible happiness is the necessary consequence. Such an antecedent is no the result of mere, arbitrary, or decretive will, but of absolute necessity, but all antecedents in a creature, or every causal influence, of which good, or happiness, whether natural or moral, is the consequence, must be the positions of decretive will, as the only possible mode of securing a good result. 24. As is the antecedent, so is the consequent; for the connexion is formed by eternal truth. If therefore a good event —for instance, a virtuous of holy choice—be the consequent, the antecedent is a decretive position. 25. In reference to God, the proper and only ground of infallible certainty that his choice is good and praiseworthy, is the goodness of his nature. Were we to admit in thought the possibility of a defectible nature in him, in the same proportion must we admit a possible failure in the goodness of his choice. And in reference to a created being, the proper and only ground of certainty that his choice will be good, is the antecedent goodness of his nature or disposition. This alone is a sufficient causal influence; but the goodness of a creature’s disposition can be secured, as a ground of certainty, only by decretive influence of a nature corresponding with the nature of the effect. 26. From these principles and considerations, which can here be but briefly stated, as necessarily connected with their legitimate consequences, we infer, that God foresees all good, in every created being, in every mode, in every event, by the evidence of a decretive necessity; a necessity resulting form actual influx, or perpetual energy, in the position of antecedents, and the essence of truth connecting the causal influence with the effect. 27. From the same principles we learn, that God foresees or foreknows all evil—however blended with the good, as the different colours in a pencil of light are blended—in every being, and in every event where found, by that necessity which is hypothetical only; a necessity resulting form the nature of things left to their own causal influence; which influence, in any circumstances, will manifest itself in the way of contrast, of dependence or both united. 28. Again: Volitions are acts of the mind, and each voluntary act is compounded of a natural and moral quality. The natural quality of a voluntary act proceeds form decretive necessity; for there is nothing in it but what is good, decreed, and effected by the first cause. The moral quality of a voluntary act is either good or evil. 29. A voluntary act morally good, is altogether of decretive necessity, both as to its physical and moral quality; and is therefore foreknown because of decretive appointment and energy. But a voluntary act morally bad, is partly of decretive, and partly of hypothetical necessity, or that of consequence. 30. The physical quality of a voluntary act morally bad, is of decretive necessity, and is foreknown because foreappointed; but the moral quality of the same act, or its badness, is foreknown only by relation, connexion, or consequence. Thus deformity is the absence of beauty, and may be known by the standard of beauty from which it deviates. Weakness is the absence of strength, and may be known by relation. A shadow is known by the interception of rays, and may be known in the same manner. Darkness is caused by the absence of light, and may be known by the light excluded. 31. How the bad quality of a moral act may be foreknown by the evidence of relation, will further appear from the consideration of the nature of moral evil itself. For what is moral, evil, or sin, but what ought not to be, in point of moral obligation? Now for at all knowing, or foreknowing, what ought not to be, which is incapable of being decreed, the proper medium or evidence is the knowledge of what ought to be. 32. If therefore what ought to be, is known to the omniscient by constituted relations, or voluntary appointment; what ought not to be may be known by evident consequences.—W.

[125] See Dr. Whitby on the five Points, p. 48,49,50.

[126] Discourse on the five Points, p. 347, 360, 361, 377

[127] 303, 326, 329, and many other places.

[128] 371.

[129] 304, 361.

[130] Treatise of the Operations of the Spirit. 2 edit. P. 112,113.

[131] The subject of “obligation to obedience,” or moral obligation, though expressed in the title of this section, is not professedly handled by our author, either here or in any other part of the work. His professed object in this place is to prove that obligation to obey commands is not weakened by moral inability. But though this conclusion is established by many considerations, yet the nature and grounds of obligation are not pointed out, which might afford evidence WHY moral obligation is consistent with moral inability? The subject is confessedly profound; but, perhaps, the following series of remarks may contribute in some degree to assist our inquiries and to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion. 1. Obligation, if we regard the term, is a binding power, or an irresistible force; but, in reference to morality and voluntary actions, obligation is expressive of a hypothetical indispensable connexion between an antecedent and a consequent; or between an end proposed, and the means of obtaining it. Thus, if a moral agent would attain the end, he is obliged or bound indispensably, to use the required means. And, on the contrary, if a moral agent adopt a different antecedent form what is required, not only he shall not attain to the proposed consequent, but another consequent is to follow, indispensably connected with the antecedent actually adopted, by a necessity of consequences. Therefore, 1. The consequent or the end, which is proposed by the moral Governor, is always a supposed good; for it would be unworthy of a governor wise and good to propose any other, especially as the antecedent prescribed and required is indispensably connected with it. But if the connexion be broken by the free agent, by the adoption of an antecedent naturally connected with a different consequent, he then becomes naturally obliged, or forced, to sustain a proportionable evil. 2. In the system of moral government, it is the prerogative of the supreme Governor to propose the consequent of the indispensable connexion; and it is the part of the moral agent, who in the act of choice is left free, to choose the antecedent, which the governor has objectively furnished, and indispensably required. To this choice his is morally or hypothetically bound, yet is naturally free; and if the required choice be made, the good follows; but if not, the corresponding evil follows. For instance; if the forgiveness of sin be the consequent proposed, and repentance the antecedent required: the agent is morally bound to repent, but naturally free. If, however, he break through the moral bond, which is done by abusing his natural freedom, or continuing his wrong choice, forgiveness does not follow, but he stands exposed to the natural and threatened consequence of that wrong choice, or impenitence. 3. Hence it is obvious, that in the system of Providence, and the execution of all decretive designs, it is the prerogative of the Sovereign of the universe to establish the chain of all antecedents, and the consequents follow from the nature of things: but in the system of moral government, it is equally obvious, the reverse takes place; for here the supreme Governor proposes, and establishes objectively, the chain of consequents, while the moral agent, or the obligee, establishes optionally the antecedents; and as the actual choice of an antecedent is, such will be the actual consequence. When the moral agent chooses that antecedent which is required, or which is conformable to rectitude, the proposed consequent is obtained by the nature of things; but when that which is not required, or is not conformable to rectitude, is chosen for an antecedent, the evil consequence flows from the same nature of things, that is from the essence of eternal truth. 4. Required antecedents are either a state of mind, or voluntary actions; according as the particular consequent proposed may be. For example, if happiness be the end or consequent proposed, holiness, or a holy state of mind, is the mean, or antecedent required. If we would see the Lord, we must be holy, or pure in heart, by a new birth unto righteousness. If justification be the end proposed, believing is a mean required. For to us righteousness shall be imputed, IF we believe. If a subsequent favourable treatment of the obligee be the end proposed; obedience, or conformity to rule, is the mean required. 5. When an agent is said to be obliged in or by any thing or consideration, that thing or consideration in or by which he is obliged, is to be considered as the consequent proposed; and the state or act leading to it is the antecedent required. To be obliged in conscience, in duty, in law, in honour &c., expresses the end to be obtained by a certain state or conduct as the mean or antecedent required. Thus for instance, if conscience be satisfied, if duty be discharged, if law be conformed to, or if honour be secured, the required antecedent means must be adopted, or such acts must be performed. 6. If the required antecedents be not performed, it is manifest that the free agent has voluntarily established other antecedents, and the injurious consequents of these last flow (as before observed) from the nature of things; which consequents will be similar or dissimilar to those proposed by the supreme Governor, in proportion, as the antecedent established voluntarily by the agent, is similar or dissimilar to what was required. Hence we may see the true standard and measure of guilt, and of the different gradations of praise or blame. 7. Having considered the nature of moral obligation, let us now advert to the subject of it. This inquiry has more immediately for its object the qualifications of the moral agent, or those considerations whereby he stands obliged, in contradistinction to those beings in the universe that are not moral agents. An attentive and long-continued investigation of the subject has taught us, that they are included in these three particulars: (1.) A natural capacity of moral enjoyment. (2.) A sufficiency of suitable means. And (3.) A freedom form compulsion in the choice of means.—Whatever being is possessed of these qualifications is morally obliged; for he has a suitable ability to establish his own antecedents as required, in order that the proposed consequents may follow. 8. The first qualification is a natural capacity of moral enjoyments. This belongs to no being that is not a free agent; but to every being who is so, it inseparably belongs. This, more than any superior degree of reason, (however great, and however forcible the influence from that superiority.) constitutes the chief and most essential difference between men and brutes. That such a capacity is an indispensably requisite qualification, is clear. For free agency necessarily implies, a consequent moral advantage, or a natural good to be morally enjoyed, either explicitly proposed by the moral Governor, or fairly implied in the system of moral government; but this could not be proposed if there were no capacity of enjoyment as now stated. And this consequent advantage may properly be called the perpetual enjoyment of God, the chief good; because the chief end of all subordinate enjoyments, as well as of all obedience, and the sum total of all happiness, is the conscious enjoyment of divine favour and excellence. 9. The second qualification is a sufficiency of suitable means. This is indispensably requisite; for to require an end while the means are our of the agent’s reach, or physically out of his power, and that under the forfeiture of the governor’s displeasure, is of the very essence of in justice. But the divine Governor is “a God of truth, and without in iniquity: just and right is he.” And that these means ought to be sufficient and suitable in their own nature to attain the end, in other words, that the antecedents required to be adopted by the agent, are infallibly connected with the proposed consequent, is equally plain, for the same reason that there should be any means at all. For means in themselves insufficient and unsuitable have no true connexion with the end proposed; even as a law in itself bad, has morally no obliging power. 10. The third qualification is a freedom from constraint and compulsion in the choice of means, or in the voluntary establishment of antecedents. By “constraint” and “compulsion” we mean a physical interference with the free agent in his act of choice, in such a sense, as that the choice would not be the genuine effect of the motive; or, that the nature of the fruit should not correspond with the nature of the tree; but some extraneous force interposing would make the nature of the volition to be different form the nature of the mind or disposition, which other wise would be its immediate cause. 11. Divine influence is admitted to be requisite, in order to prepare the state of the mind for a right choice, even as a good tree is requisite for the good fruit; but this is no interference with the act of choice itself, nor has it the least tendency to break the connexion between motive and choice, or between the mind and its volition.—Such influence, indeed, forms one glorious link of the decretive chain, which the sovereign Governor has established as so many antecedents; and a right choice, in a free agent thus divinely influenced, or formed anew, is the unrestrained and unimpelled effect which follows by a necessity of consequence. In other words, no bad choice can possibly follow, but by a failure in the cause, the mind or disposition itself. 12. On this principle it is, that the sovereign Being himself never errs in his choice. The source from which the act of choice proceeds is perfectly good, (an infinitely holy nature,) and the connexion between this cause and the effect, which is a right choice, is infallibly and in the nature of things necessarily secure. Hence it is that we never admit, or suspect, an error in his choice, however great his freedom; and hence we have a firm ground of confidence, that the Judge of the whole earth will do right. 13. The three qualifications mentioned belong to man as a free agent; but we must not confound this idea with that of a subject of moral government. An infant may be the subject of government, both human and divine; but cannot be, properly speaking, a free agent. Hence it follows that the first of the qualifications mentioned alone is essential to constitute a subject of moral government, in a the most extensive sense of the term; but in order to constitute that class of subjects who are also free agents, the other two are essential. 14. When these three qualifications are found in any free agent, nothing more is requisite to constitute moral obligation. An end is proposed—means firmly connected with that end are afforded, and required to be used - these means are physically in the power of the agent - who is also free from all constraint and compulsion in his act of choice. If these qualifications are not sufficient morally to oblige, we are fully persuaded nothing can be sufficient.—As to the notion, that moral ability is necessary to constitute moral obligation, which is maintained alike by many Arminians and most Antinomians, )for extremes will sometimes meet,) our author abundantly demonstrates its futility and absurd contradictions.—W.

[132] Our author does not mean by “motive,” the object presented to the mind according to its intrinsic worth; but he takes into the account also the state of the mind itself, in reference to that object, according to which will be the appearance of it. Therefore, strictly speaking, the motive, as he has intimated at the commencement of this work, denotes the object as it stands in the view of the mind. If we do not maintain this distinction, the dispute will soon degenerate into a confused logomachy; and we should be forced, in defending this position—that the will is “necessarily determined by the strongest motive”—to adopt this, the most absurd of all conclusions, that the will of every man in the present state always chooses what is really best, or never errs in its elections. Whereas the world is full of errors and delusions; things the most excellent in themselves, are commonly rejected, and others the most worthless are preferred. But this could not happen, except on this principle, that the reality of worth differs, in those instances, from the appearance of it. In such cases, the difference is not in the object, but in the mind, when the choice takes place. For instance; suppose the blessed God in his true character as revealed in the Scriptures, the chief and an unchangeable good, be proposed to the contemplation of a wicked man, and his will rejects that good. Now, as the mind is incapable of rejecting a good, or of choosing an evil, as such; it is plain, that the proper and immediate cause of difference between the reality and the appearance of good, is in the state of the mind. Here lies the essence of an erroneous choice,—the will preferring an object which is apparently but not really preferable. Hence it follows irrefragably, that the state of the mind is the true and proper source of a right and wrong choice. This is it that influences the appearance of an object, so as to stand in the apprehension and practical judgement of the mind as worse or better than it really is. Therefore, the true state of the mind and the real state of the object of choice, united, are the genuine parents of the objective appearance in the mind, morally considered, or according to the qualities of good and evil; and this offspring—objective appearance— is what our author calls “the strongest motive.”—W.

[133] See this distinction of moral Inability explained in Part. Sect. IV.

[134] On the subject of Sincerity or Insincerity in prohibitions, commands, counsels, invitations, and the like, in cases where God foreknows that the event will not take place by the compliance of the moral agent addressed, we may remark a few particulars in addition to our author’s reasoning: 1. The sincerity of prohibitions and commands, counsels and invitations, and the like, is foundeth—not in the event of things as good or bad, or the knowledge of events, or the purpose that secures some, or the necessity of consequence from which others flow, nor in the moral ability of the agent, but—in the very nature and tendency of the things themselves which are prohibited, commanded, or proposed, as good or evil, either intrinsically, if of a moral nature, or else relatively, if of positive appointment. Therefore, 2. Whether the event be compliance or non-compliance, the command, or invitation, &c. is perfectly sincere. For, in truth, these are neither more nor less than testimonies respecting the goodness or badness of the things in question, in the sense before mentioned, and the consequent obligations of the agent respecting them, under a forfeiture either declared or implied. Consequently, 3. Insincerity can attach to a command only on supposition that the goodness or badness of the event were the ground of the signified will, while at the same time another event, diverse from that which actually takes place, was purposed by the same will. But, 4. Strictly speaking, no events, as such, are the objects of purpose; but rather, the purpose respects the good antecedents, whereby good events, following by the necessity of consequence, are infallibly secured. Besides, 5. It is highly absurd, as must appear from the nature of law and obligation, to suppose that the sincerity of legislative or inviting will should depend on the event of compliance or non-compliance. Surely the sincerity of a lawgiver is not affected, whether all obey, or only some, or even none. Legislation is a testimony with sanctions, that the thing prohibited is evil, or the thing commanded is good, to the party. Hence, 6. The consequent, whether good or bad, is objectively established, or hypothethically proposed, by the legislator: and the antecedent is supposed to be within the reach, or, physically considered, placed within the power, of the agent. Therefore, 7. The agent’s abuse of his physical power, in reference to the antecedent, constitutes the criminality, and the right use of it constitutes the virtue, of an action. And then alone is physical power, in fact, used aright when it is the instrument of moral rectitude, or a right state of mind. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so, every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree (as such ) cannot bring forth evil fruit; neither can a corrupt tree (as such ) bring forth good fruit.—W.

[135] The true reason why counsels, exhortations, &c. commonly called motives, are consistent with the doctrine of necessity held by Calvinists, may be here noticed, in addition to some hints before given. In order to this, we must guard against ambiguity in the word “motive,” which at one time is intended for the object exhibited, abstractedly considered: at another, the object concretively, as it stands in the view of the mind. The opposers of that necessity for which our author pleads must in order to make even a show of consistency, understand the word “motive” in the first of these acceptations. And if so, it is nothing marvellous that they should maintain the existence of a power in the human mind which can, on the one hand, successfully oppose the strongest possible motive; an don the other, be determined by a weaker, and even sometimes by the weakest motive. For how often is the most insignificant bauble preferred to infinite excellence! But consistent Calvinists do not understand the term in any such manner, but rather as an effect compounded of the state of the mind and the real object. And, seeing the object, in itself considered, is not changed by mental perception, the difference of the effect, or change of mental view, must arise from the mind itself. Hence one motive, in the Arminian sense, may produce, in the other acceptation of the term, a thousand different motives, according to the different mental states to which the object is presented. Therefore counsels, exhortations, invitations, &c. are most rationally employed by Calvinists; for that which determines the human will to action, is the motive as it is perceived, or that which results from an application of the object to the mind. According to them, without an object presented there can be no motive, anymore than there can be a motive without a mind to which it is presented. Without evangelical truth, and an evangelical mind, or disposition, there can be no evangelical determining motive. Consequently, if the mind be at all roused from ignorance and apathy, determining motives must be produced in it by a representation of objects, by counsels, exhortations, invitations, expostulations, &c. These will succeed, or fail of success, morally, according to the state of the mind. But as the agent is free from co-action, constraint, and compulsion, in the act of choosing, the true inferences—not that such use of the means is unsuitable or inconsistent, but—that here is clearly implied the great necessity, the rationality, and the perfect consistency of prayer to the God of grace, for success on the use of means. Paul may plant, and Apollos may water, but God giveth the increase. To influence the mind without moral motives, is the prerogative of God. All hearts are in his hand to form them as he pleases. If the tree be good by sovereign influence, or a new birth, the fruit of love to God and hatred to sin, holy fear, unfeigned faith, humble hope, &c. will follow, according to the objects presented. A crop will not follow without the union of two things, seed and soil. If both be good, the crop will be good, but not otherwise. That motive which determines the will, cannot arise from any other cause than the object and the disposition united. And then only can the determining motive be good, when it results from a good object applied to a good disposition, or state of mind. These things duly considered will sufficiently prove why Calvinists use counsels, exhortations, invitations, &c.—W.

[136] This may appear to some to be an identical proposition “The essence of a thing lies in its nature;” but it is not wholly so, and the whole of the proposition is exceedingly important, on account of the negative part, or the incidental proposition it contains, viz. The essence of virtue and vice lies not in their cause. A single consideration may be sufficient to show the truth and importance of one part of this last proposition. If the essence of virtue lay in its cause, how could the first cause, or the uncaused nature, be virtuous? If therefore the first cause be virtuous, or have the essence of virtue, as all atheists will allow, it is plain that essence must lie in the nature of that cause itself. Hence, as God is the standard of all moral excellence, created natures are morally excellent in proportion as they resemble him. And as virtue is an imitable excellence, and as good reason can be assigned why the resemblance should not hold in this particular, it is highly probably, a priori, that, in reference to created natures, the essence of their virtue lies not in its cause. To demonstrate this last, is the design of the present section. Again, as the essence of virtue lies not in its cause, so neither does the essence of vice lie in its cause. But the philosophical ground of this part of the general proposition demands more particular attention. And as this proposition—“the essence of vice lies not in its cause,” affects the whole system of morals, and indeed of theology, we beg leave to propose a series of remarks which, it is hoped, will cast some light on the subject. 1. Causes are of two kinds, and of two only, either positive or negative. Positive causes produce positive effects, from the first cause through all secondary causes: and these positive secondary causes are nothing else but so may decretive antecedents, which act physically and their consequences follow from the nature of things; even as number follows the repetition of units, or happiness results from true virtue. 2. The term “cause” is applied less properly to express a negative idea; for it expresses merely an antecedent of a consequent. For instance, if we say that a man cannot read because he is blind, or cannot walk because he has no legs, or cannot go to heaven because he does not love God, and the like; it is manifest that blindness, want of legs, and want of love to God, are “causes” only as antecedents are causes to their consequents, without positive influence. 3. Negative causes, though they have no positive operations in producing their consequents, are no less the ground of certainty than those causes, properly so called, which exist in physical operations. For the consequent follows the antecedent with equal certainty, whether the connexion be formed by decretive will and energy, as in all positive causes, or by the nature of things only, which is essential truth, as in all negative causes. 4. The cause of vicious acts, is a vicious disposition; in other words, it is the want, or the absence of a virtuous disposition. The essence of the vicious act, however, is not in the cause, or disposition. The vice of the disposition is one thing, and the vice of the act is another. For as the nature of the disposition, and the nature of the act, are different; so the vice, or the moral badness of the one, is a different badness from that of the other. The one and the other is a bad thing whatever be the cause, and irrespective of any. Hence, 5. Evil dispositions or acts should be denominated such, not from their cause but from their nature. Were it otherwise, personal fault, or blame, could never exist; for the vicious act would transfer the blame to the disposition, and the disposition to the cause of that; whereby persons would be free from blame, and this would attach to principles only. But to suppose a moral agent incapable of blameworthiness, which on the supposition would be the case, is a gross absurdity. It would be to suppose an accountable being, who at the same time can be accountable for nothing; and it would be to impute blame to principles, or a principle, which is incapable of moral agencies. 6. The cause of virtuous acts, or, if we may so speak, the soil in which they grow, is a previous inclination or disposition to good, before any actual choice takes place. This may be called a virtuous inclination, or disposition. But the original and predisposing cause of that, is divine energy, influx, or influence; in other words, an assimilating emanation form the holy nature and decretive will of God. 7. Nevertheless, this is not a good, or a virtue, attributable to man, until he is actually possessed of it, or it becomes his, as a quality of his nature. God, the Father of lights, from whom every good and perfect gift proceedeth, is the cause of that virtuous disposition; but while the virtue remained in the cause, and not in the man, it was no human virtue. Nor does the essence of human virtue lie in the communication itself, for this was the effect of divine will; but no will can alter the nature of virtue: therefore, the essence of virtue consists not in the cause, whether we understand by “cause”, the Will that communicates the virtuous disposition, or the communication itself. Consequently, the absence of virtue is so completely confined to the disposition of the agent, and the consequent acts, as to exclude every thing else that may be termed its cause. 8. The cause of vicious acts, whatever it be, is opposite to the cause of virtuous acts; for these acts have diametrically opposite effects. That vicious acts have a cause, as well as virtuous ones, cannot be denied by any reflecting person, for this plain reason, that there is nothing in the universality of things, beings, qualities, &c. but had a cause, either positive or negative, as before explained. Neither agency, liberty, nor nay thing else, considered as an effect, or a consequent, can exist without a cause, or antecedent. The denial of this, and universal scepticism, are the same thing. Then all reasoning, and all common sense, vanish. Then body and spirit, cause and effects, good and evil, &c. are huddled up in endless confusion, without either first or last, great or small, order or proportion. 9. The original, predisposing cause of a vicious disposition, is the very opposite of the original, predisposing cause of a virtuous disposition. This last, it has been shown, is divine energy, which is a positive cause; the other, the opposite of this, is a negative cause. The cause of good, as before observed, is a cause properly so called, in the way of physical influence; but the cause of evil is called “a cause” improperly, as it implies no physical influence, but only stands as an antecedent to a consequent; from which however the consequent may be inferred with as much certainty as if the influence were physical and mechanical. Whether you suppose positive quantities, or negative quantities, consequences are equally certain, it is no less true that 5-2=3, than 1-33=6. Whether you say, If the sun were not, it would cause darkness; or say, If the sun shine, it will cause light; the difference is only in the nature of the cause, as either positive or negative, not in the certainty of the consequence. 10. It would be very absurd and contradictory to say that the cause of vice is vicious. For that would be the same as to say, that a thing was before it existed. To be vicious is to have vice; and for this to be the cause of vice, is for it to be the cause of itself, or self-caused, which is absurd. It is therefore impossible that the cause of vice should be vicious; consequently the essence of vice is no where but in its own proper nature, to the exclusion of every cause whatever. And yet, as it is an effect, it must have a cause. 11. The principle question to be determined, in this investigation, is, What is precisely the original, predisposing, negative cause of a vicious disposition? The answer is plain and short; it is that property of a creature which renders it absolutely dependent for its being and well-being. Or, it is that property which is the very opposite too independence, self-sufficiency, and immutability: and therefore is a property peculiar to a creature, and cannot belong to God. 12. Nor can this be said to be an actually existing property form eternity; since it cannot belong to God, and nothing, the only alternative, has no property. It is not therefore the Manichean eternal evil principle, if by this be meant any thing actually existing, as coeval with a good principle. Good is a principle positively eternal; but what we speak of is a mere negative principle, and owes its existence as a property to a created nature; and were every creature annihilated, this property would also cease to be. 13. But what shall we call this principle, property, or predisposing cause of vice? Shall we call it defectibility, defect, limitation, or imperfection of existence? Not the first; for the question would return, What makes a creature defectible? Not the second; for the term is ambiguous, as there are several kinds of defect, natural and moral, and therefore, as the word is of common use, and of frequent occurrence, it would require perpetual explanations. Not the third, or the fourth; for the same reason. A term therefore not ambiguous, and sufficiently expressive, should be employed; as we employ technical terms to express a specific object. For this purpose, no term, perhaps, is less exceptionable, or more suitable, than passive power; for it is free from ambiguity, and is sufficiently expressive of the idea already explained. The idea of passivity is clearly implied in the name, as in the thing; and the term power seems preferable to property, or quality, because less ambiguous, and yet more expressive to convey the intended idea of metaphysical influence of cause and effect. 14. To which we may add, That “passive power” is by no means a new coined expression; but has often been used to express the very idea to which it is here applied. Thus, above a century and a half ago, that eminently pious and profoundly learned divine, Theophilus Gale, in his “Court of the Gentiles,” says: “The root and origin of all creatural dependence, is the creature’s passive power, and God’s absolute dominion over it. - Now all limits as to nature and essence speak a mixture of nihility, passive power and dependence resulting therefrom; whence Damascene adds, ‘The Deity only is impassible;’ namely, because exempt form nihility, passive power, and dependence. This nihility or nothingness of the creature is the same with its passive power either physic or metaphysic, natural or obediential; whereby it is limited, and confined to such or such a degree of entity, existence, and operation.” (Court of Gent. Part IV. B. ii. Ch. xi. 4.) 15. Now that the essence of vice consisteth not in this property is plain, in that passive power is essential to a creature, which vice neither is nor can be. It is the soul in which vice grows, and without which it could not grow, or have existence, but is not itself vicious; otherwise we should be forced to seek the cause of that cause in perpetual retrogradation, and move from one difficulty to another into endless absurdity. The predisposing cause of vice, therefore, is passive power which in itself is not vicious, or morally evil. But how moral evil came to exist, and what is its true origin, will be more conveniently considered in a subsequent part of this work. 16. As the essence of the virtue and vice of disposition and acts lies not in their cause, so neither does it lie in their effects; that is, dispositions and acts are not to be denominated virtuous or vicious on account of their effects or consequences, such as their being productive of happiness or misery. For as the properties of any thing must be different from those of its cause, however similar, so must those properties differ from their effects. The immediate effect of virtue is—not happiness to the individual, for instance, but—that the agent is approvable or praiseworthy. But were the essence of virtue to consist in “its tendency to ultimate happiness,” as some have affirmed, immediate approbation and praise could not be safely given to any individual act or disposition, as its relation to ultimate happiness could not be ascertained but by the final event. If the essence of the virtue or vice were not in the act or disposition, but to be denominated from its effects, many other absurdities would follow. For instance, 17. That supposition, the supreme excellence of Jehovah would not be approvable and praiseworthy on its own account, or its intrinsic excellency, but only because of its effects and consequences. On that principle, to hate God would be nothing bad, it would have no intrinsic demerit; or to love God would be nothing good, nothing in itself praiseworthy, were it not for consequences. Which is not only absurd, but blasphemous also and shocking. 18. That sentiment is evidently founded on the supposition that every thing, property, quality, and event, is the fruit of divine will; and therefore that every thing must be equally good in itself, though relatively good or bad to the individual: even as matter and motion, and their laws, are equally good in themselves, but not relatively so to the individuals who suffer from them. But this is a great mistake, as it confounds things totally distinct in their nature, such as positive and negative causes, natural necessity and moral certainty. Decretive positions and their consequences are one ground of certainty; negative causes and their consequences are another; therefore, from the certainty of result in the divine view we cannot rightly infer that all results are decreed. Decretive positions comprehend neither negative causes, nor the nature of things. For an intelligent being to love God, is agreeable to the nature of things; it is what ought to be independent of any decretive position, or legal demand in reference to the case. In like manner, for an intelligent being to hate God is a voluntary contradiction to the nature of things—or the essence of eternal truth which is above all will, or is not founded in will—as well as to constitued law. Again, 19. To deny the “intrinsic merit and demerit of voluntary actions independent on their consequences,” as some do, (Belaham’s Elements, p. 309.) is to deny the nature of things; and this is nothing less than an attempt to divide eternal unity, to give the lie direct to essential truth, and to convert the first uncaused essence in to contradictory contingencies. The nature of things is nothing else, radically, but the nature of God, which is essential truth as well as essential goodness. Decretive positions, or an arbitrary constitution of things by divine will, therefore can no more alter the intrinsic merit or demerit of actions, affections, habits, or characters, then divine will can alter the character of essential truth, or choose real contradictions. Moreover, 20. Ultimate happiness is the effect or consequence of virtue as a reward. Now to make the merit or excellence of virtue to depend on ultimate happiness, while happiness is the reward of virtue, is most inconsistent; it is to reward for nothing rewardable. If virtue be not of intrinsic worth, it must be a mere moral nothing, as to rewardableness, and therefore ultimate happiness would be a reward for a mere moral nothing; that is, happiness would be no reward, which is contradictory. 21. As to vice, its consequence is punishment. If indeed this consequence were the mere effect of arbitrary positions, or sovereign appointment: if it were the plan of God first to cause the existence of vice, and then to punish the subject of it, as what the good of the whole required, there would be great plausibility in the sentiment we oppose. But the assumption itself is fundamentally erroneous. It confounds hypothetical antecedents, as the whole of decretive plans may be termed, with that eternal truth which connects them with their consequences. To suppose the hatred of God, for instance, to have no intrinsic demerit in it, or that it is bad only as dependent on its consequences; is the same as to say, it is agreeable to the nature of things, comformable to eternal truth, that God should be hated, and therefore that he must approve of it—only to the agent it is attended with bad consequences. That is, on the supposition, God has appointed misery as the consequent, for doing nothing that is in itself bad; yea for doing what is perfectly innocent, agreeable to the nature of things, comformable to eternal truth, and acceptable to God, as every thing which he appoints must be. Whether such a sentiment be nearest a-kin to “profound philosophy” or to something else, let the competent reader judge.—W.

[137] Scrip. Doc. Of Original Sin, p. 180. 3d Edit.

[138] Were the human mind, indeed, not the subject of either passive power, on the one hand, as the predisposing cause of vice; or of divine holy influence, on the other, as the predisposing cause of real virtue; and were the determining motive what some have represented it to be, the object itself, irrespective of the changeable state of mind perceiving it; the objection, that “a necessary agent is a plain contradiction,” or, in other words, that man is no proper agent, would be unanswerable. For the rank and place of man in creation, and his relative circumstances in the arrangement of providence, being the result of decretive appointment, if he himself were not liable to any change but by the same appointment, it would follow, that if the objects themselves determined him to choose, and to choose always according to the strongest motive, his very volitions in the acts themselves would be necessitated decretively, to the exclusion of all hypothetical or moral possibility of failure; and therefore could never be erroneous, any more than the first cause could act erroneously. On such principles, moral evil, vice or fault, could have no existence. No effect cold be otherwise than good, amiable, and perfectly innocent; a moral possibility of failure being excluded by natural necessity. For the volition itself to be so necessitated, and not in a moral or hypothetical manner only, is the same thing as giving it no opportunity of choice or preference, or constraining it to choose one way by a settled purpose, with a natural impossibility of acting otherwise. But if every act of man be thus the result of settled purpose, why should he be blamed for any one act whatever? He does nothing but what he is constrained, or decretively necessitated to perform, the contrary being rendered naturally impossible; and if he deserves no praise, he can incur no blame, any more than a clock for not keeping time. Such a necessary agent would be indeed a plain contradiction. There is much reason to apprehend that some philosophical necessarians have no better notion of agency than that which Mr. Chubb charges, and justly charges, with “a plain contradiction.” For those who hold the sentiment, that every act, even as to its moral quality, and every event, are of decretive appointment, in subserviency to ultimate good, must allow, in order to be tolerably consistent, that the Supreme Being is “the only proper agent in the universe;” ( Belsham’s Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, p. 254.) and thus reduce human agency, and things else called agency in a creature, to an appointed necessary choice, however odious in its nature, mischievious in its tendency, or painful in experience. Thus, according to them, God is the only proper agent in all foul crimes and horrid blasphemies, on earth and in hell! They have a right to define their terms, and to say what they mean by agency in God, or in a creature, and to state their hypothesis accordingly; but others also have a right to deduce the genuine consequences of that hypothesis, and to show wherein its error lies.—The design of these notes is not to excite a spirit of unprofitable controversy, but to assist the serious inquirer in detecting errors and recognizing truths of radical importance in ethics and theology; and, it is hoped, that to promote these ends the following observations may conduce. 1. It is granted, that in reference to natural acts, the Supreme Being is the “only proper agent in the universe,” as they all spring from his energy. In this respect he is the first cause of all causes, efficiently; and the description of the post is philosophically just: he “Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze, Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees, Lives through all life, extends through all extent, Spreads undivided, operates unspent.” POPE 2. It is also granted, that, in all acts morally good, the created agent is the subject of necessity several ways. He has an active nature from decretive necessity, which it is not in his power to alter. He is also, accordingly, compelled to some act of choice, from the activity of his nature. He is, moreover, the subject of physical influence of a holy and purifying nature, whereby the goodness of his choice is infallibly secured; and without which there could be no assignable ground of certainty that any action would be morally good. There is also a necessity of connexion, arising from the nature of things, or the essence of truth, first between the disposition and the act, or that the act will be of the same nature, morally considered, with the disposition from which it proceeds; and secondly, between the act and the end, or consequent, which is happiness. 3. It is moreover allowed, that in all acts morally evil, the soul is passive in reference to that necessity of dependence which is inseparable from a created nature, which may be called passive power; without which the existence of moral evil would be impossible. This necessity also arises form the nature of things, not from decree; for no decree can alter its existence, (though it may, and actually does, counteract it.) any more than it can alter the state of a creature from dependence into independence on the first cause. A creature without passive power involves the most palpable absurdities. For its very definition is, “that property in a creature whereby it differs essentially form the independence, self-sufficience, and indefectibility of the Creator;” and to deny it, is to suppose that a creature may be independent, self-sufficient, and indefectible - that in these respects the creature and the Creator are on a par—that a necessary and a contingent being are the same, in those very things which constitute their essential difference! Were it not for this property in an agent, he could never sin; for all his acts would be physically necessary, without any hypothetical medium, or moral alternative. 4. He is a moral agent, whose volitions might have been otherwise than they are, if the motives, and consequently the state of his mind, had been otherwise. But to suppose that his volitions might have been otherwise than they are, the motives and the state of the mind being the same, would be to make him in his volitions the sport of chance, or a mere non-entity. 5. He then is a moral agent who has, in reference to volition, a moral alternative, or a hypothetical possibility of a different choice. Where this alternative, or this possibility, is not, there the agent (if he may be so called) is not morally obliged, and therefore is not accountable. 6. But if so, where does the ground of such an alternative lie? It lies in the agent’s mind, or the disposition whence the volition springs, and whence its character is derived. If God influence the mind so as to make it, in a given degree, to resemble his own moral nature; in that degree would the choice made be morally good. But if passive power be not counteracted by such influence, (which being gracious, God is not bound in equity to do.) in any given degree, the nature of things, the essence of truth; connects, in a corresponding degree, the state of mind with the volition. 7. Hence it is plain, that moral influence, as such, effects nothing certain; but always requires a previous state of mind, in order to insure a certainty of good effect; and that previous state of mind is effected by no other possible means but a physical energy or agency, producing assimilation. There must be a virtuous mind before a virtuous choice; the quality of the act is derived from the agent. 8. One thing, which has been a source of much obscurity and confusion in reference to moral agency, is the supposition that the mind is equally free, in all respects, when choosing good and when choosing evil; in other words, that the one volition and the other becomes morally certain, form the same sort of necessity. But this is not the real case. Indeed the necessity of connexion between the previous state of mind and the corresponding volition, is the same; for it is, in each case, nothing else but the nature of things; but that necessity which effects a state of mind previous to good volitions, is as different from the other necessity which effects a state of mind previous to volitions morally evil, as light is from darkness. They proceed from opposite quarters, and operate in contrary directions. A holy disposition is generated by decretive holy influence; the other disposition (which ought not however to be called unholy) proceeds form the hypothetical nature of things. Such a disposition, though no morally vicious, yet generates vice in union with free agency. 9. It is highly worthy of remark, that though a good volition must proceed from a good heart, morally considered; yet a bad volition does not, originally and necessarily, proceed from a morally bad heart. The reason is, that the one state of heart proceeds form God., from his decretive holy will; the other proceeds form passive power, which is only a natural evil, and not a moral. Besides, were the disposition which immediately precedes a bad volition necessarily, or in a every case, evil, in a moral sense, either moral evil could have no place at all in the universe, no origin whatever, or else it must be the same as passive power. But passive power is a contrast, not to the moral perfections of God, but his natural; and has, when alone, no moral quality. And, seeing it belongs as a property to every creature, as such, were it any thing morally evil, moral evil would be essential to the very being of every creature; which is absurd. 10. Hence it is plain, that freedom is experienced in a higher sense or a greater degree, in bad volitions, than in good ones in such a sense, and to such a degree, as to justify this mode of expression. That man is necessitated to good, but free to evil. This however may need some explanatory qualification; for he is not so necessitated to good, as not to be morally or hypothetically free; nor so free to evil as not to be subject to a necessity of consequence. He who acts or chooses amiss without constraint, compulsion, or interfering voluntary force in that act, notwithstanding his passive power, is properly a free agent; for in the moral quality of the act, there is properly and strictly no will concerned but his own. But he who acts or chooses aright, is subject to a physical, decretive necessity, as to his disposition and a physical concourse of divine energy in the natural act of the will. He is indeed morally free, inasmuch as his volition might have been of a different, yea, of an opposite moral quality, if the state of his mind had been different. Hence it is evident, that in a good will, choice, or act, man is an agent in a less proper or secondary sense; but in a bad will, choice, or act, man is an agent, a moral agent, a free agent, in the most proper and strict sense. And in the production of an act morally good two wills are concerned, that of the agent, and the decretive will of God; in that of evil, only one, the agent’s own will. 11. If the Supreme Being is the only proper agent in the universe, either moral agency is no proper agency, or else man is not a moral agent; and if so, his is not accountable, and has no concern in religion or morals. Besides, if God be the only proper agent in the universe, how come there to exist evil deeds? God’s agency is good, else we have no evidence that he is a good being; but there are in the world evil deeds proceeding from evil minds, which common sense and universal consent allow, and the nature of the thing proves, to be properly evil agencies; consequently man is an agent, a moral agent, properly so called. 12. If there be no proper agent in the universe but the supreme Being, there is no evil in the nature of bad volitions, but only in their effects. Sin, on that supposition, is not bad in its own nature, but only injurious in it effects on the sinner. Sin is not to be hated, it seems, on its own account, as odious, but only shunned as dangerous. But as this must arise, according to the system of its abettors, from a sovereign appointment, it follows, that millions of beings are by this very appointment, doomed to the greatest sufferings in the universe, for that in which they had no proper agency—no possible alternative! Where is equity, of benevolence? The only clue out of this labyrinth, and out of many others formed by writers on human agency, is, we are fully persuaded , a right view of passive power, in its nature, origin, and tendency, in conjunction with a morally or hypothetically free choice. W.

[139] This distinction is of considerable moment. The soul is passive, for instance, in reference to that necessity of dependence which is inseparable from a created nature; and when the subject of providential energy in natural acts; and also when the subject of that divine influence which purifies and enables the mind, and whereby holy effects are secured; and in all these respects it is passive at the very time that it is active in its choice or preference. In other words, the mind is necessitated in some respects; as, to exist, to think, to will, to suffer, or to enjoy; at the same instant that it is free in other respects, as, from contingence, (understanding thereby an event without any cause,) and from compulsions, or physical necessity in its acts as moral.—W.

[140] It is here argued, on supposition that not all propensity implies moral necessity, but only some very high degree; which none will deny.

[141] Whitby on the five Points. Edit.3. p. 325, 326, 327.

[142] Dr. Gill, in his Answers to Dr. Whitby. Vol. III. p. 183, &c.

[143] “It might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the Supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza’s purpose; for this is a necessity, not of nature and of fate, but of fitness and wisdom: a necessity consistent with the greatest freedom, and most perfect choice. For the only foundation of this necessity is such an unalterable rectitude of will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise being to act foolishly.” dark’s Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. Edit. 6. p. 64. “Though God is a most perfect free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and wisest in the whole. The reason is evident; because perfect wisdom and goodness are as steady and certain principles of action, as necessity itself; and an infinitely wise and good Being, indued with the most perfect liberty, can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a necessary agent can act contrary to the necessity by which it is acted; It being as great an absurdity and impossibility in choice, for Infinite Wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in nature, for absolute necessity to fail of producing its necessary effect. There was, indeed, no necessity in nature, that God should at first create such beings as he has created, or indeed any being at all; because he is. in himself, infinitely happy and all-sufficient. There was, also, no necessity in nature, that he should preserve and continue things in being, after they were created; because he would be self-sufficient without their continuance, as he was before their creation. But it was fit and wise and good, that Infinite Wisdom should manifest, and Infinite Goodness communicate itself: and therefore it was necessary, in the sense of necessity I am now speaking of, that things should be made at such a time, and continued to long, and indeed with various perfections in such degrees, as Infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it wisest and best that they should.” Ibid. p. 112, 113. “It is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination.—This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the further we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment, of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side.—It is as much a perfection, that desire or the power of preferring should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will: and the certainer such determination is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free. This very end of our freedom being, that we might attain the good we choose; and, therefore, every man is brought under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to do; else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man’s will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the same time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts, before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have and not have it, will and not will it, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted.—If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good. The freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.—But to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me ask. Would any one be a changeling, because he is less determined by wise determination, than a wise man? Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man’s self? If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, mad men and fools are the only free men. Yet, I think, nobody would choose to be mad, for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already.” Locke Hum. Und. Vol. I. Edit 7. p. 215. 216. “This Being, having all things always necessarily in view, must always and eternally will, according to his infinite comprehension of things; that is. must will all things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge must direct the will without error. Here, then, is the origin of moral Necessity; and that is, really, of freedom.—Perhaps it may be said, when the Divine Will is determined, from the consideration of the eternal aptitudes of things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impelled, if that were possible. But it is unskilfulness, to suppose this an objection. The great principle is once established, viz. That the Divine Will is determined by the eternal reason and aptitudes of things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more strong and necessary this determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be: it is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose will and power are constantly, immutably determined, by the consideration of what is wisest and best; instead of a surd Being, with power, but without discerning and reason. It is the beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as fate itself, with all the advantage of reason and goodness.—It is strange, to see men contend, that the Deity is not free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a man is allowed still the perfecter being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is determined by reason and truth.” Inquiry into the Nature of the Hum. Soul Edit. 3. Vol. II. p. 408, 404.

[144] “If all created beings were taken away, all possibility of any mutation or succession of one thing to another, would appear to be also removed. Abstract succession in eternity is scarce to be understood. What is it that succeeds? One minute to another, perhaps, velut unda supervenit undam. But when we imagine this, we fancy that the minutes are things separately existing. This is the common notion; and yet it is a manifest prejudice. Time is nothing but the existence of created successive beings, and eternity the necessary existence of the Deity—Therefore, if this necessary Being hath no change or succession in his nature, his existence must of course be unsuccessive. We seem to commit a double oversight in this case; first, we find succession in the necessary nature and existence of the Deity himself: which is wrong, if the reasoning above be conclusive. And then we ascribe this succession to eternity, considered abstractedly from the eternal Being; and suppose it, one known not what, a thing subsisting by itself, and flowing, one minute after another. This is the work of pure imagination, and contrary to the reality of things. Hence the common metaphorical expressions. Time runs apace, let us lay hold on the present minute, and the like. The philosophers themselves mislead us by their illustration. They compare eternity to the motion of a point running on for ever, and making a trace less infinite line. Here the point is supposed a thing actually subsisting, representing the present minute; and then they ascribe motion or succession to it: that is, they ascribe motion to a mere nonentity. to illustrate to us a successive eternity, made up of finite successive parts. If once we allow an all-perfect mind, which hath an eternal, immutable, and infinite comprehension of all things, always (and allow it we must) the distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to such a mind.—In a wont, if we proceed step by step, as above, the eternity or existence of the Deity will appear to be Vitæ interminabilis, tota, simill et perfecta possessio; how much soever this may have been a paradox hitherto.” Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. Vol. ii 409, 410, 411. Edit. 3.

[145] “For men to have recourse to subtilties in raising difficulties, and then complain, that they should be taken off by minutely examining these subtilties.

[146] On the five Points, p. 361.

[147] Ibid. p. 486.

[148] On the five Points, p. 302, 305.

[149] Grotius, as well as Beza. observes, NOT ENGLISH must here signify decree; and Elsner has shown that it has that signification in approved NOT ENGLISH writers. And it is certain NOT ENGLISH signifies one given up into the hands of an enemy:”— Dodd. in Loc.

[150] “As this passage is not liable to the ambiguities which some have apprehended in Acts ii. 23. and iv. 28. (which yet seem on the whole to be parallel to it, in their most natural construction,) I look upon it as an evident proof, that these things are, in the language of Scripture, said to be determined or decreed (or exactly bounded and marked out by God, as the word (NOT ENGLISH ) most naturally signifies) which he sees in fact will happen, in consequences of his volitions, without any necessitating agency; as well as those events, of which he is properly the author.” Dodd, in Loc.

[151] Here are worthy to be observed some passages of a late noted writer, of our nation, that nobody who is acquainted with him, will suspect to be very favourable to Calvinism. “It is difficult, says he, to handle the necessity of evil in such a manner, as not to stumble such as are not above being alarmed at propositions which have an uncommon sound. But if philosophers will but reflect calmly on the matter, they will find, that consistently with the unlimited power of the supreme cause, it may be said, that in the best ordered system, evils must have place.”—Turnbull’s Principles of Moral Philosophy, p. 327, 328. He is there speaking of moral evils, as may be seen. Again the same author, in his second vol. entitled, Christian Philosophy, (p. 35.) has these words: “If the Author and Governor of all things be infinitely perfect, then whatever is, is right; of all possible systems he hath chosen the best: and. consequently, there a no absolute evil in the universe.—This being the case, all the seeming imperfections or evils in it are such only in a partial view; and. with respect to the whole system, they are goods. Ibid. 37. “Whence then comes evil, is the question that hath, in all ages, been reckoned the Gordian knot in philosophy. And, indeed, if we own the existence of evil in the world in an absolute sense, we diametrically contradict what hath been just now proved of God. For if there be any evil in the system, that it not good with respect to the whole, then is the whole not good, but evil: or, at best, very imperfect: and an author must be as his workmanship is; as is the effect, such is the cause. But the solution of this difficulty is at hand; That there is no evil in the universe. What! Are there no pains, no imperfections? Is there no misery, no vice in the world? or are not these evils? Evils indeed they are; that is, those of one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are equally hurtful, and abominable: but they are not evil or mischievous with respect to the whole?” Ibid. p. 42. ’‘But he is. at the same time, said to create evil, darkness. confusion; and yet to do no evil, but to be the author of good only. He is called the “Father of lights,” the Author of “every perfect and good gift, with whom there is no variableness nor shadow of turning.” who “tempteth no man,” but “giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not” And yet. by the prophet (Isa. xlv. 7.) he is introduced saying of himself, “I form light and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord, do all these things.” What Is the meaning, the plain language of all this, but that the Lord delighteth in goodness, and (as the scripture speaks) evil is “his strange work?” He intends and pursues the universal good of his creation: and the evil which happens, is not permitted for its own sake, or through any pleasure in evil, but because it is requisite to the greater good pursued.

[152] Whitby on the five Points, Edit. 2. 300, 305, 309.

[153] Certainly it is not less absurd and unreasonable, to talk of God’s Will and Desires being truly and properly crossed, without his suffering any uneasiness, or any thing grievous or disagreeable, than it is to talk of something that may be called a revealed Will, which may, in some respect, be different from a secret purpose, which purpose may be fulfilled, when the other is opposed.

[154] From the whole strain of our author’s defence of his principles, in reference to the existence of sin in the universe, though there are many excellent remarks interspersed, and sound reasoning as far as his data would admit, yet he is evidently embarrassed; makes concessions which his general principles of moral necessity did not require, and shelters himself under covers that afford him in reality no effectual protection. To say, that the existence of sin is only a common difficulty, which belongs to every hypothesis—that though God is the author of sin, in some sense, yet he is not the agent, therefore the phrase should be disliked and rejected that though God wills the event of sin, yet he wills it not as an evil, but for excellent ends—that the events of moral evils are disposed by wisdom—that God may be the orderer and disposer of moral evil, which in the agent is infinitely evil, but in the orderer of it no evil at all—that in order to a thing being morally evil it must be unfit and unsuitable, or of a bad tendency, or from an evil disposition; but that in willing the event of sin neither can be attributed to God—that if a wise and good man knew, with absolute certainty, that it would be best, all things considered, there should be moral evil, he might choose that it should be so—that the reason why he might not order it, if he were able, would not be because he might not desire, but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to him—and that, in the language of Turnbull, “there is no Eric in the universe,—no absolute evil; sins are evils only in a partial view, but with respect to the whole system they are not evil or mischievous, but goods,” &c. to say these things, and more of a similar cast, is not calculated to satisfy a mind that wants the best evidence which the nature of the case will admit; and we strongly suspect, from his manner of writing, that our author’s own mind was not satisfied with the solution which he has attempted. In former notes we have had occasion only to explain principles adopted; or to point out others either more evident, or more radical, on which those of the author were founded, or with which they stood inseparably connected. But at the close of the present section we feel ourselves obliged to attempt, at least, the rectification of his principles; or perhaps more properly, to point out other principles, which, we conceive, are attended with no such embarrassment, are exposed to no self-contradiction, and which represent the Great Supreme in a much more amiable light The task is indeed arduous; but let it not be thought impossible; nor let the imperfection of language be confounded with the inadequacy of principles. And while we solicit the candour of the reader—whereby he will be prepared to make such allowances as the nature of the subject requires, be prevented from drawing hasty conclusions of the impracticability of bringing the subject of inquiry to a satisfactory issue, or of presumption in attempting it—we no less demand a strictness of examination. The real inquirer after truth, the christian divine, and the moral philosophers, should be solicitous, not to have the “last word,” in controversy, but to make all possible advances in ascertaining the genuine grounds of acknowledged truths, in discovering radical principles, and in ascertaining their just bearings and tendencies. 1. The true point of inquiry is—not whether there be moral evil, or whether God be just? but—how the actual existence of sin, or moral evil, in the universe, is to be reconciled with the moral perfections and character of God? Therefore, the thing wanted is a middle term, or argumentative medium, whereby it may be shown that this proposition is true, viz. There is no real inconsistency between the existence of sin and the moral perfections of God. 2. We may therefore consider the following propositions as first principles: axioms. There does exist in the universe moral evil. II. God is infinitely free from injustice, unholiness, and all imperfections. Hence. corollary. There is no real inconsistent between the existence of moral evil and the moral perfections of God. 3. Now the question returns. What is the best evidence that there is no such inconsistency? Those who are satisfied with these plain propositions the axioms, and corollary, may have the evidence of faith, than there is no inconsistence between the subject and predicate of the last proposition. They may know so much of God as to be assured, that the existence of sin in the world is no impeachment of the moral character of the Most High. For such evidence it behoves us to be thankful. Millions are now in heaven, who enjoyed no other evidence while on earth than that of faith. But this is no sufficient reason why those who have opportunity should make no further inquiries into the subject. Some, indeed, suppose, that no rational evidence is in the present state attainable by man. But why any should so conclude it is difficult to say, except it be, that they wish to make their own minds the standard of all others, or their own attainments the ne plus ultra of moral philosophy. Such persons are not likely to acknowledge or perceive the real evidence, on supposition that it is laid before them, as their minds will be strongly prejudiced against all reasoning on the subject 4. One thing, however, is incontrovertible, as necessarily connected with the axioms, that the existence of moral evil, and the spotless and infinitely excellent moral character of God. are perfectly consistent; and therefore there must be somewhere good evidence of it And another thing is equally plain, that the brighter the evidence we have of the truth of the proposition which asserts the consistency of the two axioms, the more will be our acquaintance with God’s real character, and the real nature of sin, which all must allow to be advantageous. To which we may add; that increased evidence of such a proposition is far from being injurious, may be further inferred from this consideration, that the higher any beings rise in holiness and happiness, the more clear will be that evidence to their view. 5. The terms of the question are so plain, and so generally understood, that it is scarcely necessary to notice them; we may, however, briefly observe, that moral evil is what stands in direct opposition to the moral character of God; and that this latter includes universal rectitude, or holiness, and perfect benevolence. Therefore, postulate. Whatever is perfectly consistent with universal rectitude, and perfect benevolence, is consistent with the moral perfections of God. The reader will observe, that what is asserted of rectitude and benevolence, is different; the one is said to be universal and the other perfect only. Every attribute of Jehovah is in ITSELF both perfect and universal; but not relatively so. Thus his rectitude is both perfect in itself, and universal with respect to its object: but his benevolence, however infinitely perfect, is restricted as to its objects, both in extent and in degree. And this restriction is necessary two ways: 6. First, the objects of benevolence, at least in this world, compose a system; and every system, whether natural or moral, implies a subordination and comparative superiority of parts; therefore the very idea of a systematic whole implies a restriction of benevolence as to extent and degree. 7. Secondly, the exercise of benevolence is an exercise of will; and the exercise of will implies diversity of objects, and a preference of some, rather than others, to occupy the more excellent parts of the whole system; so that perfect universality, or a strict equality of benevolence, without a distinguishing preference, is necessarily excluded by the very nature of benevolence in exercise. 8. Divine benevolence, therefore, admits of gradations, from the smallest degree conceivable to the utmost extent of the system; while rectitude admits of no such degree. Were we to attempt an illustration of so abstracted a subject by mental images, we might say. that rectitude in its exercise towards the creatures, may be compared to a plain surface as widely extended as the universe, of infinitely perfect polish, and without a flaw in any part. Hence, in its exercise. It is universal as its objects; and can no more admit of degrees, than a perfect polish can admit of flaws. On the contrary, benevolence may be compared to a cone, in an inverted form, the vertex of which is in contact with a point of that plane, and which, from the least possible degree, is capable of rising at sovereign pleasure, in its exercise towards the universe, to such a height, as that the base of it may be, or may not be, of equal extent with the plane below. 9. From just views of benevolence we may infer, that its exercise is purely free, and undeserved by the creature; being the fruit of will, choice, and sovereign pleasure. The absence of it, with respect to creatures, implies no flaw in perfect rectitude. Every degree of benevolence, from the least to the greatest, must be altogether optional. Perfect rectitude, with respect to created beings, and each individual creature, may subsist, without any more benevolence than what is necessarily included in mere existence. 10. This being the case, the state of the universe, in reference to perfect rectitude, and irrespective of benevolence, may be further compared to a balance in perfect equilibrium. The least weight of benevolence makes it preponderate, proportionally, in favour of virtue and happiness; but without which weight neither could take place. 11. But, according to what has been said in a former note, every created being is the subject of passive power; which, with respect to its influence on the creature, is, in some respect, the opposite of benevolence. In some, not in all respects. Benevolence is an exercise of will, and implies an agent; but passive power is a quality or principle inseparable from every creature, and from the universe at large. In reference to a former illustration, this may be compared to another cone exactly opposite, the vertex of which, from below, meets that of the other in the same plane. The intermediate point, and Indeed every point in the same plane, may represent the perfect rectitude of God towards every individual; the inverted cone above, divine benevolence; the cone below, passive power, with its base necessarily equal to the whole plane, as it respects the created universe. 12. Hence we may say that the neutral state of any being is placed in the plane; his degree of influence from passive power, the predisposing cause of vice, is represented by a corresponding given part of the cone below; and his degree of predisposition to virtue from divine benevolence, is represented by a corresponding given part of the cone above. Or, to change the comparison, if a perfectly poised balance be made to represent perfect rectitude, then we may suppose weights at each end in all possible proportions, from the smallest to the greatest. Passive power not being the effect of will, but of the relative nature of things, and inseparably connected with one end of the balance, it is evident, that it can be counteracted in its tendency only by the weight of benevolence, or sovereign pleasure. Therefore, whoever on earth or in heaven, rises to, and is confirmed in virtue, his attainment must be the effect of mere benevolence. And whoever on earth, or in hell, falls into, and is confirmed in vice, bis deterioration must be the effect of passive power, as the predisposing cause of vice, which nothing in the universe can counteract but sovereign, free, unmerited benevolence. 13. Consequently, all the good and happiness in the universe is the effect of benevolence, or sovereign pleasure, and exists above the plane of perfect rectitude; but all the evil and misery in the world is the effect of passive power, in union with free agency, and exists below the plane of rectitude. The one generates virtue, and raises to happiness and heaven; the other generates vice, and sinks to misery and hell. 14. Every thing in the universe planned, decreed, and effected by Jehovah, is a structure of benevolence. All he effects is good, and only good. The evil that exists is not his work. Benevolence has decreed an endless chain of antecedents, including the natural and moral worlds; and the consequents peculiar to them result therefrom with infallible certainty. But other antecedents, in this world, and in hell, are constantly interposed by free agents under the influence of passive power, whose consequences also follow with equal Infallible certainty. To the eye of created intelligence these counter positions, and opposite consequents, appear blended in an inextricable manner, like the different rays of light in the same pencil, different gasses in a given space, and different subtle fluids in the same body. But to the eye of Omniscience they appear perfectly distinct, in their proper nature, in all their directions and bearings, in all their tendencies and effects. 15. Instead, therefore, of saying, “There is no evil in the universe,” we should say, “There is much evil in the universe; there is much on earth, and more in hell; but none of God’s appointment.” It is demonstrable, that passive power can no more be an object of appointment, than the most direct contradictions; and yet it is equally demonstrable that such a principle is the inseparable concomitant of every creature. It is of prior consideration to moral agency; for whatever is a property of a created nature as such, is of prior consideration to the agency of that creature. Consequently it is a property neither divinely appointed, nor yet a moral evil. 16. Liberty, in one sense, bears the same relation to good and evil, as rectitude does to benevolence and passive power. Liberty in itself is equally a medium between good and evil, as rectitude is between benevolence and passive power; and the medium is of a nature perfectly distinct from both extremes. To which we may add, that liberty united to or under the influence of, sovereign benevolence, generates virtue; but liberty united to, or under the influence of, passive power, generates vice. 17. From the premises it may be seen, that the existence of all evil, and especially moral evil, in the universe, is not inconsistent with the moral perfections of God. It is evident also that in no sense whatever except by a total misapplication of terms, can God be said to be “the author of sin.” Nor can it be said that God “wills the event of sin;” but the contrary is plain, that he does not will it either in a decretive, a legislative, or any other sense. 18. The great source of confusion into which many authors have plunged themselves, is, that they draw too hasty an inference in attempting to make not hindering an event to be ultimately the same as willing it. Upon their data, indeed, it may be true, while they regard every event alike to be the effect of divine energy, and even the worst, in order to answer a good end. And this will always be the case, for self-consistency requires it, until we see and acknowledge a metaphysical negative cause of moral evil, and an eternal nature of things antecedent to all will, with their infallible effects, when not counteracted by sovereign benevolence. 19. Let us now view the subject in the light of terms a little different. Much error often arises through the defect of language; and where there is danger of misapprehension, it may be of use to change expressions. Hereby a difficult subject may be taken by different handles, or a reader may apprehend it by one handle, which he could not by another. Let us then substitute the word equity Instead of rectitude. and undeserved favour instead of benevolence. postulate. Whatever is perfectly consistent with equity is also perfectly consistent with the moral character of God. 20. Whatever to the pure effect at equity and the nature of things, or essential truth, united, cannot be inconsistent with the moral perfections of God; the existence of morel evil in the universe is the pure effect of these; therefore the existence of moral evil in the universe cannot be inconsistent with the moral perfections of God. 21. The only ground of hesitation here is, now moral evil is the effect of equity and the nature of things? Liberty itself is a natural good, and therefore is the fruit of divine favour; and toe mere exercise of liberty must be ascribed to the same cause. But he who is hypothetically free to good, must be in like manner free to evil. For this hypothetical freedom either to good or to evil is what constitutes the morality of his acts of choice. Take away this hypothetical freedom, and you take away the essence of moral agency. It is plain, then, that to possess this freedom and consequent moral agency, is not inconsistent with the equity, rectitude, or moral perfections of God. Yet it is demonstrable that freedom cannot be influenced in its choice, so as to constitute it virtuous or vicious, holy or sinful, morally right or wrong, good or evil, but from two causes radically; divine favour and passive power. If the agent be under the influence of divine favour, a happy result, in the same proportion, is secured by the same essential truth as renders the choice of the great I AM, Infallibly good; which no one will say is inconsistent with the divine perfections. For though favour raises the agent above what rigid or pure equity can do, there is no incontinence between them; any more than between paying a just debt, and bestowing also a free gift in addition. But if the agent be not under the influence of undeserved favour, the only alternative is, that be must necessarily be under the influence of passive power. And as nothing can possibly secure a happy result but undeserved favour, or benevolent influence, a negative cause becomes an infallible ground of certainty of an opposite result Again. 22. When God gives to creatures what is their due, he deals with them in equity, but when God gives them less grace than is actually sufficient to secure from sin, or will in fact do so, he gives them their due. Were it otherwise, it would be impossible for any to sin. If to give them so much favour, or benevolent influence, as would actually preserve them from sin, were their due, it is plain that the God of equity would give them their due. and preserve them from sin accordingly. But the fact is widely otherwise. They are not all preserved from sin, though all might be. through the interposition of sovereign favour; therefore it is not their due, or equity does not require it 23. If it be said, it is owing to their own fault; it is very true; but how came any creature to be faulty? God made angels and men upright. And he has always dealt with every creature, however debased by sin, in equity. He has also given to every creature capable of sinning. liberty unconstrained. He often influences the disposition by benevolence; and the goodness of God, by providential and gracious dispensations, leadeth to repentance. But never has he dealt with any unjustly, or given them less than their due. Not a fallen spirit, however deeply sunk, can verify such a charge. Assuredly, they have destroyed themselves, but in God is the only help. A principle, of which God is not the author, as before explained in union with the abuse of their liberty, satisfactorily accounts for the fact. Our evil is of ourselves; but all our good is from God. 24. From what has been said, we may safely draw this inference, that tile existence of moral evil in the universe, is not inconsistent with the moral perfections of God. And the proposition would be equally true, had the proportion of moral evil been greater than it is. But some will continue to cavil, it is probable, because every objection is not professedly answered, and some difficulties, or divine arcana, will always remain. They will still be asking, why benevolence is not more universal, and thereby moral evil altogether prevented? Why the cone (to which benevolence has been compared) is not a cylinder, whose base is commensurate with the plane of creatural existence, and whose top rises ad infinitum? They might as well inquire. Why is not every atom a sun? Why not every drop an ocean? Why not every moment an age? Why not every worm an angel? Why not the solar system as large as all material systems united? Why the number of angels and men not a thousand times greater? And, to complete the absurdity of demanding evidence for every thing, as an objection against demonstrable truth. Why is not any given part on the surface of a cone, a cylinder, or a globe, not in the centre? To all such inquiries -and if advanced as objections impertinent inquiries—it is sufficient to reply, Infinite Wisdom has planned an universe, in which divine benevolence appears wonderfully conspicuous; and even the evils, whether natural or moral, which are intermixed, and which in their origin are equally remote from divine causation and from chance, are overruled to answer purposes the most benevolent, and the most wonderfully sublime. corollaries. 1. The only possible way of avoiding the most ruinous consequences—moral evil and misery—is to direct the will, through the instrumentality of its freedom, to a state of union to God, submission to his will, and an imitation of his moral perfections, according to his most merciful appointment 2. To creatures fallen below the line of rectitude, and yet the subjects of hope, prayer to God for grace, undeserved favour, or benevolent influence, is an exercise the most becoming, a duty to be most necessary and important, and a privilege of the first magnitude.—W.

[155] * On the subject of the origin of moral evil, our author is more concise than usual. His design in this very short section, is merely to show, that the difficulties which have been started, concerning tbe first entrance of sin into the world, are such as cannot be discussed in a small compass; and, that the Arminian cause gains nothing by urging them. That cause has been sufficiently examined in several parts of this Inquiry; but the true and precise origin of moral evil, requires further notice. It is indeed of infinitely greater Importance to be acquainted with that celestial art, and that sacred influence, whereby we may emerge from the gulf of sin to holiness and heaven, than to be accurately versed in the science of its origination. And so it is far more important to see objects, and improve sight, than to be able to demonstrate the theory of vision: to recover health, and to use it aright, than to have skill to ascertain the cause and the symptom of disease; to contribute vigorously in extinguishing a fire that threatens to destroy our dwellings and ourselves, than to know the author of the calamity; to participate the effects of varied seasons, than to understand, astronomically, the precise reason of those variations. The mariner may navigate without knowing why his needle points to the north; and the celestial bodies in the solar system were as equally regular in their motions before Sir Isaac Newton had existence, as they have been since he has ascertained those laws and proportions according to which they move And yet the science of optics is not useless, the healing art is not to be despised, to discover an incendiary is desirable, and never is that philosopher who attempts to ascertain the cause of natural phenomena, held up as blameworthy. In like manner, though millions are delivered from the influence of sin, and raised to the most exalted eminence of happiness, who never knew, or even sought to know, scientifically, the origination of sin; this is no good reason that such knowledge is useless, or even unimportant. As we do not wish to swell these notes unnecessarily, we beg leave to refer to what we have said elsewhere on the subject, particularly in notes on the former part of this Treatise, on Dr. Doddridge’s Lectures, and on a Sermon, concerning “Predestination to Life,” second edition, in connexion with what we now add. (See Doddr. Works, vol. iv. p. 363, &c. vol v. p. 208. c. Notes.)—As the basis of our present demonstration, we begin with proposing a few axioms. axioms. 1. No effect can exist without an adequate cause. On this truth are founded all reasonings and all metaphysical evidence. 2. Sin is an effect, and has a cause. On this truth are founded all moral means and all religious principles. 3. The origin of moral evil cannot be moral evil; or, the cause of sin cannot be sin itself. Except we admit this, the same thing may be and not be, at the same time, and in the same respect—the same thing may be sin and no sin—cause and no cause—or, contrary to the first axiom, a contingent event may be the cause of itself, or may exist without an adequate cause. 4. There is no positive cause but what is ultimately from God. If otherwise, something positive may begin to be without a positive cause; or, something may exist without an adequate cause; which is the same as an effect to exist without a cause, contrary to the first axiom. 5. There may be a negative, metaphysical cause, where there is no decretive divine operation to effect it were there no negative metaphysical causes, such ideas as absence, ignorance, folly, weakness, and the like, could have no metaphysical effects; contrary to universal experience. And we must renounce all ideas of congruity to suppose that such things are the mere effects of divine decree and operation. Having premised these positions as axioms not to be disputed, we proceed to make a few observations, which, though equally true, may not be equally obvious. 6. The origin of moral evil cannot be one principle. For were it one, it must be either a positive or negative cause. If positive, it would be ultimately from God; but this would exclude a moral alternative, the very essence of moral agency, and consequently be incompatible with the existence of moral evil. But if a negative cause, it must ultimately be referred to the prime negative cause, which can be no other than passive power, as before explained; which is nothing independent of positive existence; and consequently can have no effect but in union with positive existence. 7. It remains, then, that the origin of moral evil is a compound of two causes at least. Yet not more than two; because, as we shall see, these are sufficient, and more would be superfluous, in order to produce the effect. 8. Now the question remains, What are these compound principles? Are they two positive causes, two negative causes, or one of each? They cannot be two positive causes; for then they might be ultimately reduced to one, the first cause; as before proved, gr. 4, 6. Nor can they be two negative ones; for ultimately there is but one cause properly negative. Consequently, 9. The first entrance of sin into the world, or the true and precise origin of moral evil, may be found in two causes united; the one positive and the other negative. But neither of which is morally good or morally evil; if the cause were morally good, the effect could not be morally bad; and if morally evil, it would be contrary to the third axiom, and to common sense. These two causes are, first, liberty, a cause naturally good; secondly, passive power, a cause naturally evil. And these two causes are as necessary for the production of moral evil, as two parents for the production of a human being according to the taws of nature, 9. Dr. Clarke, whose brief account has been more implicitly admitted than any other, says, that moral evil “arises wholly from the abuse of liberty; which God gave to his creatures for other purposes, and which it was reasonable and fit to give them for the perfection and order of the whole creation: only they, contrary to God’s intention and command, have abused what was necessary for the perfection of the whole, to the corruption and depravation of themselves.” This extract from Dr. Clarke (in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. p. 113. 5th edit) has been advanced by celebrated writers, as “containing all that can be advanced with certainty ” on the subject. But surety those minds must be easily satisfied, who can be satisfied with such evidence. Dr. Clarke allows and proves, that liberty is a perfection, rather than an evil. How came it then to product evil? He answers, “This arises wholly from the abuse of liberty. But what is the cause of this effect called “the abuse of liberty?” This in fact is the whole of the difficulty, and yet he leaves it untouched. The free agent fails in the exercise of liberty; this failure is an effect; but there is no effect without a cause; therefore this failure must have a cause; and this cause (not the abuse of liberty) must bring us to the origin of moral evil. 10. What Dr. Clarke has left untouched may yet be ascertained. We think it has been fairly excluded, by what has been already advanced, from every thing except liberty and passive power. Therefore, the abuse of liberty can arise only from its associate. But how can this operate as a cause of the abuse of liberty? In order to answer this question, we must recollect what liberty itself is, viz. a natural power, or instrument of the mind, capable of producing moral effects. Not a self-determining power, which would be contrary to the first axiom; and which our author has abundantly demonstrated to be full of contradictions, and an utter impossibility. It must, then, be determined by motives. But motives, as before shown, (in a former note,) are the objects of choice in union with the state of the mind, as a compound effect. Now the cause why the real good, suppose the chief good, which is absolutely unchangeable, is not chosen, and an inferior good appears at the instant of choice preferable, and is in fact preferred, must arise from that part of the motive which is the state of the mind. 11. Now there an only two states of the mind conceivable whereby liberty can be influenced; the one, a state naturally evil; the other, a state morally good. Were we to say, that the state was morally evil, at the first entrance of sin, we should contradict the third axiom. And were we to say, that the cause was only naturally good, we should contradict the first axiom. Therefore the cause of the abuse of liberty, is a state naturally evil. No other cause can possibly be assigned, without involving a contradiction. Bat what is a state naturally evil, and without any mixture of moral evil? It can be no other but a state under the influence of what we call passive power. 12. Let us view the subject in another light. Perfect liberty, in reference to virtue and vice, the scale of merit and demerit, and its attendant degrees of happiness or misery, is a medium, standing between all extremes—between virtue and vice, merit and demerit, happiness and misery. If we regard divine rectitude or equity, according to a former simile, in reference to the moral system, as an universal plane, liberty may be said to coincide with it. And being a natural perfection, or. when exerted, a good which has a positive cause, it is the effect of benevolent energy. If the mind be under unmerited, sovereign, benevolent influence, its liberty attaches itself to real good; then the agent rises on the scale of excellence, and therefore of happiness. But if the mind be under passive influence, or the influence of passive power, (a depraved nature and confirmed vicious habits being now out of the question,) its liberty attaches itself to apparent good, in opposition to real; then vice is generated, the agent sinks on the scale of deterioration, and consequently of misery. 13. It appears, then, that the will, in the exercise of its freedom, when producing moral effects, is the instrument of the disposition; and that the character of the effect bears an infallible and exact proportion to that of the predisposing cause. Yet the will in the exercise of choice is so free, that all constraint, coaction, and impulse, are entirely excluded from that which constitutes the morality of the act. Here lies the essence of moral agency, and the ground of accountableness. The agent has a moral alternative; IF he be different minded may choose otherwise than he actually does if under benevolent influence, he will, in proportion, infallibly choose aright; if under equitable, passive influence, the apparent good will not be the real one, and consequently the choice will be morally bad. Means, objects perfectly suitable and sufficient, are exhibited to view; but these of themselves would never determine the will, otherwise the same effect would always follow the same means. Temptations also are presented; these in like manner of themselves never determine the will, otherwise temptation and sin would be infallibly connected. Then the holy Jesus could not have withstood the numerous and powerful solicitations of the tempter. But why did he withstand all? Because objects of temptation did not constitute the whole of motives; because objects operate according to the state of the mind; and because in him benevolent influence counteracted passive power. Hence, when the prince of this world came, he found nothing in him; and hence he rose to the greatest height of glory, having “a name above every name.” 14. There is no end of objections and cavils, however demonstrative the proof; for such there have been against all the first principles of religion—the being of God—a revelation of his will to that human race—the doctrine of a future state, &c. &c. Some may say, Why should sin be made to originate in these two things, liberty and passive power? We answer, it has been demonstrated, that all metaphysical, positive and negative, causation, in reference to moral evil, is reducible to these two; and therefore they might as well ask. Why one and one make two, rather than any other number? 15. Others may say, Why not proceed from God alone? They might as well ask, Why is not the sun the cause of darkness? Love, the cause of enmity? Wisdom, the cause of folly? Happiness, the cause of misery? Order, the cause of confusion? But the effect, it may be said, is the same. We reply, the assignation of a cause, whether true or false, does not alter the nature of phenomena. It would be, indeed, a strange phenomenon, hitherto unknown, and unknowable, for an hypothesis, however demonstrable, to alter the nature of the things in question. The effect are the same. Very true. But the question is not about the effects; the inquiry is about the true cause of those effects, in opposition to false philosophy. The effect of moral evil is misery, or deserved suffering. Now does it make no difference, in justifying the ways of God to men, whether a rational, immortal being suffer deservedly or undeservedly? To suffer for moral evil, is to suffer deservedly; but were sin and suffering from God alone, or the effect of constituted laws, this could not be the case. To say. that this partial suffering may be ultimately counterbalanced by a restoration, is begging the question, that there will be a restoration And if there were, what is it better than an apology for past injustice? To suffer undeservedly, is to suffer unjustly; and to punish at all is an act of injustice, if undeserved, as well as to punish for ever. 16. It may be again asked, What advantage is there in fixing on this origin of moral evil, rather than another? We reply by putting another question. Why should we put up with a false cause assigned for any thing? Surely, phenomena more interesting, more alarming in their nature, and more awful in their consequences, than moral evils, cannot arrest human observation. And it would be passing strange to suppose, that the ascertaining of their true cause and origin is not an important part of philosophy, and deserving of the closest investigation. What can be more dishonourable to the moral character of Deity, than to make sin originate in his will alone? Or, if this be its origin, how preposterous to call it moral evil, as distinguished from natural. How cruel and unjust, beyond precedent, to punish it; and how absurd the idea of threatening punishment for what was irreversibly appointed! 17. Some may say, Why may we not be satisfied with the idea of permission? If properly understood, we acknowledge that this goes a considerable way. But we suspect, few seem acquainted with the full implication of the term. God permits. True; if by it we mean he does not hinder. The free agent acts amiss when he it not hindered. This only shows, that God might hinder if he pleased; but it assigns no cause why the agent acts amiss. Permitting or not hindering, IMPLIES a cause distinct from divine causation. And the question returns, what is the cause of sin taking place when not hindered? In vain do we fix on chance, or a self-determining power; these explain nothing, and in fact are nothing, as our author has demonstrated various ways. In vain do we say. sin arises from the abuse of liberty. For the question recurs. What is the cause of that abuse? If this be not explained, nothing is effected. In vain shall we say, it proceeds from the cause of causes. For that cause is good only. From such a cause only good can proceed; and to ascribe sin to this cause is as proper as to say that moral evil is a good thing, and ought to be rewarded rather than punished. If this be not a reprovable mode of calling “evil good, and good evil,” (Isa. v. 90.) we know not what is. corollaries. 18. Those who renounce the idea of passive power, as before explained. and its influence on the mind of a free agent, as a negative metaphysical cause; can never find the true, philosophical cause of vice and sin, and consequently of deserved suffering. As soon might they ascertain the laws of the planetary motions, while rejecting the principle of gravitation If it be asked, What is the link of connexion between this principle and the event? We reply, Essential truth, the same truth as connects 2+2=4 or 2-1=1. 19. Those who renounce a sovereign, benevolent, physical, holy influence on the mind can never And the true, philosophical origin of virtue and holiness, and consequently happiness. 20. From the premises we infer, that the highest wisdom, the best interest, and the greatest honour of a rational and accountable being, is to employ his liberty, and all his powers, in the way of absolute submission to the divine will; in supreme affection, fear and love, to the infinite majesty and self-existent excellence of God; and in the way or humble and diligent obedience, according to the manifestation which God has made for himself.—W.

[156] It does not appear that the author did any thing more, towards accomplishing this design, than to pen some thoughts, probably with a view to an elaborate treatise, which are included in his Miscellaneous Remarks and Observations.—W.

[157] Part III Sect VI.

[158] Part III Sect VI. Ibid Sect VII. Part IV. Sect. I. Part. III. Sect. III. Corol 1. after the first head

[159] A certain noted author of the present age says, the arguments for necessity are nothing but quibbling, or logomachy, using words without a meaning, or begging the question.—I do not know what kind of necessity any authors to whom he may have reference are advocates for; or whether they have managed their arguments well or ill. As to the arguments I have made use, if they are quibbles they may be shown to be so; such knots are capable of being untied, and the trick and cheat may be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly done, with respect to the grounds and reasons I have relied upon. I shall have just occasion, for the future, to be silent, if not to be ashamed of my argumentations. I am willing my proofs should be thoroughly examined: and if there be nothing but begging the question, or mere logomachy, or dispute of words, let it be made manifest and shown how the seeming strength of the argument depends on my using words without a meaning, or arises from the ambiguity of terms, or my making use of words in an indeterminate and unsteady manner; and that the weight of my reasons rest mainly on such a foundation; and then, I shall either be ready to retract what I have urged, and thank the man that has done the kind part, or shall be justly exposed for my obstinacy. The same author is abundant in appealing, in this affair, from what he calls logomachy and sophistry, to experience.—A person can experience only what passes in his own mind. But yet. as we may well suppose, that all men have the same human faculties; so a man may well argue from his own experience to that of others. In things that show the nature of these faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then one has as good a right to allege his experience as another. As to my own experience, I find, that in innumerable things I can do as I will; that the motions of my body, in many respects, instantaneously follow the acts of my will concerning those motions; and that my will has some command or my thoughts; and that the acts of my will are my own. i. e. that they are acts of my will, the volitions of my own mind; or, in other words, that what I will, I will. Which, I presume, is the sum of what others experience in this affair. But as to finding by experience, that my will is originally determined by itself: or that, my will first choosing what volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly follows; and that this is the first rise of the determination of my will in any affair; or that any volition arises in my mind contingently; I declare, I know nothing in myself, by experience, of this nature: and nothing that ever I experienced, carries the least appearance or shadow of any such thing, or gives me any more reason to suppose or suspect any such thing, than to suppose that my volitions existed twenty years before they existed. It is true, I find myself possessed of my volitions, before I can see the effectual power of any cause to produce them, for the power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect, and this, for ought I know, may make some imagine, that volition has no cause, or that it produces itself. But I have no more reason from hence to determine any such thing, than I have to determine that I gave myself my own being, or that I came into being accidentally without a cause became I first found myself possessed of being, before I had knowledge of a cause of my being.

[160] A writer of the present age, whom I have several times had occasion to mention, speaks once and again of those who hold the doctrine of Necessity, as scarcely worthy of the name of philosophers. I do not know, whether he has respect to any particular notion of necessity, that some may have maintained; and, if so, what doctrine of necessity it is that he means. Whether I am worthy of the name of a philosopher, or not, would be a question little to the present purpose. If any, and ever so many, should deny it. I should not think it worth the while to enter into a dispute on that question: Though at the same time I might expect some better answer should be given to the arguments brought for the truth of the doctrine I maintain; and I might further reasonably desire, that it might be considered, whether it does not become those, who are truly worthy of the name of philosophers, to be sensible, that there is a difference between argument and contempt, yea, and a difference between the contemptibleness of the person that argues, and the inconclusiveness of the arguments he offers.

[161] Certain foreknowledge does imply some necessity. But our author is not sufficiently guarded, or else not sufficiently explicit, when he says, that foreknowledge must suppose an absolute decree. For certainty, or hypothetical necessity, may arise from the nature of things, and from negative causes. as well as from a decree. If. indeed, the remark be limited to the subject immediately preceding, it is an important truth.—W.

[162] The terms design and endeavours are not sufficiently discriminating. It is here supposed that it is unworthy of God to use endeavours which are beside his decree, or to prosecute a design which he knows will not be accomplished. Is it not a matter of plain fact that he uses endeavours which are beside his decree, and prosecutes a design which he knows will not be accomplished, through the whole system of legislation and government? Is it not the very design of legislation and government to prevent crimes as well as to punish them, and to promote obedience and conformity to law? Legislative design, therefore, is not accomplished in the commission of crimes, otherwise the legislator, as such, could not find fault for breach of law. Our Lord used endeavours with the inhabitants of Jerusalem, &c. beside his decree, yet with perfect propriety. If we keep in mind that the divine Will subsists under two relations, according to the two-fold state of man, who is at once a subject of decree and a subject of government, we shall see the propriety of calling it decretive and rectoral.

[163] The “Essays” to which this Appendix relates, were the production of Lord Kaimes.

[164] P. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many other places.

[165] P. 169.

[166] P. 191, 195, 197, 206.

[167] P. 183.

[168] P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 206.

[169] P. 207, 209, and other places.

[170] P. 200.

[171] P. 152.

[172] P. 183.

[173] P. 186.

[174] P. 205.

[175] P.203, 204, 211.

[176] P. 183.

[177] P. 209.

[178] P. 211.

[179] P. 153.

[180] P. 214.

[181] P. 160, 194, 199, 205, 206, 207, 210.

[182] P. Inquiry Part IV. Sect. 4. throughout.

[183] Idem. Part IV. Sect. 1. throughout.

[184] See this matter illustrated in my Inquiry. Part IV. Sect. 4.

[185] P. 156-159, Sect. 6 and 7.

[186] Especially in Part III.

[187] P. 184.

[188] P. 189.

[189] P. 184, 185.

[190] P. Especially Part IV. Sect. 5.

[191] P. 188-192 and many other places.

[192] P. 188, 189, &c.

[193] * P. 178, 213, 214.

[194] This preface was originally prefixed to the following Dissertations, “concerning the End for which God created the World, and the Nature of True Virtue,” in one volume.—W.

[195] “The end of wisdom (says Mr. G. Tennent, in his sermon at the opening of the presbyterian church of Philadelphia) is design; the end of power is action; the end of goodness is doing good. To suppose these perfections no to be exerted would be to represent them as insignificant. Of what use would God’s wisdom be, it had nothing to design or direct? To what purpose his almightiness, if it never brought any thing to pass ? And of what avail his goodness, if it never did any good?”

[196] I shall often use the phrase God’s fulness, as signifying and comprehending all the good which is in God natural and moral, either excellence or happiness; partly, because I know of no better phrase to be used in this general meaning; and partly, because I am led hereto by some of the inspired writers, particularly the apostle Paul, who often useth the phrase in this sense.

[197] Very remarkable is that place, John xii. 23, 24. And Jesus answered them saying, The hour is come, that the Son of man should be glorified. Verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and dies, it abideth alone; but if it die, if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit. Christ had respect herein to the blessed fruits of his death, in the conversion, salvation, and eternal happiness of those that should be redeemed by him. This consequence of his death, he calls his glory; and his obtaining this fruit, he calls his being glorified; as the flourishing, beautiful produce of a corn of wheat sown in the ground its glory. Without this he is alone, as Adam was before Eve was created. But from him, by his death, proceeds a glorious offspring; in which are communicated his fulness and glory: As from Adam, in his deep sleep, proceeds the woman, a beautiful companion to fill his emptiness, and relieve his solitariness; by Christ’s death, his fulness is abundantly diffused in many streams; and expressed in the beauty and glory of a great multitude of his spiritual offspring.

[198] This remark must be understood with limitation; as expressing the effect of benevolent influence, but not the effect of justice on a moral system. — W.

[199] See ver 9. and also Isa. iii. 24. xxii.21. and xxiii. 10. Exod. xxviii. 8.

[200] 1 Cor. vi. 20.

[201] John xiii. 31, 32.

[202] Eph. i 13, 14.

[203] See also, Psal. ix. 1, 11, 14and Psal. xix. 1.and Psal. xxvi. 7.and Psal. lxxi. 18.and Psal. lxxv. 9.and Psal. lxxvi. 1and Psal. lxxix 13and Psal.xcvi. 2, 3. and Psal. ci. 1and Psal. cvii. 22and Psal.cxviii. 17and Psal. cxlv. 6, 11, 12. Isa. xlii. 12. Isa. lxiv. 1, 2. Jer. li. 10.

[204] Exod. xiv 17, 18. 1 Sam. xvii. 46. Psal. lxxxii. 18 Isa. xiv. 3.Ezek. vi. 7, 10, 13, 14and Ezek. vii. 4, 9, 27.and Ezek. xi. 10, 11, 12.and Ezek. xii. 15, 16, 20.and xiii. 9, 14, 21, 23.and Ezek. xiv. 8.and Ezek. xv. 7.and Ezek. xxi. 5.and Ezek. xxii. 16.and Ezek. xxv. 7, 11, 17.and Ezek. xxvi. 6.and Ezek. xxvii. 22, 23, 24.and Ezek. xxix. 9, 16.and Ezek. xxx. 8, 19, 26, 26.and Ezek. xxxii. 15.and Ezek. xxxii. 29.and Ezek. xxxv. 4, 12, 15. and Ezek. xxxviii. 23.and Ezek. xxxix. 6, 7, 21, 22.

[205] Exod. vi. 7.and Exod. viii. 22.and Exod. xvi. 12. 1 Kings viii. 43.and 1 Kings xx. 28.Psal. cii. 21.Ezek. xxiii. 49.and Ezek. xxiv. 21.and Ezek. xxv. 5.and Ezek.xxxv. 9.and Ezek. xxxix. 21, 22.

[206] See also, Ezek. xvi. 62.and Ezek. xxix. 21.and Ezek. xxxiv. 27.and Ezek. xxxvi. 38.and Ezek. xxxix. 28, 29. Joel iii. 17.

[207] Psal.xxv. 11.

[208] Eph. i. 20-23 John xvii. 2 Matt. xi. 27 Matt. xxviii. 18, 19 John iii. 35

[209] Exod. xvi. 7.and Exod. xxviii. 2, 40and Exod. iii. 8. Numb. xvi. 19 Deut. v. 24.and Deut. xxviii. 58. 2 Sam. 6, 20 1 Chron. xvi. 24. Esth. i. 4. Job xxix. 20. Psal. xix. 1and Psal. xiv. 13and Psal. lxiii. 3and Psal. lxvi. 3.and Psal. lxviii. 6and Psal.lxxxvii. 6and Psal. cii. 16and Psal. cxiv. 5, 12, 13 Isa. iv. 2.and Isa. x. 18.and Isa. xvi. 40.and Isa. xxxv. 3. Isa. xl. 5.and Isa. lx. 13.and Isa. lxii. 2 Ezek. xxxi. 18 Hab. ii. 14. Hag. ii. 3, 9 Matt. vi. 29. Matt. xvi. 27. Matt. xxiv. 30. Luke ix. 31, 32. John i. 14.and John ii. 11.and John xi. 40 Rom. vi. 4. 1 Cor. ii. 8. 1 Cor. xv. 40 2 Cor. iii. 10 Eph. iii. 21. Col. i. 11 2 Thess. i. 9. Tit. ii. 13. 1 Pet. i. 24. 2 Pet. i. 17

[210] See also. Colos. i. 27and Colos. iii. 4 1 Thess. ii. 12. 2 Thess. ii. 14 1 Tim. iii. 16. 2 Tim. ii. 10 Heb. ii. 10. 1 Pet. 11, 21and 1 Pet. v. 10 2 Pet. i. 3. Rev. xxi. 24, 26. Psal. lxxiii.and Psal. cxlix. 5 Isa. vi. 10.

[211] Exod. xvi. 12and Exod. xxiv. 16, 17, 23.and Exod. xl. 35, 35. Lev. 6, 23. Num. xiv. 10. and Num. xvi. 19. 1 Kings viii. 11. 2 Chron. v. 14.and 2 Chron. vii. 1, 2, 3. Isa. lviii. 8. Ezek. iii. 23.and Ezek. viii. 4.and Ezek. ix. 3.and Ezek. x. 18, 19. and Ezek. xi. 22, 23.and Ezek. xiii. 4, 5.and Ezek. xliv. 4. Acts vii. 55. Rev. xv. 8

[212] Exod. xxxiii. 18.

[213] Dr. Goodwin observes, (Vol. I. of his works, part 2d, page 166) that riches of grace are called riches of glory in Scripture. “The Scripture,” says he, “speaks of riches in glory in Eph. iii. 6 That he would grant you according to the riches of glory; yet eminently mercy is there intended: for it is that which God bestows, and which the apostle there prayeth for. And he calls his mercy there his glory, as elsewhere he doth, as being the most eminent excellency in God.— That in Rom. ix. 22, 23. compared, is observable. In the 22nd verse, where the apostle speaks of God’s making known the power of his wrath, saith he, God is willing to show his wrath, and make his power known. But in verse 3d, when he comes to speak of mercy, he saith, That he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy.”

[214] John xii. 24.

[215] Here may be remembered what was before observed of the church being so often spoken of as the glory and fulness of Christ.

[216] Exod. vi. 3 — “Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory.” In the original, His glory is the fulness of the whole earth: which signifies much more than the words of the translation. God’s glory, consisting especially in his holiness, is that, in the sight or communications of which man’s fulness, i.e. his holiness and happiness, consists. By God’s glory here, there seems to be respect to those effulgent beams that filled the temple: these beams signifying God’s glory shining forth and communicated. This effulgence or communication, is the fulness of all intelligent creatures, who have no fulness of their own.

[217] See particularly, Heb. iii. 3..

[218] Psal. cxiv. 1-12and Psal. xxiv. 1, 2, 3. and Psal. xliv. 8.and Psal. xxi. 14, 15and Psal. xcix. 2, 3and Psal. cvii. 31, 32and Psal. cviii. 3, 4, 5.and Psal. cxix. 164ans Psal. cxlvii. 13and Psal. cl. 2. Rev. xix. 1, 2, 3. —

[219] Psal. ix. 1, 2, 14 and Psal. xxviii. 7.and Psal. xxxv. 27, 28and Psal. xlii. 4. and Psal. lxiii. 5.and Psal. lxvii. 3, 4, 5.and Psal. lxxi. 22, 23.and Psal. civ. 33, 34.and Psal. cvi. 47and Psal. cxxxv. 3and Psal. cxlvii. 1and Psal. cxlix. 1, 2, 5, 6. Acts ii. 46, 47. Acts 46, 47. Acts iii. 8 Rev. xix. 6, 7.

[220] Psal. xxx. 12.and Psal. xxxv. 4, 5.and Psal. cvii. 21, 22.and cxxxviii. 2. And many other places.

[221]

[222] See also, 2 Sam. vii. 9and 2 Sam. vii. 13and 2 Sam. xxii. 18 Neh. ix. 10 Job xxx. 8 Prov. xxii. 1 Many other places import the same thing.

[223] It is used to signify knowledge, or that manifestation and evidence by which knowledge is received. Psal. xix. 8.and Psal. cxix. 105, 130 Prov. vi. 23 Isa. viii. 20and Isa. ix. 2 and Isa. xxix-. 18 Dan. v. 11 Eph. v. 13“But all things that are reproved , are made manifest by the light; for whatsoever doth make manifest , is light. &c. It is used to signify virtue, or moral ground. Job xxv. 5. Eccl. viii. 1 Isa. v. 20.and Isa. xxiv. 23.and Isa. lxii. 1. Ezek. xxviii. 7, 17. Dan. ii. 31 John i. 5 &c And it is abundantly used to signify comfort, joy & happiness. Est. viii. 16. Job xviii. 8.and Job xxii. 28.and Job xxix. 3.and Job xxx. 26. Psal. xxvii. 1and Psal. xcvi. 11and Psal. cxvii. 27.abd Psal. cxii. 4. Isa. xliii. 16and Isa. i. 10and Isa. lix. 9 Jer. xiii. 16. Lam. iii. Ezek. xxxii. 8. Amos v. 18. Mic. vii. 8, 9. &c.

[224] Our author has produced, from the purest principles of reason, and the fountain of revealed truth, abundant evidence, that God’s ultimate and chief end in the creation of the universe, in the operations of providence, and in the methods of salvation, is his own glory. But we do not think it superfluous to add a few observations on this important subject. 1. A clear and comprehensive view of the universe, or what our author calls “the world,” will lead us to observe two grand divisions, which may be termed physical and moral. And though in both the glory of God is the chief end, yet this end is not attained by the same means in the moral as in the physical department. 2. By the creation and disposal of the physical part of the universe, the glory of God’s natural perfections, as of sovereign wisdom, power, and goodness, is chiefly displayed. But by the creation and government of the moral part, the glory of the moral perfections of Deity, that is, of infinite moral rectitude, or equity, and of sovereign benevolence and mercy, is made to appear. 3. God being an infinite sovereign, controlled by no consideration but infinite rectitude, or a regard to the consistency of his own character; and a created universe being capable of two forms, and it should seem, for ought that appears, to the contrary, of two only, physical and moral; a full emanation and display ad extra of the moral perfections of Deity could not be made without a moral system in all its capabilities of relation. 4. The physical part of the universe, even including the physical operations of intelligent beings, may subsist, it is evident, without requiring any other display of glory than what is included in sovereign wisdom, power, and goodness; and it is equally plain, that there would be no opportunity of manifesting strict equity, much less mercy, to existent beings, without a moral system. Therefore, 5. If strict or absolute equity, and sovereign mercy, be manifested, a moral system was necessary. To exercise strict, unmixed, or absolute equity, whereby is given to its object what is due to it, (a capacity for moral agency being supposed,) and yet to preserve that object, that is, a moral agent, from being liable to sin, involves a contradiction. For it is the same as to say, a free agent is not free to sin, though fully permitted to follow his own tendencies. And this is the same thing as to say, an accountable creature is not liable to fall; in other words, a moral agent is no moral agent, and a moral system is no moral system. Man would be impeccable, and the very existence of sin impossible. 6. If it be asked, might not the whole of the moral part of the universe have been preserved from sin? We reply, undoubtedly it might; if sovereign benevolence had though proper to interpose, in order to counteract the exercise of strict, unmixed, and absolute rectitude or equity; but then it must have been at the expense of eternally concealing the glory of this divine perfection.—absolute rectitude. 7. To permit the creature to sin, and to exercise absolute equity, is the same thing; in other words, to exercise this glorious perfection, and not to permit the creature to sin, are incompatible ideas. If this perfection be exercised, there is, there can be, no principle belonging to a moral system, which preserves it from being liable to sin. Nor is there any principle belonging to it independent of sovereign benevolence, which is adequate to preserve that liability to sin from actual defection. But to appeal, in the way of objection, to the alternative of sovereign benevolence, which alone can preserve from sin, is the same as to concede what the proposition asserts. 8. Equity, in one view of it, is indeed compatible with the exercise of sovereign benevolence towards the same object, and at the same time. To question this, would be to question God’s proper sovereignty, and therefore his right of creating and preserving the universe, and of beatifying and creatures he hath made. For neither of these effects could take place but by sovereign benevolence as a cause. But if sovereign benevolence were not compatible with justice, or equity, in one view of it, God could not be benevolent without being unjust, which is absurd. 9. Yet equity, in another view, stands as a contrast to benevolence. Strict or absolute equity, is that which excludes all sovereign, benevolent influence; and when moral agents are its object, (their being and natural capacities, or their moral capabilities, being supposed,) the exercise of absolute equity must necessarily exclude benevolent, sovereign influence. Thus among men we find some resemblance of this abstract but momentous truth. In one view, justice and generosity are compatible; for strict, absolute justice, is the same as justice and nothing more, and therefore must exclude generosity. 10. Therefore, equity, in the one view, implies the exclusion of injustice; and in the other, the exclusion of undeserved favour, or sovereign benevolent influence. The exercise of rectitude in the former sense, might have been without the permission of sin; but not so in the latter sense. If perfect absolute rectitude towards a moral system, be made to emanate ad extra, to the full development of the capabilities of such a system, the permission of sin is not only equitable, but even metaphysically necessary. That is, it involves a contradiction to say, that such a divine perfection may be so displayed, or its glory made to appear ad extra, and yet not to permit the existence of moral defect, or, in other words, to actually hinder its existence. 11. The very idea of a moral system, in which the permission of defect is excluded by equity, is one of the most absurd that can be conceived. For it is the same as to say that God was bound in equity not to permit sin, while at the same time he constituted the agent free, and accountable for the exercise of his freedom; and as he has in fact permitted the introduction of sin into the world, such an idea would be the same as to charge infinite perfection with want of equity. 12. We may therefore safely conclude, that the glory of the divine rectitude, towards the intelligent and moral part of the universe, could not be manifested without the permission of sin. The full exercise of equity must necessarily leave the moral system to its own tendencies and operations. 13. To permit the event of sin, or not to hinder it, implies, that the cause of defection is not in the permitter, but in the permitted; not in the governor, but the governed. There is in the moral part of the universe a cause, why an event which ought not to take place, will take place, if not hindered. If there be no such cause in the system, how could the event take place on permission? If it be said, There is a chance it may not take place, and there is a chance of the contrary — it is but fair to ask, Is this chance something which has a cause, or has it no cause? If the latter, the concession itself reduces chance to a mere nothing. For a contingent event, as the operation of chance is supposed to be, without any cause, is a metaphysical impossibility. If the former; what is the cause of what the objector calls chance? Is it something external, or internal? What is its nature and character? To say that liberty of indifference or a self-determining power, is the chance which requires no preceding cause to produce the event, is to contradict absolute demonstration, if ever there was a metaphysical demonstration of any subject: as our author has abundantly shown in his “Essay on the Freedom of the Will.” 14. It is therefore inaccurate and unintelligible language to say, that either chance, liberty or indifference, or a self-determining power, independent of any antecedent cause, is adequate to account for the event of sin, or a deterioration of a moral system. God, therefore, permitting, there is an inherent adequate cause of failure, distinct from divine causation. What this cause is, and what is its nature, has been shown and proved in a former note. 15. Permission is an act of equity; or, it is the exercise of rectitude, to the exclusion of benevolent influence; whether we regard that influence as preventing the event of sin, or as delivering from its power. Sovereign benevolence prevents the fall of angels; and it delivers, restores, and eternally saves a goodly number of the human fallen race. Without the permission of sin, restoring benevolence, or the exercise of mercy, would have been impossible; and consequently, the glory of that perfection, which can be fully displayed only by its exercise towards the miserable, which would have be eternally concealed. 16. If, therefore, equity be a glorious attribute of God, its emanation and exercise must be glorious. But the exercise of equity, in the strict sense, includes the permission of sin, as before proved. And, here we may add, if not to hinder be an exercise of strict rectitude, the continued existence of sin is not inconsistent with it. 17. It will be allowed by everyone, that, as mercy itself is a glorious attribute, so is the exercise of it a glorious thing. But this would have been impossible, if sin had no existence; nor could sin have existence, if not permitted to exist; and sin could not have been permitted, if strict equity had not been exercised; nor could strict equity have been exercised, if the exercise of preventing sovereign benevolence had not been excluded, in those instances wherein moral defect actually took place. corollaries. 18. The ultimate and chief end of God in the creation and government of the moral part of the universe, is the glory of his moral perfections; which are virtually included in strict rectitude and sovereign benevolence. 19. If strict rectitude be exercised towards the degenerate part of the system, the restoration of those who are the objects of it is not possible; that is, to suppose it is possible involves a contradiction. Therefore, 20. If any degenerate moral agent be restored, it must be necessarily be by the exercise of that sovereign benevolence which we call mercy. 21. “Behold therefore the goodnesS and severity of God! on them who fell, severity; but toward thee goodness, if thou continue in his goodness; otherwise thou also shalt be cut off.” Goodness and severity are but other words for sovereign benevolence and strict equity, the glory of which is abundantly conspicuous in the various divine dispensations towards the children of men, even in this life; but will appear still more transcendent in the day when God shall judge the world in righteousness, and in the day of eternity.—W.

[225]

[226] I say, “in proportion to the degree of existence,” because one being may have more existence than another, as he may be greater than another. That which is great, has more existence, and is further from nothing, than that which is little. One being may have every thing positive belonging to it, or every thing which goes to its positive existence (in opposition to defect) in a higher degree than another; or a greater capacity and power, greater understanding, every faculty and every positive quality in a higher degree. An arch-angel must be supposed to have more existence, and to be every way further removed from non-entity, than a worm.

[227] In this masterly Dissertation on the nature of virtue, our author enters at once on his own definition of the term, and explains very clearly what he means by true virtue. His views, in some respects, are considerably different from those which are most current among ethical writers; and, probably, for want of some explanations, whereby the different definitions adopted by others may be accounted for, his invaluable treatise has not only been underrated, but even, by some, unreasonably opposed. We shall here offer a few remarks, which, perhaps, may tend to cast some light on the subject in general, as well as to relieve our author’s definition from unfair imputations. 1. Virtue, if we regard the use of the term () among the NOT ENGLISHs, seems to have been appropriated as much to the idea of martial courage, as the English term is appropriated to that of female chastity. Not that it was used exclusively in the former case, any more than in the latter. It often signifies power, energy, efficacy, and excellence. But by moral writers both ancient and modern, it has been unanimously adopted to represent a very general moral idea.—It would be easy to produce a great number of definitions from moralists and divines; but this is neither necessary, nor does it comport with our present purpose. 2. If we mistake not, there is just definition of virtue, which is not reducible to this general one: virtue is a laudable mean of real happiness. Cicero, indeed, says of it, that it is “affectio animi constans, conveniensque, laudabiles efficiens eos. in quibus est, et ipsa per se, sua sponte, separatea etiam utilitate, laudabilis.” (Tuscul. Quæst. Lib. iv. § 15.) But virtue being laudable from its very nature, independently of any advantageous result, does not hinder it from being “a laudable mean of real happiness.” 3. Now happiness being the uniform and voluntary end of intellectual existence, a desire of it being inseparable from our nature; we become liable to err, not only by adopting wrong means for accomplishing the end we propose to ourselves, but also by forming a false estimate of the nature of happiness, or the end itself. If the happiness be not real but imaginery, in the contemplation of the agent, however well adapted the means may be in order to attain it, they deserve not the epithet virtuous. 4. To discover the nature of true happiness, the light of wisdom is requisite: and while desire is blind, false estimates will be made. But every one thinks himself wise and prudent enough to prescribe his own happiness, till much folly be shown him by the wisdom which is from above; and he who supposes himself adequate to fix the end, cannot be very diffident about the means to be employed. 5. Hence there is room for as many representations of virtue, as there are kinds of happiness which men think to be real; in addition to as many means employed to accomplish their proposed end, as they judge to be laudable. 6. From these preliminary remarks, it appears, that the nature and real character of virtue, must arise from the nature of the end proposed, and of the means employed for securing it. We shall now attempt to illustrate the ground of numerous representations of virtue, by comparison. 7. Let the different kinds of happiness which we propose to ourselves, whether those which have been classified by moral writers, or any others, be represented by so many concentric circles. For instance, let happiness be considered as personal and relative, private and public, domestic and national, temporal and eternal, or the like: and for every species of happiness let there be a corresponding circle drawn. Let the filling up of that circle express the virtue requisite to attain the happiness thus represented. 8. Suppose, for example, that health, friendship, domestic unanimity, national prosperity, the welfare of the human race, and our individual conformity to God in his moral excellence through eternal ages, or the happiness implied in these respectively, be represented by the concentric circles above mentioned. Then, the happiness implied in health, a small circle, will be filled by corresponding virtues, when the end is sought by laudable means: such as temperance, moderation, chastity, government of the passions, &c. The circle representing the happiness implied in friendship will be filled by corresponding virtues, when the end is sought, as before, by laudable means: such as benevolence, fidelity, prudence, sympathy, &c. The circle of domestic happiness is filled with the virtues of kindness, meekness, patience, industry, economy, &c. That of national prosperity by diligence in business, honesty, justice, truth, liberality, conscientious submission, fortitude, real patriotism, &c. The circle representing the welfare of the human race, as the common offspring of one progenitor, and who are regarded by the Supreme Parent as the children of one family, is filled by the virtues of philanthropy, expansive benevolent zeal, self-denial, public spirit, passive courage, &c. And the circle of that happiness which is implied in our individual conformity to God’s moral excellence; in other words, that happiness which is ultimate and supreme, is filled by nothing short of supreme love to God, or, in language more philosophically accurate, consent of will to BEING in general—benevolent attachment to universal being. 9. Now who can question whether temperance, fidelity, meekness, honesty and liberality, philanthropy and public spirit, should be ranked among the virtues? And who can doubt that they are calculated to secure the happiness implied in health, friendship, national prosperity, and the welfare of the human race, respectively? And yet, if we exclude the disposition which is required to fill the largest circle—benevolent attachment to universal being—which of these virtues may not an atheist actually possess? Nay, may not an atheist possess them all? For may he not promote his health by temperance, moderation, chastity, and the like? May he not exercise friendly benevolence, fidelity, prudence, sympathy, and similar virtues? Have not atheists been great patriots, if by patriotism we mean a supreme regard for the prosperity and glory of the nation to which they belonged, manifested by severe studies, by the lightning and thunder of their eloquence, the fatigues of war, and a willingness to shed the last drop of their blood in defence of their country? Nay more, may not an atheist possess the virtues of generous philanthropy, and, to a certain extent, of benevolent zeal for the welfare of mankind in general, expressed by an attempt to remove their ignominious chains, to promote the civilization of savage nations whom he has never seen, to alleviate the sufferings and to enhance the comforts of all mankind? 10. Far be it from us to suppose that atheists are favourable to virtue, even in these inferior acceptations of the term. The reverse is abundantly evident. But this is what we assert, that such virtues as those above mentioned, when exclusive of what our author contends for, are what an atheist may possess, without inconsistency; and that they have no moral worth, no direct connexion, either with the complacency of God in them, or with the ultimate happiness of the agent. However attentive a man may be to practise the virtues in subservience to his health, while he repels those of friendship; or however observant of the virtues of friendship, while he repels others which are conducive to domestic, national, and universal happiness; his virtues, if the name be retained, are those of a bad character. Some have been conspicuous and zealous patriots, while determined foes to philanthropy and general good will to mankind as such. And how many have fought with the most patriotic zeal and courage in the field of honour, though tyrants at home, and in private life trampling on those virtues which constitute a good husband, a good father, a good master, a good neighbour, a good friend, or a good any thing. In short, were a man to “give all his goods to feed the poor, and his body to be burned,” out of zeal to promote some public good, yet without love to God, without benevolent attachment to universal being, he is morally nothing, or worse than nothing. 11. What are called virtues, without a disposition to embrace universal being and excellence, are, morally considered, but lifeless images. To compare them to a series of decimal figures, which, however increased, will never amount to an unit of moral worth, is to place them in too favourable a view; they are more like cyphers. But let these unmeaning cyphers be preceded by a figure, let these images have an informing and invigorating principle, let these dry bones have the spirit of life in them, and they will acquire a moral excellence; they will deserve the name of real virtues. 12. Some have defined virtue, by calling it, “a tendency to ultimate happiness.” If the meaning of this definition be, “a tendency to God, in whom our ultimate happiness is found,” it may be admitted; otherwise, it seems not admissible on many accounts. Tendency may be considered as either voluntary or involuntary. In the first place, let us suppose it to be voluntary. We then observe, that it is not rational, nor even compatible with common sense, to say, that virtue is a voluntary tendency to a quality of our own minds, as happiness evidently is. For happiness, from its very nature, is a relative state, or quality of mind, which is the result of enjoying an object suited to our wants. And to desire ultimate happiness, without including the object of choice from whence happiness results, is the same as to seek happiness in nothing. If it be said, that happiness itself is the object sought; then virtue consists in a voluntary tendency to seek happiness in happiness, which is absurd. 13. Ultimate happiness has been defined, “the durable possession of perfect good.” If this be a just statement, which few or none will question, what is the perfect good possessed? If it be answered, The Supreme Being: to this there is no objection. But if it be said, the ultimate happiness itself is the perfect good enjoyed: then the happiness to which the choice is directed is both cause and effect at the same time. Both the thing enjoyed and the enjoyment itself are the same thing. Which is no less absurd than for a man to assert, that the stock of a tree and the fruit on its branches, are the same thing; or that his relish of food is the same as the food itself. A tendency to happiness resulting from no object of that tendency, is the same thing as a tendency to no happiness. In other words, according to this definition, supposing the tendency to be voluntary, virtue is a desire of ultimate happiness. And this will reduce it to another absurdity; for, as a desire of ultimate happiness is an inseparable property of intelligent beings, the most vicious being in existence is virtuous. These consequences, however just, will not be thought very extraordinary, when compared with the following declarations. “The following seems to be at present the true moral state of the world: In every moral agent the number of virtuous actions greatly exceed that of vicious ones.—In by far the greater number of moral agents, and even amongst those who are considered as most vicious and profligate, the number of virtuous affections and habits greatly preponderates over the vicious ones. A character in which there is a preponderance of vice, is very rarely, if ever, to be met with.” (Belsham’s Elements, p. 400.) And, to advance one step further in this hopeful way, as this desire belongs to all intelligent beings alike, all intelligent beings are alike virtuous! 14. In reality, a mere desire of ultimate happiness is no virtue, has nothing laudable in it, but is a mere instinct of intellectual nature, and belongs alike to the best and the worst of intelligent beings. But virtue consists in the choice of, or a disposition to choose, laudable means in order to arrive at this end. A bad man in his choice of objects, or a vicious choice itself, aims at ultimate happiness; but the means are not laudable, and this wrong choice of means constitutes the very essence of his vice. 15. If it be said, that virtue is a tendency to ultimate self-enjoyment, as constituting happiness; then it follows that self is the perfect good desired. And then every one is himself all-sufficient to constitute his own happiness. Let any rational person judge, whether this be not a definition of sordid vice, rather than of virtue; and whether such a disposition would not be a tendency to insubordination, anarchy, and confusion, rather than to happiness—the very temper of an apostate spirit. 16. If it be said, moreover, that “a tendency to ultimate happiness,” does not refer to the will, desire, or choice; but expresses any thing which in fact tends to ultimate happiness. This leads us to suppose secondly, that the tendency is involuntary. It seems, then, on this supposition, that the means employed to acquire ultimate happiness need not be laudable. This is the genuine result of that account of virtue which is here animadverted upon; and which the abettors of it are forced to admit. The doctrine of “intrinsic merit or demerit of actions. Independent on their consequences.” they call an “absurd supposition.” (Belsham’s Elements, p. 309, 372, 373.) 17. It seems, then, we are all bound to be virtuous at our peril, and yet we must wait the result of all our actions, before we can know what is virtuous and what is not. For if virtue and vice have no intrinsic character of good or evil, but actions, affections, habits, or characters, are either good or bad from their ultimate consequences; then we must wait for those consequences, as the only expositors of virtue and vice. 18. Can any thing more be necessary, in order to show the absurdity of such a notion of virtue? Happiness, it is allowed, is a consequent, of which virtue is the antecedent. But what is the moral nature of this antecedent? Is it any thing good, beautiful, or laudable per se? No, say they; it has no nature beside tendency; which has no intrinsic merit or demerit; and consequently, that which has no moral nature is a moral nothing; that is, virtue is a moral nothing, or nothing moral. And whether this character of virtue be not totally distinct from the distant of right reason, philosophic accuracy, common sense, and christian piety, let the reader judge.—W.

[228] As was shown at large in the former treatise, on God’s end in creating the world, Chap. 1. sect. 4. whither I must refer the reader for a more full answer to this objection.

[229] It may be here noted, that when hereafter, I use such a phrase as private system of being, or others similar, I thereby intend any system or society of beings that contains but a small part of the great system, comprehending the universality of existence. I think that may well be called a private system, which is but an infinitely small part of this great whole we stand related to. I therefore also call that affection private affection, which is limited to so narrow a circle: and that general affection or benevolence, which has being in general for its object.

[230] In what manner it is so, I have endeavoured in some measure to explain in the preceding discourse of God’s end in creating the world.

[231] In this chapter our very ingenious and judicious author has assigned several reasons why many things are commonly thought to be virtuous which in reality are not so, or have no claim to moral goodness in the proper acceptation of these words. It is with some reluctance that we notice in this place a writer, who by his masterly attack on modern infidelity and atheism, has rendered such important service to the cause of truth and virtue: but who seems either to have been dissatisfied with these reasons, or to have omitted a strict examination of them when duty required it. We shall not here inquire into the candour of Mr. Robert Hall’s remarks, in associating President Edwards with modern infidels on the subject of virtue: nor on the congruity of the business, whereby a definition implying, and an explication declaring, the love of God to be essential to true virtue, is made to coincide with a definition adopted by infidels, and consistent with atheism itself. These are his words: “It is somewhat singular, that many of the fashionable infidels have hit upon a definition of virtue which perfectly coincides with that of certain metaphysical divines in America, first invented and defended by that most acute reasoner, Jonathan Edwards. They both place virtue exclusively in a passion for the general good; or, as Mr. Edwards expresses it, love to being in general: so that our love is always to be proportioned to the magnitude of its object in the scale of being: which is liable to the objections I have already stated, as well as to many others which the limits of this note will not permit me to enumerate. Let it suffice to remark, (1) That virtue, on these principles, is an utter impossibility: for the system of being, comprehending the great Supreme, is infinite: and therefore, to maintain the proper proportion, the force of particular attachment must be infinitely less than the passion for the general good: but the limits of the human mind are not capable of any emotions so infinitely different in degree. (2) since our views of the extent of the universe are capable of perpetual enlargement, admitting the sum of existence is ever the same, we must return back at each step to diminish the strength of particular affections, or they will become disproportionate: and consequently, on these principles, vicious: so that the balance must be continually fluctuating, by the weights being taken out of one scale and put one into the other. (3) If virtue consist exclusively in love to being in general, or attachment to the general good, the particular affections are, to every purpose of virtue, useless, and even pernicious: for their immediate, nay, their necessary tendency is to attract to their objects a proportion of attention which far exceeds their comparative value in the general scale. To allege that the general good is promoted by them, will be of no advantage to the defence of this system, but the contrary, by confessing that a greater sum of happiness is attained by a deviation from, than an adherence to, its principles: unless its advocates mean by the love of being in general, the same thing as the private affections, which is to confound all the distinctions of language, as well as all the operations of mind. Let it be remembered we have no dispute respecting what is the ultimate end of virtue, which is allowed on both sides to be the greatest sum of happiness in the universe. The question is merely what is virtue itself; or, in other words, what are the means appointed for the attainment of that end? There is little doubt, from some parts of Mr. Godwin’s work, entitled ‘Political Justice,’ as well as from his early habits of reading, that he was indebted to Mr. Edwards for his principal arguments against the private affections; though, with a daring consistence, he has pursued his principles to an extreme from which that most excellent man would have revolted with horror.—The fundamental error of the whole system arose, as I conceive, from a mistaken pursuit of simplicity: from a wish to construct a moral system, without leaving sufficient scope for the infinite variety of moral phenomena and mental combination; in consequence of which its advocates were induced to place virtue exclusively in some one disposition of mind; and, since the passion for the general good is undeniably the noblest and most extensive of all others, when it was once resolved to place virtue in any one thing, there remained little room to hesitate which should be preferred. It might have been worth while to reflect, that in the natural world there are two kinds of attraction; one, which holds several parts of individual bodies in contact; another, which maintains the union of bodies themselves with the general system; and that, though the union in the former case is much more intimate than in the latter, each is equally essential to the order of the world. Similar to this is the relation which the public and private affections bear to each other, and their use in the moral system.” (Modern Infidelity considered, p. 62, &c. Note, sixth edition.) On this note, so very uncongenial with the body of the work we were going to say, as unseemly, when connected with the discourse, as a deforming wart on a fair countenance, justice constrains us to make a few remarks. 1. “Singular” indeed would it be to find an Atheist, or an infidel, who should even approve of Edwards’s definition, and still more “singular” to find them maintaining, in conformity with his explanation of that definition, that supreme love to God is of the essence of true virtue. But so far are their definitions from “coinciding,” that they differ toto cælo. A passionate attachment for the welfare of a country, or “a passion for the general good,” in any sense wherein this expression can be ascribed to infidels, is a representation not more different from that of President Edwards, than Mr. Hall is different from Voltaire or D’Alembert. Our author’s meaning, as explained by himself, is as truly sublime as theirs is truly selfish and contracted. For their definition had no regard to the Being of beings; but this adorable Being is necessarily included in Mr. E’s definition, and essential to it. We say, is “included,” because the Supreme Being, together with every derived existence, is contained in “being in general.” 2. If by “a metaphysical divine” be meant “a most acute reasoner,” we feel no objection having the term “metaphysical” applied to our author, for few, if any, have deserved it better. If error and absurdity appeal to metaphysical discussions, and involve the truth in a labyrinth of sophisms, surely hard would be the case of a man who should be called by an opprobrious name, for venturing into that labyrinth by the light of essential principles, in order to detect and expose false reasoning. 3. Mr. H. objects to the sentiment, “that our love is always to be proportioned to the magnitude of its object in the scale of being.” We presume, however, he will allow, that the whole system of being is in itself the most worthy of being prized, other things being equal. But if so, the nature of true virtue requires this regard to the whole system of being, compared with its parts. Nor does it follow from this, that the same principle in the progress of its operations, disregards the smaller circle of attachments. Surely a virtuous person, loving God supremely, is not, on that account, less qualified for personal and domestic duties. Besides, Mr. E. does not maintain that our love is always to be proportioned to the magnitude of its object in the scale of being, except where other things are equal. This he expressly and repeatedly mentions—“other things being equal.” To this important distinction Mr. H. does not appear to have adverted; his representation of the case, therefore, is defective, and calculated to mislead the unwary. 4. Mr. H’s statement in the first objection, does not distinguish between the nature of the attachment and its force or degree. A little reflection will fully show, that these are entirely distinct considerations. The greatest force, or the highest degree of attachment, may exist, when the nature of it is not at all virtuous. If, indeed, attachment be made to include accurate knowledge, a divine relish, and deliberate esteem in appreciating the worth of any object, then the degree of attachment may be justly considered as proportionate to the “magnitude of the object in the scale of being,” but not otherwise. A truly virtuous mother, for instance, may have a great force of affection for her child, or husband, and be more conscious of it than of her love to God: but let her be put to the test of deliberate esteem, and she would sooner part with child, husband, or life itself, than renounce her supreme love to God. 5. Our author’s representation of true virtue, by no means implies, as Mr. H. supposes, that the degree or force of attachment, in its operation, should bear an exact proportion to the magnitude of its object. The nature of virtue indeed is to be denominated according to its object, but its degree must necessarily be measured pro captu agentis. The nature of love to God may be the same in the heart of a child, as in that of an angel, because the object of it is the same: but the degree of it will be as differently varied as the views and capacities of the subjects. It is not a little surprising how Mr. H. came to imagine, that our author held the sentiment he is pleased to ascribe to him, a sentiment so absurd as to be held, we apprehend, by no person in the world: a sentiment which requires an infinite force of affection from a finite being, an affection equal in degree to that of his Maker. 6. So far is the exercise of virtue, according to Mr. E’s definition, from being an impossibility, that we think he has fully proved, there can be no true virtue on any other principle. To illustrate this, suppose a man has strong attachment to himself, but none to his family: will that force of affection constitute him virtuous? Again, suppose his affection, with any assignable force, be extended to his family, but repels the well-founded claims of a whole nation, can that be virtuous? Or if he extend his force of affection to a whole nation, if it repels all the human race beside, can it be virtuous? Moreover, suppose his ardent affection embrace the whole human kind, can it be virtuous while it repels all other created beings? Or if, together with himself, he feels an affectionate attachment, in different and proportionate degrees, to every created being, but repels the Creator of all, can that forcible and orderly affection be denominated truly virtuous? If the reply be in the affirmative, then an atheist may be virtuous, which is absurd. Therefore, attachment to the Supreme Being. or to being in general, is essential to the very nature of true virtue. 7. No one yet denied, except those who deny the being of a God, that supreme love to him is virtuous, if any thing be so. The great Supreme is infinite, and if he ought not to be loved according to his greatness, what constitutes the crime of Idolatry? And if supreme love to an infinite being were inconsistent with subordinate attachments, we ought to extinguish the supremacy of our love to God, before we could discharge our duty to our fellow-creatures, which every one must allow to be preposterous. 8. As the second objection is founded on the same principle which was assumed in the first, it has been already virtually answered. But it may be controverted on another account. That “extended views” diminish the strength of particular affections, does not appear consonant with experience. Is it consistent with experience, that the acquisition of a second friend must rob the first of a moiety of his friendly affection? Does a parent experience any diminution of affection to a first child, in proportion to a subsequent increase of number? Has a tenth child but a tenth part of a mother’s former affection to her first? Does a man love his neighbour the less because his views are extended to an infinite object? Or when the heart, or supremacy of affection, is fixed on God, is virtuous affection to man diminished? 9. Besides, this objection proceeds on another gratuitous principle, viz. that there may be true virtue, or virtuous affection, when our views of existence do not include God. For if we view him, we view an object infinite and unchangeable, who is all in all, and the sum of existence. That our views of the extent of the created universe are capable of perpetual enlargement, is no good reason why “particular affections” should fluctuate, become disproportionate, or vicious: any more than the love of God should constitute the love of our neighbour criminal. So that there is no necessity for “the balance to be continually fluctuating by the weights being taken out of one scale and put into the other:” except it be by correcting past mistakes, as those do, who, when grown up to manhood, put away childish things. 10. Virtuous love, however forcible to oneself, to relatives, to a nation, to mankind, or to the whole created universe, is not virtuous because of this particular, private, or limited attachment, but because of its tendency to God, except we prostitute the term virtue to signify something claimed equally by the worst and the best of men. And this general attachment, or love to God and universal being, does not at all counteract, or even lessen, the commendable force of private ones, any more than the force of general gravity tends to destroy the force of cohesion. 11. Mr. H’s third and last objection, like the preceding ones, rests on a mistaken apprehension of Mr. E’s real sentiment. Mr. H. still confounds the nature of attachment with its degree. If virtue, according to Mr. E. consists exclusively in love to being in general, his meaning is, that no force of affection which has not universal being for its ultimate object, can be virtuous, in the most proper sense of the word. He cannot mean that there is no virtuous love to particular beings: for, in perfect consistency with his views, even a love of ourselves may be virtuous, as well as a love of our neighbour. What he maintains, then, is, that the love of ourselves, of our neighbour, our nation, or any private system whatever, if detached from a tendency of affection to universal being, is not truly virtuous. And what is this, more or less, than what all judicious divines have maintained, that he who does not really love god, does not truly love his neighbour? If Mr. E. uses language more philosophically exact, and investigates the principle on which a commonly received truth is founded, he certainly deserves commendation, rather than blame. 12. On Mr. E’s principles, the particular affections are so far from being “useless,” that their operations are not at all affected by those principles, except in being more exalted and refined. When the heart is enlarged to the love of being in general, it includes all particular objects: and then the attachment to them is for the sake of the whole system of being. Thus a truly virtuous love of our neighbour, springs from our love to God: or without a supreme regard to God, there is no genuine, or, in the highest sense, praiseworthy, love to our neighbour. And so far are particular affections from being “pernicious,” on Mr. E’s principles, that they are highly useful. Those objects which contain, or are apprehended to contain, only a secondary beauty, attract a particular affection which is useful in various respects, as explained by our author; and those which contain the primary beauty, attract affections still more useful. For governors, and subjects, and friends, and relatives to feel attachment to their subjects, governors, friends, and relatives, must be useful, even when not virtuous; but when these attachments are animated, regulated, and ennobled by the love of God, or benevolence to universal being, they must be still more so. Benevolent affections are like a pleasant flame; a flame which is not lessened by an addition of fuel. Zeal at home is not found in fact to be weakened by the extension of zealous and benevolent affections abroad. National reform, and religious revival, will not be impeded by a truly benevolent missionary spirit. Neither will the love of God, or of universal being, prove detrimental to “particular affections.” 13. Respecting the “particular affections,” Mr. H. remarks, that “their immediate, nay their necessary tendency is, to attract to their object a proportion of attention, which far exceeds their comparative value in the general scale.” But surely “attention” is a very different thing from “attachment.” A man who is about to buy a horse, has his attention attracted very forcibly to the size, the shape, the age, and the action of the animal; but does this imply attachment. The word Satan may attract our “attention” to the malevolent being signified by it; but does this prove that the “immediate, nay the necessary tendency” of the word is to attract to this object any degree of “attachment?” It would be difficult to find either man, woman, or child, but has much “attention attracted’ to what he does not esteem, and to which he feels no attachment. If a person feels an attachment to any object not founded on the “comparative value” of that object, let the “particular affection” be denominated as we please, but let us not attach to it the idea of true virtue. For why should we be tempted to call that truly virtuous which has no relation to God, the object and fountain of all excellence? 14. It is but justice to our author to say, that his definition of virtue, against which Mr. H. objects, by no means countenances that perversion of our powers which is but too justly ascribed to modern infidels. No one acting on the principles of this Dissertation, will be less amiable in private life, than when acting on any others which Mr. H. might point out. This hypothesis, which we believe is the scriptural one, and which, in substance, has been maintained by theological writers and holy men of every age, pours no chilling influence on the affections, encourages no unscriptural disregards or antipathies in society, nor does it countenance any neglect of private duties under pretence of public utility. We are assured, by an authority from which, in the views of Christians, there lies no appeal, that “to love God with all our heart,” is the first and great commandment. We would fain know, if knowable, wherein this requisition differs from that which is implied in Mr. E’s notion of true virtue? Moreover, whether loving God with ALL our heart is calculated to render “the particular affections, to every purpose of virtue, useless, and even pernicious?” And, once more, whether that act of the mind which is compatible with a rejection of what the divine oracle thus requires, can in any propriety of language, among Christians, be termed virtuous? 15. “To allege,” Mr. H. observes, “that the general good is promoted by them will be no advantage to the defence of this system.” We apprehend he means, that some may be disposed to allow, that the private affections, though not virtuous, may yet promote the general good, on some other account. But the objector is under a mistake, if he suppose, as he apparently does, that Mr. E. held any notion of true virtue which will admit no private or “particular affections” to be virtuous. In fact, the system explained in this Dissertation excludes no particular affection: but fully admits that any, yea, that all of them may be virtuous, by a proper direction. Supreme love to God, or attachment to universal being, is virtue per se; but any other affection, however public or private, particular or general, is a virtue only relatively; that is, only so far as it is a tendency to universal being. When the affection terminates on any particular object, without any relation in its tendency to universal existence, it is not a mean of ultimate happiness in itself commendable, and therefore is not virtuous. 16. “We have no dispute,” says Mr. H. “respecting what is the ultimate end of virtue—the question is, What is virtue itself?” Very true; what is it? We say, a love, an attachment, or a tendency of mind, to general or universal existence; whatever be the immediate object of the will or affections. If the affection be, for instance, that of parent to a child, however strong in its operation, it is no further truly virtuous, than there is a regard to God in it: or, a tendency to general being. But what is virtue itself, according to Mr. H.? The answer is not given. Had Mr. H. thought proper to give us a definition of virtue, we might compare notes, and form an estimate. It is much easier to find fault than to amend it; but this we feel disposed to promise, that if the objector produce what he thinks a better definition than what he opposes, we will endeavour too examine it with impartiality. 17. Mr. H. supposes that the author of the work entitled “Political Justice” was “indebted to Mr. Edwards for his principal arguments against the private affections.” Surely that author must possess a most perverse kind of ingenuity, who could deduce any thing from the works of President Edwards against the private affections. Such ingenuity as an infidel some times employs, when he is indebted to the writers of the Old or New Testament for his principal arguments against religion, and in favour of infidelity. 18. “A mistaken pursuit of simplicity,” Mr. H. supposes, attaches to this system, whereby its advocates “place virtue exclusively in some one disposition of mind.” We conceive, there is just as much propriety in this remark, as in the following: A mistaken pursuit of simplicity led a certain writer to place conformity to law “exclusively” in some one disposition of mind, where he says, that the law is fulfilled in one word, love. We are not aware that it is a matter of doubt, whether moral acts, and consequently virtue, proceed from the will, or the heart? and, as every exercise of will or affection is not virtuous, it requires no long “pursuit of simplicity” to determine that the virtuous character of the affection must arise from its nature, rather than its degree; and from its being directed to a worthy, rather than an unworthy object. 19. Mr. H. illustrates his meaning by two kinds of attraction; and so does Mr. E. illustrate his. Private affections, or instincts, irrespective of their virtuous quality, may be represented by the attraction of cohesion, whereby the several parts of individual bodies are held in contact. A truly virtuous affection may be represented by the attraction of gravitation, which maintains the union of bodies themselves with the general system. And, “though the union in the former case is much more intimate, than in the latter,” and “each is equally essential to the order of the world:” yet, private affections, irrespective of their tendency to God, can with no more propriety be respected as virtues, than cohesion can be termed gravitation.—W.

[232] As we have given a full Memoir in the first volume, those particulars which were contained in this brief account, and which are more fully and accurately narrated there, are omitted, in order to avoid needless repetition.

[233] Moral Philos. p. 289, 290.

[234] He often speaks of death and affliction as coming on Adam’s posterity in consequence of his sin; and in p. 20, 21. and many other places, he supposes, that these things come in consequence of his sin, not as a punishment or a calamity, but as a benefit. But in p. 23. he supposes, those things would be a great calamity and misery, if it were not for the resurrection; which resurrection he there, and in the following pages, and in many other places, speaks of as being by Christ; and often speaks of it as being by the grace of God in Christ. P. 63, 64. Speaking of our being subjected to sorrow, labour, and death, in consequence of Adam’s sin, he represents these as evils that are reversed and turned into advantages, and from which we are delivered through grace in Christ. And p. 65, 66, 67. he speaks of God thus turning death into an advantage through grace in Christ, as what vindicates the justice of God in bringing death by Adam. P. 152, 156. One thing he alleges against this proposition of the Assembly of Divines—That we are by nature bond-slaves to Satan—That God hath been providing, from the beginning of the world to this day, various means and dispensations, to preserve and rescue mankind from the devil. P. 168, 169, 170. In answer to that objection against his doctrine. That we are in worse circumstances than Adam, he alleges the happy circumstances we are under by the provision and means furnished through free grace in Christ. P. 228. In answering that argument against his doctrine —That there is a law in our members, bringing us into captivity to the law of sin and death.Rom. vii —He allows, that the case of those who are under a law threatening death for every sin, (which law he elsewhere says, shows us the natural and proper demerit of sin, and is perfectly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness,) must be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver. P. 90-93. S. In opposition to what is supposed of the miserable state mankind are brought into by Adam’s sin, he alleges, The noble designs of love, manifested by advancing a new and happy dispensation, founded on the obedience and righteousness of the Son of God; and that, although by Adam we are subjected to death, yet in this dispensation a resurrection is provided; and that Adam’s posterity are under a mild dispensation of Grace, &c. P. 112. S. He vindicates God’s dealings with Adam, in placing him at first under the rigour of law, transgress and die, (which, as he expresses it, was putting his happiness on a foot extremely dangerous,) by saying, that as God had before determined in his own breast, so he immediately established his covenant upon a quite different bottom, namely, upon grace. P. 122, 123. S. Against what R. R. says, That God forsook man when he fell, and that mankind after Adam’s sin were born without the divine favour, &c. he alleges, among other things, Christ’s coming to be the propitiation for the sins of the whole world—And the riches of God’s mercy in giving the promise of a Redeemer to destroy the works of the devil—That he caught his sinning falling creature in the arms of his grace. In his note on Rom. v. 20. p. 297, 298. he says as follows: “The law I conceive, is not a dispensation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in our present state; or it doth not seem congruous to the goodness of God, to afford us no other way of salvation but by a law, which, if we once transgress, we are ruined for ever. For who then from the beginning of the world could be saved? And therefore it seems to me, that the law was not absolutely intended to be a rule for obtaining life, even to Adam in paradise: Grace was the dispensation God intended mankind should be under; and therefore Christ was fore-ordained before the foundation of the world.”—There are various other passages in this author’s writings of the like kind.

[235] Gal. iii. 11.

[236] I am sensible, these things are quite inconsistent with what he says elsewhere, of sufficient power in all mankind constantly to do the whole duty which God requires of them without a necessity of breaking God’s law in any degree. (p. 63-68. S.) But, I hope, the reader will not think me accountable for his inconsistences.

[237] Here may be observed the weakness of that objection, made against the validity of the argument for a fixed propensity to sin, from the constancy and universality of the event, that Adam sinned in one instance, without a fixed propensity. Without doubt a single event is an evidence, that there was some cause or occasion of that event. But the thing we are speaking of, is a fixed cause: propensity is a stated continued thing. We justly agree, that a stated effect must have a stated cause, and truly observe, that we obtain the notion of tendency, or stated preponderation in causes, no other way than by observing a stated prevalence of a particular kind of effect. But who ever argues a fixed propensity from a single event? And is it not strange arguing, that because an event which once comes to pass, does not prove any stated tendency, therefore the unfailing constancy of an event is an evidence of no such thing? But because Dr. T. makes so much of this objection from Adam sinning without a propensity, I shall hereafter consider it more particularly, in the beginning of the 9th section of this chapter; where will also be considered what is objected from the fall of the angels.

[238] If any should object, that this is an overstraining of things; and that it supposes a greater niceness and exactness than is observed in scripture representations, to infer from these expressions, that all men sin immediately as soon as ever they are capable of it. To this I would say, that I think the arguments used are truly solid, and do really and justly conclude, either that men are born guilty, and so are chargeable with sin before they come to act for themselves, or else commit sin immediately, without the least time intervening, after they are capable of understanding their obligations to God, and reflecting on themselves; and that the Scripture clearly determines, there is not one such person in the world , free from sin. But whether this be straining things to too great an exactness, or not; yet I suppose, none that do not entirely set aside the sense of such scriptures as have been mentioned, and deny those propositions which Dr. T himself allows to be contained in some of them, will deny they prove, that no considerable time passes after men are capable of acting for themselves, as the subjects of God’s law, before they are guilty of sin; because if the time were considerable, it would be great enough to deserve to be taken notice of, as an exception to such universal propositions, as, in thy sight shall no man living be justified, &c. And if this be allowed, that men are so prone to sin, that in fact all mankind do sin, as it were, immediately after they come to be capable of it, or fail not to sin so soon, that no considerable time passes before they run into transgression against God; it does not much alter the case, as to the present argument. If the time of freedom from sin be so small, as not to be worthy of notice in the forementioned universal propositions of Scripture, it is also so small, as not to be worthy of notice in the present argument.

[239] What Dr. Turnbull says of the character of a good man, is also worthy to be observed, Chris. Phil. p. 86, 258, 259, 288, 375, 376, 409, 410

[240] Levit. xvii.7. Josh. v.9.and Josh. xxiv.14. Ezek. xx. 7, 8. and Ezek. xxii.3.

[241] Dr. Turnbull, though so great an enemy to the doctrine of the depravity of nature, yet greatly insists upon it, that the experimental method of reasoning ought to be adopted in moral matter, and things pertaining to the human nature; and should chiefly be relied upon, in moral as well as natural philosophy. See Introduc. to Mor. Phil.

[242] Key, § 167.

[243] Note on Rom. i. 16.

[244] Pref to Par, on Rom. p 145, 47

[245] See p. 259. 63, 64, 72. S.

[246] Pref. To Par. On Rom. p. 146, 48.

[247] Belsham.

[248] See p. 81, note.

[249] See p. 81, note.

[250] Page 257, 258, 52, 53. S. and many other places.

[251] See Jer. ii. 2, 3. Psal. lxviii. 14.Josh. xxii. 2.andJosh xxiii. 8. Deut. iv. 3, 4.Hos. xi. 1. and Hos. ix. 10. Judg. ii. 7,Judg. ii. 17, Judg. ii. 22. and many other places.

[252] See Mor. Phil. p. 279 and Chris. Phil. p. 274.

[253] Chris. Phil. p. 282, 283.

[254] Mor. Phil. p. 311.

[255] Belsham.

[256] Chris. Phil. p. 113, 114, 115.

[257] See Lev. x. 6. Num. i. 53. and Num. xviii. 5. Josh. ix. 20. 2 Chron. xxiv. 18. and 2 Chron. xix. 2, 10. and 2 Chron. xxviii. 13. and 2 Chron. xxxii. 25 Ezra vii. 23. Neh. xiii.18. Zech. vii. 12. and many other places.

[258] P 21, 67, and other places.

[259] See 1 Pet. iv. 17, 18, compared with Prov. xi. 31. See also Psal. lxix. 4-9.

[260] As in Psal. lxxviii. 38, 39. Psal. ciii. 9. with Psal. ciii. 14, 15. Psal. xxx. 2, 3, 9. and Job xxxiii. 22-24.

[261] So Job x. 9. Psal. vi. 1-5. Psal. lxxxviii 9, 10, 11. and Psal. cxliii. 7.

[262] Gen. xx. 4. Exod. xxiii. 7. Deut. xxv. 1. 2 Sam. iv. 11. 2 Chron. vi. 23. and Prov. xviii. 5.

[263] Mor. Phil. p. 112-115. p. 142 et alibi passim.

[264] Marginal Note, annexed to § 356.

[265] This is doubtless true: for although there was no natural sinful inclination in Adam, yet an inclination to that sin of eating the forbidden fruit, was begotten in him by the delusion and error he was led into; and this inclination to eat the forbidden fruit, must precede his actual eating.

[266] Making use of Buxtorf’s Concordance, which, according to the author’s professed design, directs to all the places where the word is used.

[267] See p. 78, note on Rom. vii. 5. and note on Rom. vii. 6. Note on Rom. vii. 8

[268] By comparing what he says, p. 126, with what he often says of that death and destruction which is the demerit and end of personal sin, which he says is the second death or eternal destruction.

[269] To the like purposes are Ezek. iii. 19, 20. and Ezek. xviii. 4, 9, 13, 17-21, 24, 26, 28. Ezek. xxxiii 8, 9, 12-14, 19.

[270] So Prov. v. 5, 6, 23. Prov. vii. 27. Prov. viii. 36. Prov. ix. 18. Prov. x. 21. Prov. xi. 19. Prov. xiv. 12. Prov. xv. 10. Prov. xviii. 21. Prov. xix. 16, 21. and Prov. xxiii. 13, 14.

[271] Note on Rom. v. 20. Par. p. 291-299

[272] Page 27. S.

[273] The subsequent part of the quotation the reader will not meet with in the third edition of Dr. T. but the second, of 1711.

[274] Page 95, 90, 91. S

[275] Page 25, 45, 46. S.

[276] Note annexed to § 267.

[277] As in Gen. i. 21, 24, 28. Gen. ii. 19. Gen. vi. 19. Gen. vii. 23. and Gen. viii. 1. and many other places in the Bible.

[278] Page 120, &c. S.

[279] To the like purpose in Prov. iii. 3. and Deut. xi. 18. where this word is used.

[280] A word of the same root is used to signify a young child, or a little child, in the following places; 1 Sam. i. 24, 25, 27. 1 Kings iii. 7. and 1 Kings xi. 17. 2 Kings ii. 23. Job xxxiii. 25. Prov. xxii. 6. Prov. xxiii. 13. and Prov. xxix. 21. Isa. x. 19. Isa. xi. 6. and Isa. lxv. 20. Hos. xi.1. The same word is used to signify an infant, in Exod. ii. 6. and Exod. x. 9. Judg. xiii. 5, 7, 8, 24. 1 Sam. i. 22. and 1 Sam. iv. 21. 2 Kings v. 14. Isa. vii. 16. and Isa viii. 4.

[281] So Gen. xlvi. 34. Job xxxi.18. Jer. xxxii. 30. and Jer. xlviii. 11. Ezek. iv. 14. Zech. xiii.5.

[282] A phrase of the like import with that in Gen. viii. 21. The imagination, or, as it might have been rendered, the operation, of his heart is evil.

[283] Judges xiii. 5.

[284] Page 5, 64, 96, 97, 98, 102, 108, 112, 118, 120, 122, 127, 128, 136, 142, 143, 149, 152, 155, 229.

[285] 142.

[286] See also Acts ii.17. Rom iii. 20. 1 Cor. i. 29. Gal. ii.16.

[287] See Key, § 307, 310.

[288] Page 102, 104, 117, 119, 120. and note on Rom. iii.10-19.

[289] See note on Rom. iii.10-19 Rom. v.11. and Rom. ix. 30, 31

[290] Rom. iii. 12.

[291] Rom. iii. 13.

[292] Rom. iii. 11.

[293] Page 114-120. See also Dr. T.’s Paraph. and notes on the place.

[294] Matt. viii. 5-13. Matt. ix. 9-13. Matt. xi. 19-24. Matt. xv. 21-28. Luke vii. 37 to the end; Luke xvii.12-19. Luke. xix.1-10. John iv. 9, 39. &c. Compare Luke x. 29. &c.

[295] Matt. xxi. 28-32. Matt. xxii.1-10. Luke xiv.16-24. Compare Luke xiii. 28, 29, 30.

[296] Matt. x.14, 15

[297] John viii. 33-44. It may be observed, that John the Baptist greatly contradicted the Jew’s opinion of themselves, as being a holy people, and accepted of God, because they were children of Abraham—and on that account better than the heathen whom they called sinners, enemies, unclean, &c.—in baptizing the Jews as a polluted people, and sinners, as the Jews used to baptize proselytes from among the heathen; calling them to repentance as sinners, saying, Think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father; for I say unto you, that God is able, of these stones, to raise up children unto Abraham; and teaching the Pharisees, that instead of their being a holy generation, and children of God, as they call themselves, they were a generation of vipers.

[298] See Rom. vii. 4-13. agreeably to those words of Christ, John v. 45.

[299] Rom. iv. 7, 8.

[300] The following are all the other places where the word is used, Rom. i. 26. Rom. ii. 14, 27. and Rom. xi. 21, 24. thrice in that verse; 1 Cor. xi.14. Gal. ii.15. Gal. iv. 8. Jam.iii.7.twice in that verse; and 2 Pet. i. 4.

[301] See also the following chapters, Eph. iii. 6. and Eph. iv.17. And not only in this epistle, but constantly in other epistles; as Rom. i. 12, 13. Rom. xi.13, 14, 17-25, 28, 30, 31. Rom. xv. 15, 16. 1 Cor. xii. 2. Gal. iv. 8. Col. i. 27; Col. ii. 13 1 Thess. i. 5, 6, 9; 1 Thess. ii. 13, 14, 15, 16.

[302] Dr. T. himself reckons this a part of the same discourse or paragraph, in the division he makes of the epistle, in his paraphrase, and notes upon it.

[303] See note on Rom. v. 20.

[304] Rom. v. 14.

[305] There are many places parallel with these, as John xi. 25,26. ” I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth, and believeth in me, shall never die.” Here both the words, life and death, are used with this variation: “I am the resurrection and the life,” meaning spiritual and eternal life, “He that believeth in me, though he were dead,” having respect to temporal death, “yet shall he live,” with respect to spiritual life, and the restoration of the life of the body. “And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die,” meaning a spiritual and eternal death. So in John vi. 49,50. “Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead,” having respect chiefly to temporal death. “This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die,” i.e. by the loss of spiritual life, and by eternal death. (See also ver. 58.) And in the next verse, “If any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever.” have eternal life. So ver. 54. See another like instance, John v. 24-29.

[306] Page 56.

[307] Key,§ 374. where it is to be observed, that he himself puts the word ANY in capital letters. The same thing in substance is often asserted elsewhere. And this indeed is his main point in what he calls the true gospel-scheme.

[308] Key, chap. viii. title, p. 44.

[309] Key, § 145.

[310] Page 40, 41, 43, 57. and often elsewhere.

[311] See also Job iv. 7, 8, 9. Job xv. 17-35. Job xviii. 5-21. Job xix. 29. and Job xx. 4-8, 23-29. Job xxi 16-18, 20-26. Job xxii. 13-20 and Job xxvii. 11-23 Job xxxi. 3,23 Job xxxiii. 18,22,23,24,28,30. Job xxxiv. 11, 21-26. Job xxxvii. 12, 18, 19, 20. and Job xxxviii. 13.

[312] Page 117. S.

[313] Page 77, 78.

[314] Page 68.

[315] | Page 120. S. He says to the like purpose in his note on Rom. v. 17.

[316] This is plain by what he says, p. 38, 40, 53, 117. S.

[317] * Page 39, 70, 148, 27. S. See also contents of this paragraph in Rom v. in his notes on the epistle, and his notes on Rom. v. 15, 16, 17.

[318] † Page 119. S.

[319] Page 69.

[320] Page 148.

[321] See chap. ii. 1, 2, 3. six times in these verses; also ver. 12 and 27. and chap. iii. 7. chap. viii. 1, and 3. chap. xiv. 3. 4. and ver. 10, 13, 22, and 23.

[322] So page 47, 49, 60,61, 62, and other places.

[323] Notes on the epistle, page 284.

[324] As may be observed in Matt. xxii. 30. Luke xx. 35, 36. John vi. 39, 40, 54. Philip. iii. 11. and other places.

[325] 1 Cor. xv. 22.

[326] As in Luke xiv. 14. and xxi. 28. Rom. viii. 23. Eph. iv. 30. Colos. iii. 4. 2 Thess. i.7. 2 Tim. iv. 8. 1 Pet. i. 13. and v. 4. 1 John iii. 2. and other places.

[327] Page 30.

[328] Page 54, and elsewhere.

[329] Page 34.

[330] Gen. xx. 9.

[331] Page 27. S.

[332] Agreeably to his manner, our author, in explaining the 7th chap. of Romans, understands the pronoun I, or me, used by the apostle in that one continued discourse, in no less than six different senses. He takes it in the 1st ver. to signify the apostle Paul himself. In the 8, 9, 10, and 11th verses, for the people of the Jews, through all ages, both before and after Moses, especially the carnal ungodly part of them. In the 13th ver. for an objecting Jew, entering into a dialogue with the apostle. In the 15, 16, 17, 20, and latter part of the 25th ver. it is understood in two different senses, for two I’s in the same person; one, a man’s reason; and the other, his passions and carnal appetites. And in the 7th and former part of the last verse, for us Christians in general; or, for all that enjoy the word of God, the law and the gospel: and these different senses, the most of them strangely inter mixed and interchanged backwards and forwards.

[333] Pref. to Paraph. on Rom. p. 146. 48.

[334] Here are worthy to be observed the things which Dr. T. himself says to the same purpose, Key. § 302, 303. and Pref. to Par. on Ep. to Rom. p. 144, 43.

[335] Rom. v. 12.

[336] Rom. v. 16.

[337] The offence, according to Dr. T.‘s explanation, docs not abound by the law at all really and truly, in any sense; neither the sin, nor the punishment. For he says, “The meaning is not, that men should be made more wicked; but, that men should be liable to death for every transgression.” But after all, they are liable to no more deaths, nor to any worse deaths, if they are not more sinful: for they were to have punishments according to their desert, before. Such as died, and went into another world, before the law of Moses was given, were punished according to their deserts; and the law, when it came, threatened no more.

[338] Page 88. 89. S.

[339] In this inferential short reply, our author it not quite so guarded as usual. It seems applicable only to infant; since adults have actual or personal sin and guilt from which to be redeemed. But what immediately follows anticipates the objection.—W.

[340] Page 111. 68, 64. S.

[341] Page 67. S.

[342] Page 68. S.

[343] Here, also, our author will be thought not quite accurate, in the inference lie draws against Dr. T. for the “sufficient power,” for which Dr. T. pleads, relates only to the prevention of sin, but not to its remission, or the removal of its effects. But this also will be soon answered.—W.

[344] Pref. to Par. on Rom. p. 143. 38.

[345] Note on Rom. v. 20. p. 297.

[346] Ibid.

[347] Page 92. S.

[348] See p. 228. and also what he says of the helpless state of the heathen, in paraph. and notes on Rom. vii. and beginning of chap. viii.

[349] Page 128.

[350] See p. 180, 245, 250

[351] In p. 44, 50. and innumerable other places.

[352] See page 234, 61, 64-72. S.

[353] See Paraph, on Rom. ii. 9. also on ver. 12.

[354] Page 144.

[355] Page 251.

[356] Ezek. xxxvi. 25, 26.

[357] Page 149-153. S.

[358] Page 224.

[359] Page 125, 128-130, 186-188, 190, 200, 245, 246, 253, 258, 63, 64, 161. S. and other places.

[360] Page. 128

[361] Page 190.

[362] Page 200. See also p. 216.

[363] Contents of Rom. chap. vii. in Notes on the epistle.

[364] Page 125.

[365] P. 137, 187-189, 256, 258, 260, 143. S. and other places.

[366] Page 187.

[367] Page 146, 148, 149. S. and the like in many other places.

[368] The sentiment contained in this paragraph, and illustrated in the following part of this chapter, is of the utmost importance, in order not only to remove Pelagian prejudices, and the cavils of modern philosophers, but also to give a just and consistent view of the nature and cause of sin; the cause of all sin in general, and original sin in particular. Our author’s explanation, which immediately follows, both in the text and in the note, is ingenious, and in some respects quite satisfactory. But a brief representation of the same result in another way, may demand some attention. 1. It is probably more philosophical, as well as more intelligible, in describing the two kinds of principles, as the author calls them, possessed by Adam, to say, that the inferior ones were, those faculties in man which constituted him a moral agent; rather than calling them “the principles of mere human nature.” The superior ones are very accurately described; but instead of calling them “supernatural principles;” they may more properly be termed, divine, benevolent, sovereign influence, superadded to those faculties which constituted adam a moral agent. This representation leads to the essential relations that subsist between God and his creature man. “Mere human nature,” and “supernatural principles” convey no distinctive character of relation. “Faculties which constitute a moral agent,” express the ground of relation between equity in God and accountableness in man; and “benevolent influences,” express the ground of relation between sovereignty in God and passiveness in man. 2. That Adam had such qualifications, or faculties, as rendered him a moral agent, independently of his spiritual knowledge, righteousness, holiness, dominion, honour, and glory—in other words, his divine light, holy life, and supreme love to God—is self-evident. For, after he had lost those excellencies, he was confessedly no less a moral agent, and accountable to his divine Governor and Judge for his temper, thoughts, desires, words, and works, than he was before he lost them. 3. The philosophical cause, or the true origin, of Adam’s defection, was his liberty in union with his passive power. For an explanation of these terms, and the proof of the proposition just laid down, we must refer the reader to our notes on the first volume of this work, where the subject is professedly discussed. 4. The true and ultimate cause of the first sin of Adam, of all his subsequent sins, and those of his posterity, whether infants or adults, is not essentially different. If the principles, as our author calls them, or the faculties and qualifications, which constitute moral agency and accountability, be left to themselves—whereby they become influenced by passive power, not counteracted by sovereign, benevolent, or holy divine influence—the effect will be the same, though attended with different circumstances. 5. When the cause of Adam’s integrity, perfection, spirituality, and happiness, or his paradisiacal life, was no longer operative for his preservation, defection ensued; which consisted in the loss of the chief good, together with that disorder, confusion, and a conscious exposedness to a continuance in that state, whereby happiness was necessarily exchanged for a restless uneasiness, called misery. 6. This was the case of Adam in his own person. But our author, in the next chapter, excellently shows, that Adam and all his posterity were strictly one. This union we may call a systematic whole. For mankind, or the whole race of man, has a constituted connexion, no less than a seed with its plant; for instance, the acorn with the oak-plant, and that with its future branches. We justly called it the same tree from the time it was planted to its utmost longevity, though some of its branches came into existence a hundred years or more after the first shoot. This union of Adam with his posterity, is no less a constituted union, than that which connects the solar system; or any other inferior systematic whole, as an animal body, which is regarded as one from its birth till its death. For instance, nothing but a constitution founded in the sovereign pleasure of God, caused the body of Methuselah to be the same, or regarded as the same, when in infancy, and above nine hundred years after. The parts of his body, at least most of them, were as different in old age, compared with his infancy, as any of his posterity are different from Adam. In each case alike, the appointment of God in forming a course of nature, or his operations according to a constituted plan, could make the body of Methuselah to be the same body from the first to the last; and the posterity of Adam the same with himself. 7. In every vital system there is a vital part, and in every other system, as such, one part is more essential than another. Adam was the vital part of the system of mankind.—The root of the tree, the foundation of the building, the main spring of the machine, the sun of the system. We his posterity are but so many members of a body, and are all dependent on him as on our head or heart; but not so on one another. There may be the amputation of a limb, while the other limbs are not injured; but if the head or heart be deprived of life, all the members are deprived at the same time. A branch of a tree may be lopped off without injury to the other part; but if the root, the vital part, be affected, all the branches are also affected as the necessary consequence. A dead root and a living tree are incompatible; though a dead branch and a living branch of the same tree are not. A watch is a system formed on principles of mechanism, the index may be mutilated, or the cog of a wheel may be broken and detached, without affecting the more essential parts; but if the main spring be broken, the whole system, as to its designed use, is destroyed. A building is a system; a slate or a chimney may be blown down, without affecting the foundation, but if the whole foundation be undermined, the whole fabric must fall to ruin. The solar system might subsist, for ought that appears to the contrary, though a comet, a satellite, or a planet, were annihilated; but if the sun were annihilated, ruin and confusion must ensue. 8. Whatever Adam lost by transgression, he could have no claim either in equity or by promise, that is, he could have no claim at all, for a restoration of it. And what he could have no claim for himself, could not be claimable by or for his posterity; any more than a branch or a member could obtain life, when the root of that branch or the head of that member had ceased to live; or any more than the subordinate parts of any system when the radical, vital, fundamental, and essential parts had failed. 9. What Adam lost was the divine life, and the happiness implied in it, as a favour granted on a condition. Observing the condition, he was to have it continued; but on breaking the condition, it was to be forfeited. Adam may be compared to a lord in waiting, who should have free access to every room in the king’s palace one excepted. By abstaining from this intrusion, he should have his honour and dignity preserved, and confirmed to his heirs for ever; but by offending as to the condition prescribed, he must sink to the rank of a common subject, stripped of all his former dignity. How absurd would it be for the heirs of such a lord to step forward and claim what he had forfeited! Equally absurd is it to say, that Adam’s posterity are no suffers by his transgression. 10. If we would form accurate notions of Adam’s transgression, original sin, and the imputation of guilt, it will be of the utmost importance to consider the divine law, by which is the knowledge of sin, under a twofold consideration. As a rule requiring conformity and obedience in every period of our existence, or the measure of moral obligation; and as a covenant, the condition of which was perfect conformity and obedience, under forfeiture of a special favour. The law as a rule may be transgressed times and methods innumerable; but as a covenant it could be transgressed only once. For the very first offence was a breach of the condition, and a forfeiture of that favour which depended on the performance of that condition. It is possible for the transgressor of the law as a rule to become, through grace, a perfect character, and therefore perfectly conformable to that law. But to be perfectly conformable to the required condition, once broken, is impossible; as impossible as to recall time once past, or to make transgression to be no transgression. 11. Our author very justly remarks that “there is not the least, need of supposing any evil quality infused, implanted, or wrought into the nature of man, by any positive cause or influence whatsoever, either from God, or the creature; or of supposing, that man is conceived and born with a foundation of evil in his heart, such as in any thing properly positive.” But however just this remark, there is reason to fear that many beside Dr. Taylor have imbibed a notion of original sin considerably different from what is here asserted. It is not improbable that the terms by which the evil has been commonly expressed without a due examination of the idea intended, have had no small influence to effect this. The frequent use of such analogical and allusive terms as pollution, defilement, corruption, contamination, and the like, seems to imitate something positive; as these expressions in their original meaning convey an idea of something superadded to the subject. Whereas other terms, though equally analogical and allusive, imply no such thing; such as, disorder, discord, confusion, and the like. We do not mean to condemn the use of the former, or to recommend the latter to their exclusion; but only design to caution against a wrong inference from a frequent use of them. 12. On the subject of the imputation of Adam’s offence to his posterity, our author, in the next chapter, has treated very ably and fully. But we may here observe, that it is of the greatest importance to have just views of what is called original guilt. It is to be feared that many form very confused notions of the subject, when it is said. “we are all guilty when born,” or “we are all guilty of Adam’s transgression,” or “the guilt of Adam’s offence is ours.” Though we conceive these, and similar propositions, to be expressive of an important truth; yet we are no less liable to be led astray from the true idea referred to by these expressions, than by others employed to represent moral depravity. 13. It may contribute to a clearness of conception on the subject, if we keep in mind, that Adam was guilty by his first offence, under a twofold consideration. He was guilty of a breach of law considered as a rule of rectitude, and of the same law as a covenant enjoining the observance of a special duty, which was the avowed and express condition of it. The performance of the condition was to secure not merely moral purity and innocence, but also the favour, or gracious benefit, which he possessed on the footing of a sovereign grant. This was his federal privilege. How by the transgression of the law, considered as a covenant, this favour was forfeited; and for God to treat him as one deprived of this favour, is the same thing as to treat him as guilty. For how could he be treated otherwise, when the very condition on which he retained the favour was broken? 14. Whatever Adam possessed, beyond those considerations which constituted him a moral agent, was the fruit of sovereign benevolence. Hence arises the propriety of regarding the possession of his privilege, on the observance of a specified condition, under the term covenant. For, if Adam possessed some spiritual principles, or benevolent influences, as a person possesses immunities and privileges by charter for himself and his heirs; and if these chartered benefits be retained on condition of not offending in a specified manner; it follows, that a privation of such benefits belongs as much to the heirs as to the individual offending. But if they are treated for breach of such covenant, or charter held on condition, as persons included in the forfeiture, it is manifest they are regarded so far guilty or worthy to suffer such loss. 15. From these considerations it follows that Adam’s breach of law as a rule which brought guilt upon him as an individual, is not the guilt imputable to his posterity. During his long life, no doubt, he was guilty of innumerable offences after the first transgression, but not one of these is imputed to us; the reason is, that after he broke the condition of the charter, he stood upon the bare ground of personal moral obligation. But personal guilt, on such ground, cannot in equity be transferred from one to another. The sins of the father, whether the first father or any other, considered merely as a personal deviation from rectitude, or a breach of moral obligation, cannot be imputed to the children. 16. What Adam, therefore, suffered for breach of covenant, was a privation of chartered benefits. The unavoidable effect of this was, DEATH; a privation of spiritual life—which continued is death eternal—and a privation of that protection and care which would have preserved from temporal death. There seems little room to doubt that even the corporeal, or elementary part of Adam underwent a great change by the fall. However, having forfeited his charter of preservation by transgression, he and all his posterity became exposed to the natural operations of this world and its elements. Matter and motion, in animals and vegetables, in the natural state of things, insure a dissolution. 17. Much has been said by some divines, about the probability of Adam, had he kept the condition, being promoted to some situation still more exalted. But there is reason to suspect, that such a sentiment proceeds on the supposition of Adam possessing a less exalted situation than he really did possess. The idea seems to be founded on a probable promotion for continued obedience. But what could be a greater reward than a continuance of chartered privileges? And what greater loss than their forfeiture? 18. It would not be difficult to demonstrate, were not this note too far extended to admit of it, that Adam, dealt with on the ground of strict equity, would have been not less liable to defection than his posterity are, when they begin to exercise moral agency. Therefore, the objection against the constitution of Adam and his posterity being regarded as one, is deprived of all force. For, whatever creature, in whatever world, were dealt with in strict equity, without benevolent influence to counteract passive power, he would have no advantages against a liability to defection above the race of man after the fall. The only difference is, that Adam once actually possessed an exalted privilege, and fell from it. And if his posterity, rendered so far guilty as to be deprived of chartered benefits with him, cannot be raised to happiness from their fallen state without the exercise of benevolent sovereign influence in the plan of salvation: it should be recollected, that Adam himself could not have maintained his standing but by the same benevolent sovereign influence, though exercised in a different way. COROLLARY. 19. Hence the propriety and the true ground of the well known distinction of a believer in the second Adam not being under the law (i.e. the condemnation of the law) as a covenant, though under the law as a rule. It is found, as to its true reason, in the state of Adam, as above explained.—W

[369] To prevent all cavils, the reader is desired particularly to observe, in what sense I here use the words natural and supernatural:—Not as epithets of distinction between that which is concreated or connate, and that which is extraordinarily introduced afterwards, besides the first state of things, or the order established originally, beginning when man’s nature began; but as distinguishing between what belongs to, or flows from, that nature which man has, merely as man, and those things which are above this, by which one is denominated, not only a man, but a truly virtuous, holy, and spiritual man; which, though they began in Adam as soon as humanity began, and are necessary to the perfection and well-being of the human nature, yet are not essential to the constitution of it, or necessary to its being: inasmuch as one may have every thing to his being man, exclusively of them. If in thus using the words, natural and supernatural, I use them in an uncommon sense, it is not from any affectation of singularity, but for want of other terms more aptly to express my meaning.

[370] Part iv. § 9.

[371] Key, § 388, note: and Par. on Rom. i. 24, 36.

[372] Page 134. S. See also with what vehemence this is urged in p. 137. S.

[373] Page 146, 187.

[374] Page 136. S.

[375] My meaning, in the whole of what has been said, may be illustrated thus: Let us suppose that Adam and all his posterity had co-existed, and that his posterity had been, through a law of nature established by the Creator, united to him, something as the branches of a tree are united to the root, or the members of the body to the head, so as to constitute as it were one complex person, or one moral whole: so that by the law of union there should have been a communion and co-existence in acts and affections; all jointly participating, and all concurring, as one whole, in the disposition and action of the head: as we see in the body natural, the whole body is affected as the head is affected; and the whole body concurs when the head acts. Now, in this case, all the branches of mankind, by the constitution of nature and law of union, would have been affected just as Adam, their common root, was affected. When the heart of a root, by a full disposition, committed the first sin, the hearts of all the branches would have concurred; and when the root, in consequence of this, became guilty, so would all the branches; and when the root, as a punishment of the sin committed, was forsaken of God, in like manner would it have fared with all the branches; and when the root, in consequence of this, was confirmed in permanent depravity, the case would have been the same with all the branches; and as new guilt on the soul of Adam would have been consequent on this, so also would it have been with his moral branches. And thus all things, with relation to evil disposition, guilt, pollution, and depravity, would exist, in the same order and dependence, in each branch, as in the root. Now, difference of the time of existence does not at all hinder things succeeding in the same order, any more than difference of place in a co-existence of time. Here may be observed, as in several respects to the present purpose, some things are said by STAPFERUS, an eminent divine of Zurich, in Switzerland, in his Theologia Polemica, published about fourteen years ago:—in English as follows. “Seeing all Adam’s posterity are derived from their first parent, as their root, the whole of human kind, with its root, may be considered as constituting but one whole, or one mass; so as not to be properly distinct from its root; the posterity not differing from it, any otherwise than the branches of from the tree. From which it easily appears, how that when the root sinned, all which is derived from it, and with it constitutes but one whole, may be looked upon as also sinning; seeing it is not distinct from the root, but one with it.”—Tom. i. cap. 3. § 856. 57. “It is objected, against the imputation of Adam’s sin, that we never committed the same sin with Adam, neither in number or in kind. I answer, we should distinguish here between the physical act itself, which Adam committed, and the morality of the action, and consent to it. If we have respect only to the external act, to be sure it must be confessed, that Adam’s posterity did not put forth their hands to the forbidden fruit: in which sense, that act of transgression, and that fall of Adam, cannot be physically one with the sin of his posterity. But if we consider the morality of the action, and what consent there is to it, it is altogether to be maintained, that his posterity committed the same sin, both in number and in kind, inasmuch as they are to be looked upon as consenting to it. For where there is consent to a sin, there the same sin is committed. Seeing therefore that Adam with all his posterity constitute but one moral person, and are united in the same covenant, and are transgressors of the same law, they are also to be looked upon as having, in a moral estimation, committed the same transgression of the law, both in number and in kind. Therefore this reasoning avails nothing against the righteous imputation of the sin of Adam to all mankind or to the whole moral person that is consenting to it. And for the reason mentioned, we may rather argue thus: the sin of the posterity, on account of their consent, and the moral view in which they are to be taken, is the same with the sin of Adam, not only in kind, but in number; therefore the sin of Adam is rightfully imputed to his posterity.”—Id. Tom. iv. cap. 16. § 60, 61. The imputation of Adam’s first sin consists in nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him. But seeing, agreeable to what we have already proved, God might, according to his own righteous judgment, which was founded on his most righteous law, give Adam a posterity that were like himself; and indeed it could not be otherwise, according to the very laws of nature: therefore he might also in righteous judgment impute Adam’s sin to them, inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity like himself, and to impute his sin to them, is one and the same thing. And therefore if the former be not contrary to the divine perfections, so neither is the latter. Our adversaries contend with us chiefly on this account, that according to our doctrine of original sin, such an imputation of the first sin is maintained, whereby God, without any regard to universal native corruption, esteems all Adam’s posterity as guilty, and holds them as liable to condemnation, purely on account of that sinful act of their first parent: so that they without any respect had to their own sin, and so, as innocent in themselves, are destined to eternal punishment.—I have therefore ever been careful to show, that they do injurously suppose those things to be separated in our doctrine which are by no means separated. The whole of the controversy they have with us about this matter, evidently arises from this, that they suppose the mediate and the immediate imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the matter of conception, but in reality. And so indeed they consider imputation only as immediate and abstractly from the mediate; when yet our divines suppose, that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Therefore I chose not to use any such distinction, or to suppose any such thing, in what I have said on the subject: but only have endeavoured to explain the thing itself, and to reconcile it with divine attributes. And therefore I have everywhere conjoined both these conceptions concerning the imputation of the first sin, as inseparable; and judged, that one ought never to be considered without the other.—While I have been writing this note, I consulted all the systems of divinity, which I have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine opinion of our chief divines in this affair: and I found that they were of the same mind with me: namely, that these two kinds of imputation are by no means to be separated, or to be considered abstractly one from the other, but that one does involve the other.” He there particularly cites these two famous reformed divines, Vitringa and Lampins. Tom. iv. cap 17. § 78.

[376] See also p. 39, note, § 8, &c. 48 § 12, &c. 80 § 9, &c. 82§ 17, &c. 121 § 7, &c.

[377] Page 13. 150, 151, 156, 261. 108, 109, 111. S.

[378] Part I. Chap. I, the three first sections.

[379] Page 134. S.

[380] Page 140. S.

[381] Mor. Phil. p. 7.

[382] Ibid. p. 9.

[383] The christian observer, (vol. v. p. 177.) in reviewing a sermon, entitled, “Predestination to Life,” remarks: “It may be allowed, (though even this is not to us in the sense formerly explained, a self-evident proposition,) that all created nature, as such, tends to nihility. Since it sprung out of nothing, only through the intervention of Almighty Power, it must certainly relapse into nothing when the intervening power is removed. Since it became something only during the pleasure of another, it will cease to be something when left to itself. But it is not apparent, why that which never subsisted but in a state of virtue and purity, should of itself have a tendency to subsist in any other state; or why, when left to itself, if it continue at all, it should not continue in that state in which it was left.” But, in p. 186. he retracts what he first said, in the following very singular note: “The preceding sheet was printed off before we perceived that we had expressed ourselves at p. 177. col. 2. in language which may be construed into an admission of the truth of the doctrine maintained by Dr. Williams, as it respects the necessary tendency of all created nature to nihility. In a popular sense, indeed, it may perhaps be said, (though the proposition will be found “to fill the ear rather than the mind,”) that what sprung out of nothing at the pleasure of another, must again become nothing when left to itself; and, for the sake of shortening the discussion, we were willing to concede thus much. We must at the same time confess that we do not quite understand the position, that created beings tend to nihility: and we leave it to our readers to judge whether there be much more meaning in saying that ‘what is tends not to be,’ than in saying that ‘what is not tends to be;’ or, in other words, whether a tendency to annihilation in that which exists, be at all more conceivable, than a tendency to become existent in that which exists not.” How far the writer had any good reason for retracting what he first asserted, and thereby opposing the sentiments, not only of the author he reviews, but of nearly all the divines that ever have written upon providence, let the reader judge by a careful perusal of this chapter. We are ignorant of what Bishop Burnet says on this head, (Art. I p. 30. 3d Ed.) but are well satisfied his notion is as incapable of being supported by sound reason, as it was novel; and as little calculated to support the cause of piety as any one opinion he advances, in his undecisive and latitudinarian exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles. ( See particularly Art. ix. on Original Sin.) For what can be a more heterodox opinion, or more full of horrid impiety, if traced to its just consequences, that the sentiment advanced by that Bishop and by the christian observer! though we are far from supposing that either the one or the other foresaw these consequences. The best excuse we can form for this writer is, that “he does not quite understand the position” against which he writes. This record, we believe, is true; and is equally applicable to several other positions in that article. But then, the public expects from a Reviewer a comprehensive acquaintance with the subject which he criticises, instead of “a wood of words” and inconclusive declamations. However, he seems to be notoriously deficient in comprehending the true state of the question. A great part of that long article consists in proving what was not denied, and in disproving what was never asserted; with a goodly portion of contradictory propositions. We might have expected, that an author who studiously shuns the intricacies of a subject which will, in his apprehension, “descend to posterity with all the difficulties on its head”— a subject, the depth of which “the sounding line of metaphysics will never fathom”—would have kept himself more free from embarrassments and self-contradictions. And it was also to be expected from one who professes to advocate the cause of piety and practical religion, that he should keep aloof from the horrible sentiment suggested by Burnet, in opposition to the almost unanimous verdict of all the pious and learned divines that ever lived. We almost shudder to draw the inference demonstrably implied in the sentiment.—That the world would continue in being, were there no God to uphold it! When we say, that this is the just inference drawn from the sentiment held by the christian observer, we mean, by the individual Reviewer in question, whose critique disgraces that excellent work. Aware, perhaps, that the author whose works we now publish was of the same way of thinking; or at least, that his works have the same tendency with what he opposes, he observes: “We are apt to think that the metaphysical cast which the celebrated Mr. Edwards gave to his writings in divinity, has to a certain degree produced an unfavourable effect on the minds of his followers.” It would have been extremely difficult for this writer to point out any preacher who comes closer in men’s consciences, or any writer who more effectually promotes the interest of genuine, humble, holy, practical religion, than President Edwards; and the editors of his works are fully conscious, that what they publish tends, in the most direct manner, when duly considered and understood, to essential truth—to God: of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen.—W.

[384] When I suppose, that an effect which is produced every moment by a new action or exertion of power, must be a new effect in each moment, and not absolutely and numerically the same with that which existed in preceding moments, what I intend, may be illustrated by this example. The lucid colour or brightness of the moon, as we look steadfastly upon it, seems to be a permanent thing, as though it were perfectly the same brightness continued. But indeed it is an effect produced every moment. It ceases, and is renewed, in each successive point of time; and so becomes altogether a new effect at each instant; and no one thing that belongs to it, is numerically the same that existed in the preceding moment. The rays of the sun, impressed on that body, and reflected from it, which cause the effect, are none of them the same: the impression, made in each moment on our sensory, is by the stroke of new rays: and the sensation excited by the stroke, is a new effect, an effect of a new impulse. Therefore the brightness or lucid whiteness of this body is no more numerically the same thing with that which existed in the preceding moment, than the sound of the wind that blows now, is individually the same with the sound of the wind that blew just before; which, though it be like it, is not the same, any more than the agitated air, that makes the sound, is the same; or than the water, flowing in a river, that now passes by, is individually the same with that which passed a little before. And if it be thus with the brightness or colour of the moon, so it must be with its solidity, and every thing else belonging to its substance, if all be, each moment, as much the immediate effect of a new exertion or application of power. The matter may perhaps be in some respects still more clearly illustrated thus.—The images of things in a glass, as we keep our eye upon them, seem to remain precisely the same, with a continuing perfect identity. But it is known to be otherwise. Philosophers well know, that these images are constantly renewed, by the impression and reflection of new rays of light: so that the image impressed by the former rays is constantly vanishing, and a new image impressed by new rays every moment, both on the glass and on the eye. The image constantly renewed, by new successive rays, is no more numerically the same, than if it were by some artist put on anew with a pencil, and the colours constantly vanishing as fast as put on. And the new images being put on immediately or instantly, do not make them the same, any more than if it were done with the intermission of an hour or a day. The image that exists this moment, is not at all derived from the image which existed the last preceding moment: for, if the succession of new rays be intercepted, by something interposed between the object and the glass, the image immediately ceases: the past existence of the image has no influence to uphold it, so much as for one moment. Which shows, that the image is altogether new-made every moment; and strictly speaking, is in no part numerically the same with that which existed the moment preceding. And truly so the matter must be with the bodies themselves, as well as the images: they also cannot be the same, with an absolute identity, but must be wholly renewed every moment, if the case be as has been proved, that their present existence is not, strictly speaking, at all the effect of their past existence; but is wholly, every instant, the effect of a new agency, or exertion of the powerful cause of their existence. If so, the existence caused is every instant a new effect, whether the cause be light or immediate divine power, or whatever it be.

[385] I appeal to such as are not wont to content themselves with judging by a superficial appearance and view of things, but are habituated to examine things strictly and closely, that they may judge righteous judgment, whether on supposition that all mankind had co-existed, in the manner mentioned before, any good reason can be given, why their Creator might not, if he had pleased, have established such an union between Adam and the rest of mankind, as was in that case supposed. Particularly, if it had been the case, that Adam’s posterity had actually, according to the law of nature, some how grown out of him, and yet remained continuous and literally united to him, as the branches to a tree, or the members of the body to the head; and had all, before the fall, existed together at the same time, though in different places, as the head and members are in different places: in this case who can determine, that the Author of nature might not, if it had pleased him, have established such an union between the root and branches of this complex being, as that all should constitute one moral whole; so that by the law of union, there should be a communion in each moral alteration, and that the heart of every branch should at the same moment participate with the heart of the root, be confirmed to it and concurring with it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly partaking in its state, as part of the same thing? Why might not God, if he had pleased, have fixed such a kind of union as this, an union of the various parts of such a moral whole, as well as many other unions, which he has actually fixed, according to his sovereign pleasure? And if he might, by his sovereign constitution, have established such an union of the various branches of mankind, when existing in different places, I do not see why he might not also do the same, through they exist in different times. I know not why succession, or diversity of time, should make any such constituted union more unreasonable, than diversity of place. The only reason, why diversity of time can seem to make it unreasonable, is that difference of time shows, there is no absolute identity of the things existing in those different times: but it shows this, I think, not at all more than the difference of the place of existence.

[386] Page 14.

[387] Which Dr. T. alleges, p. 10, 11 S.

[388] It may be noted, that Dr. T himself signifies it as his mind, that these blessings on Noah were on account of the covenant of grace, p. 84, 90, 91. 92. S.

[389] Page 256, 357, 260, 71-74. S.

[390] Page 72, 73. S.

[391] Page 65, 66, 111. S.

[392] Page 3, &c. 105.

[393] Page 77, 78. S.

[394] Page 74, 75. S.

[395] Page 231, and some other places.

[396] Page 139, and 259.

[397] See his exposition on Rom. vii. p. 205 -220. But especially in his paraphrase and notes on the epistle.

[398] Page 145.

[399] Page 242, 243.

[400] Matt. ix.12.

[401] Matt. xviii.11. Luke xix.10.

[402] Matt. xviii. 3.

[403] Luke xiii.1-5.

[404] Matt.vi.12. Luke xi.4.

[405] Matt. vi. 14, 15.

[406] Matt. vii. 11.

[407] Matt. xvi. 23.

[408] Matt. x.16, 17.

[409] John vii.7, viii.23, xiv. 17, xv. 18, 19.

[410] Matt. xviii. 21, to the end

[411] What is found in the more ancient of the Jewish rabbies, who have written since the coming of Christ, is an argument of this. Many things of this sort are taken notice of by Stapferus, in his Theologia Polemica before mentioned. Some of these things which are there cited by him in Latin, I shall here faithfully give in English, for the sake of the English reader. ”—So Manasseh, concerning Human Frailty. p. 129.—Gen viii. 21. I will not any more curse the earth for man’s sake; for the appetite of man is evil from his youth; that is, from the time when he comes forth from his mother’s womb. For at the same time that he sucks the breasts, he follows his lust; and while he is yet an infant, he is under the dominion of anger, envy, hatred, and other vices to which that tender age is obnoxious.”— ”Prov. xxii. 15. Solomon says, Foolishness is bound to the mind of a child.” Concerning which place R. Levi Ben Gersom observes thus, “Foolishness as it were grows to him in his very beginning.” Concerning this sin, which is common and original to all men, David said, Psal. ii. 5. Behold I was begotten in iniquity, and in sin did my mother warm me. Upon which place Ebeb-Ezra says thus: “Behold, because of the concupiscence which is innate in the heart of man, it is said, I am begotten in iniquity. And the sense is, that there is implanted in the heart of man, jetzer harang, an evil figment, from his nativity.” And Manasseh Ben Israel, de Fragil. pag. 2. “Behold, I was formed in iniquity, and in sin hath my mother warmed me. But whether this be understood concerning the common mother, which was Eve, or whether David spake only of his own mother, he would signify, that sin is as it were natural, and inseparable in this life. For it is to be observed, that Eve conceived after the transgression was committed: and as many as were begotten afterwards, were not brought forth in conformity to the rule of right reason, but in conformity to disordly and lustful affections.” He adds, “One of the wise men of the Jews, namely, R. Aha, rightly observed, David would signify that it is impossible, even for pious men who excel in virtue, never to commit any sin.” “Job also asserts the same thing with David, chap xiv. 4. saying, “Who will give a clean thing for an unclean? Truly not one.” Concerning which words Aben-Ezra says thus: “The sense is the same with that, I was begotten in iniquity, because man is made out of an unclean thing.” Stapferus, Theolog. Polem. tom. iii. p. 36, 37. Id. Ibid. p. 132, &c. So Sal. Jarchi ad Gemaram, Cod. Schabbath, fol. 142. p. 2. “And this is not only to be referred to sinners; because all the posterity of the first man are in like manner subjected to all the curses pronounced on him.” And Manasseh Ben Israel, in his preface to Human Fraility, says, “I had a mind to show by what means it came to pass, that when the first father of all had lost his righteousness, his posterity are begotten liable to the same punishment with him.” And Munsterus on the Gospel of Matthew cites the following words, from the book called The Bundle of Myrrh:” The blessed Lord said to the first man, when he cursed him, Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field. The thing which he means is, that because of his sin all who should descend from him, should be wicked and perverse, like thorns and thistles, according to that word of the Lord, speaking to the prophet: Thorns and irritators are with thee, and thou dwellest among scorpions. And all this from the serpent, who was the devil, Sammael, who emitted a mortiferous and corruptive poison into Eve, and became the cause of death to Adam himself, when he eat the the fruit.” Remarkable is the place quoted in Joseph de Voisin, against Martin Raymond, p. 471. of Master Menachem Rakanatensis, sect. Bereschit, from Midrasch Tehillim: which is cited by Hoerndekius, against the Jews, in these words: “It is no wonder, that the sin of Adam and Eve is written and sealed with the king’s ring, and to be propagated to all following generations; because on the day that Adam was created, all things were finished: so that he stood forth the perfection and completion of the whole workmanship of the world: so when he sinned, the whole world sinned; whose sin we bear and suffer. But the matter is not thus with respect to the sins of his posterity.” —Thus far Stapferus. Besides these, as Ainsworth on Gen. viii. 21. observes, “In Bereshith Rabba, a Hebrew commentary on this place, a rabbin is said to be asked, When is the evil imagination put into man? And he answered, From the hour that he is formed.” And in Pool’s Synopsis it is added, from Grotius, “So Rabbi Salomon interprets Gen. viii. 21. The imagination of man’s heart, is evil from his youth, of its being evil from the time that he is taken out of his mother’s bowels.” Aben-Ezra thus interprets Psal. li. 5. “I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me; that evil concupiscence is implanted in the heart from childhood, as if he were formed in it; and by my mother, he understands Eve,who did not bear children till she had sinned. And so Kafvenaki says, How shall I avoid sinning? My ORIGINAL is corrupt, and from thence are those sins. So Manasseh Ben Israel, from this place (Psal. li. 5.) concludes, that not only David, but all mankind, ever since sin was introduced into the world, do sin from their original. To this purpose is the answer of Rabbi Hakkadosch which there is an account of in the Talmud. From what time does concupiscence rule over man? From the very moment of his first formation, or from his nativity? Ans. From his formation.”’—Pool’s Synops. in Loc. On these things I observe, there is the greatest reason to suppose, that these old rabbies of the Jewish nation, who give such heed to the tradition of the elders, would never have received this doctrine of original sin, had it not been delivered down to them from their forefathers. For it is a doctrine very disagreeable to those practical principles and notions, wherein the religion of the unbelieving Jews most fundamentally differs from the religion maintained among Christians: particularly their notion of justification by their own righteousness, and privileges as the children of Abraham. &c. without standing in need of any satisfaction, by the sufferings of the Messiah. On which account the modern Jews do now universally reject the doctrine of original sin, and corruption of nature: as Stapferus observes. And it is not at all likely, that the ancient Jews, if no such doctrine had been received by tradition from the fathers would have taken it up from the Christians, whom they had in such great contempt and enmity; especially as it is a doctrine so peculiarly agreeable to the christian notion of the spiritual salvation of Jesus, and so contrary to their carnal notions of the Messiah, and of his salvation and kingdom, and so contrary to their opinion of themselves; and a doctrine, which men in general are so apt to be prejudiced against. And besides, these rabbies do expressly refer to the opinion of their forefathers; as R. Manasseh says, “according to the opinion of the ancients, none are subject to death, but those which have sinned; for where there is no sin, there is no death.” Stapfer. tom. iii. p. 37, 38. But where we have more direct evidence, that the doctrine of original sin was truly a received doctrine among the ancient Jews, even before the coming of Christ. This appears by ancient Jewish writings, which were written before Christ: as, in the apocrypha, 2 Esdras iii. 21. “For the first Adam, bearing a wicked heart, transgressed, and was overcome: and so be all they that are born of him. Thus infirmity was made permanent; and the law also in the heart of the people, with the malignity of the root; so that the good departed away, and the evil abode still.” 2 Esdras iv. 30. “For the grain of evil seed hath been sown in the heart of Adam, from the beginning; and how much ungodliness hath it brought up unto this time? And how much shall it yet bring forth, till the time of threshing shall come?” And chap. vii. 46. “It had been better, not to have given the earth unto Adam; or else, when it was given to him, to have restrained him from sinning; for what profit is it, for men now in this present time, to live in heaviness, and after death to look for punishment? O thou Adam, what hast thou done? For though it was thou that sinned, thou art not fallen alone, but we all that came of thee.” And we read Eccl. xxv. 24. “Of the woman came the beginning of sin, and through her we all die.” As this doctrine of original corruption was constantly maintained in the church of God from the beginning; so from thence, in all probability, as well as from the evidennce of it in universal experience, it was, that the wiser heathens maintained the like doctrine. Particularly Plato, that great philosopher, so distinguished for his veneration of ancient traditions, and diligent inquiries after them. Gale, in his Court of the Gentiles, observes as follows: “PLATO says, (Gorg. fol. 493.) I have heard from the wise men, that are now dead, and that the body is but our sepulchre. And in his Timaeus Locrus (fol. 103) he says, The cause of vitiosity is from our parents, and first principles, rather than from ourselves. So that we never relinquish those actions, which lead us to follow those primitive blemishes of our first parents. Plato mentions the corruption of the will, and seems to disown free will to true good; albeit he allows some (NOT ENGLISH), or natural dispositions, to civil good, in some great heroes. Socrates asserted the corruption of human nature, or (NOT ENGLISH) .—Grotius affirms, that the philosophers acknowledged, it was con-natural to men to sin. Seneca (Benef. 5. 14.) says, wickedness has not its first beginning in wicked practice; though by that it is first exercised and made manifest. And Plutarch (de sera vindictis) says man does not first become wicked, when he first manifests himself so: but he hath wickedness from the beginning; and he shows it as soon as he finds opportunity and ability. As men rightly judge, that the sting is not first engendered in scorpions when they strike, or the poison in vipers when they bite.—Pool’s Synopsis on Gen. viii. 21. To which may be subjoined what Juvenal says, —Admores natura recurrit Damnates fixa et mutari nescia. Englished thus, in prose: Nature, a thing fixed and not knowing how to change, returns to its wicked manners.—WATTS, Ruin and Recovery.

[412] See Dissertation concerning the Nature of True Virtue, p. 122.

[413] See his Preface, and p. 6. 237, 263, 267, 175. S.

[414] Page 110, 125, 150, 151, 159, 161, 183, 188. 77. S.

[415] This appears plain by these texts of Scripture, Isa. lii. 1 Ezek. xliv. 6,7,9 Joel iii. 17 Zech. xiv. 21 Psal. lxix. 32,35,36 Isa. xxxv. 8,10 iv. 3,4 Ezek. xx. 38 Psal. xxxvii. 9,10,11,29

[416] So Psal. lxxiii. 25. cxliii. 6, 7. cxxx. 6. Cant. iii. 1, 2. vi. 8.

[417] This is evident by many scriptures, as Prov. iv. 18. John iv. 14. vi.40, 47, 50, 51, 54, 58. iii. 15. 1 Cor. xiii. 8-12.

[418] Mark xii. 30.

[419] Gal. iv. 15.

[420] Matt. xxi. 9.

[421] Mr. Stoddard observes. “That common affections are sometimes stronger than saving.” Guide to Christ, p. 21.

[422] Eph. ii. 7.

[423] 2 Tim. i. 7.

[424] Eph. iii. 7, 20.

[425] Eph. i. 19.

[426] Psal. cxix. 120. Ezra ix. 4. Isa. lxvi. 2, 5. Hab. iii. 16.

[427] Rom. viii. 26.

[428] Cant. ii. 5. and v. 8

[429] Psal. lxxxiv. 2.

[430] Psal. xxxviii. 10. and xliii. 1. and cxix 131.

[431] Psal lxxxiv. 2. and cxix 8l.

[432] That famous experimental divine Mr. Shephard, says, “A Pharisee’s trumpet shall he heard to the town’s end; when simplicity walks through the town unseen. Hence a man will sometimes covertly commend himself, (and myself ever comes in.) and tells you a long story of conversion; and an hundred to one if some lie or other slip not out with it Why, the secret meaning is, I pray admire me. Hence complain of wants and weaknesses: pray think what a broken-hearted Christian I am.”—Parab. of the Ten Virgins. Part I. page 179, 180. And holy Mr. Flavel says this. “O reader, if thy heart were right with God, and thou didst not cheat thyself with a vain profession, thou wouldst have frequent business with God, which thou wouldst be loth thy dearest friend, or the wife of thy bosom, should be privy to. Non est religio, ubi omnia patent Religion doth not lie open to all, to the eyes of men. Observed duties maintain our credit, but secret duties maintain our life. It was the saying of a heathen, about his secret correspondency with his friend What need the world to be acquainted with it? Thou and I are theatre enough to each other. There are inclosed pleasures in religion, which none but renewed spiritual souls do feelingly understand.” Flavel’s Touchstone of Sincerity, chap. II. sect. 2.

[433] Eph. i. 17-20.

[434] 1 Cor. i. 27, 28, 29.

[435] Isa. i. 11-17.

[436] 2 Cor. iv. 7.

[437] 2 Cor. xii. 9.

[438] Judg. vii. 2.

[439] Mr Stoddard, in his Guide to Christ, speaks of it as a common thing, for persons while in a natural condition, and before they have ever truly accepted of Christ, to have scripture promises come to them, with a great deal of refreshing, which they take as tokens of God’ s love, and hope that God has accepted them; and so are confident of their good estate, page 8, 9. Impression anno 1735.

[440] Agreeable to this Mr Stoddard observes, in his Guide to Christ that some sinners have pangs of affection, and give an account that they find a spirit of love to God, and of their aiming at the glory of God, having that which as a great resemblance of saving grace and that sometimes their common affections are stronger than saving. And supposes that sometimes natural men may have such violent pangs of false affection to God, that they may think themselves willing to be damned. Page 21, and 65.

[441] Exod. ix. 27. 1 Sam. xxiv. 16, 17. and xxvi. 21. 1 Kings xxi. 27. Num. xiv. 39, 40.

[442] 1 Sam. ix. 21.

[443] “Associating with godly men does not prove that a man has grace: Ahithopbel was David’s companion. Sorrows for the afflictions of the church, and desires for the conversion of souls, do not prove it. These things may be found in carnal men. and so can be no evidences of grace.” Stoddard’s Nature of Saving Conversion, p. 82.

[444] Acts xvi. 29.

[445] Mr. Shepard speaks of “men’s being cast down as low as hell by sorrow, and lying under chains, quaking in apprehension of terror to come, and then raised up to heaven in joy, not able to live; and yet not rent from lust; and such are objects of pity now, and are like to be the objects of terror at the great day.”— Parable of the Ten Virgins P. i. p. 125.

[446] “The way of the Spirit’s working, when it does convince men, is by enlightening natural conscience. The Spirit does not work by giving a testimony, but by assisting natural conscience to do its work. Natural conscience is the instrument in the hand of God, to accuse, condemn, terrify. and to urge to duty. The Spirit of God leads men into the consideration of their danger, and makes them to be affected therewith, Prov. xx. 27.’ The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord, searching all the inward parts of the belly.’” Stoddard’s Guide to Christ, p. 44.

[447] The famous Mr. Perkins distinguishes between “those sorrows that come through convictions of conscience, and melancholic passions arising only from mere imaginations, strongly conceived in the brain; which he says, usually come on a sudden, like lightning into a house.” Vol. i. of his works, p. 385.

[448] The venerable Stoddard observes, “A man may say, that now he can justify God however he deals with him, and not be brought off from his own righteousness; and that some men do justify God, from a partial conviction of the righteousness of their condemnation; conscience takes notice of their sinfulness, and tells them that they may be righteously damned; as Pharaoh, who justified God, Exod. ix. 27. And they give some kind of consent to it, but many times it does not continue, they have only a pang upon them, that usually dies away after a little time.” —Guide to Christ, p. II.

[449] 1 Sam. xxiv. 17.

[450] Mr. Stoddard, who had much experience of things of this nature, long ago observed, that converted and unconverted men cannot be certainly distinguished by the account they give of their experience; the same relation of experiences being common to both. And that many persons have given a fair account of a work of conversion, that have carried well in the eye of the world for several years, but have not proved well at last. Appeal to the Learned, p. 75, 76.

[451] Mr. Shepard, speaking of the soul’s closing with Christ, says, “As a child cannot tell how his soul comes into it, nor it may be when; but afterwards it sees and feels that life; so that he were as bad as a beast, that should deny an immortal soul; so here.” Parable of the Ten Virgins, Part II. p. 171. “If the man do not know the time of his conversion, or first closing with Christ; the minister may not draw any peremptory conclusion from thence, that he is not godly.” Stoddard’s Guide to Christ, p. 83. ” Do not think there is no compunction, or sense of sin, wrought in the soul because you cannot so clearly discern and feel it; nor the time of the working, and first beginning of it. I have known many that have come with their complaints, that they were never humbled, they never felt it so; yet there it hath been, and many times they have seen it, by the other spectacles, and blessed God for it” Shepard’s Sound Believer, page 38. The late impression in Boston.

[452] “O professor, look carefully to your foundation: be not high-minded, but fear. You have, it may be, done and suffered many things in and for religion; you have excellent gifts and sweet comforts; a warm zeal for God, and high confidence of your integrity: all this may be right, for ought that I, or (it may be) you know: but yet, it is possible it may be false also. You have sometimes judged yourselves, and pronounced yourselves upright; but remember your final sentence is not yet pronounced by your Judge. And what if God weigh you over again, in his more equal balance, and should say, Mene, Tekel, Thou art weighed in the balance, and art found wanting? What a confounded man wilt thou be, under such a sentence! Quae resplendent in conspectu hominis, sordent in conspectu Judicis; Things that are highly esteemed of men, are an abomination in the sight of God: he seeth not as men seeth. Thy heart may be false, and thou not know it: yea, it may be false, and thou strongly confident of its integrity.”—Flavel’s Touchstone of Sincerity, chap. ii. sect. 5. “Some hypocrites are a great deal more confident than many saints.”— Stoddard’s Discourse on the way to know Sincerity and Hypocrisy. p. 128.

[453] “Doth the work of faith in some believers, bear upon its top-branches, the full ripe fruits of a blessed assurance? Lo, what strong confidence, and high-built persuasions of an interest in God, have sometimes been found in unsanctified ones! Yea, so strong may this false assurance be, that they dare boldly venture to go to the judgment-seat of God, and there defend it Doth the Spirit of God fill the heart of the assured believer with joy unshakable, and full of glory, giving them, through faith, a prelibation or foretaste of heaven itself, in those first-fruits of it? How near to this comes what the apostle supposes may be found in apostates!” Flavel’s Husbandry Spiritualized, chap. xii.

[454] • Mr. Shepard speaks of it. “as a presumptuous peace, that is not interrupted and broke by evil works.” And says, that “the spirit will sigh, and not sing, in that bosom, whence corrupt dispositions and passions break out.” And that, “though men in such frames may seem to maintain the consolation of the Spirit, and not suspect their hypocrisy, under pretence of trusting the Lord’s mercy; yet they cannot avoid the ’ condemnation of the world.’” Parable of the Ten Virgins, Part I. p. 139. Dr. Ames speaks of it as a thing, by which the peace of a wicked man may be distinguished from the peace of a godly man, “that the peace of a wicked man continues, whether be performs the duties of piety and righteousness or no; provided those crimes are avoided that appear horrid to nature itself.” Cases of Conscience, lib. 111. chap. vii.

[455] As 2 Cor. iv. 18. and v. 7. Heb. xi. 1, 8, 13, 17, 27, 29. Rom. viii. 24. John xx. 29.

[456] “Men do not know that they are godly, by believing that they are godly. We know many things by faith, Heb. xi. 3. By faith we understand that the worlds were made by the word of God. Faith is the evidence of things not seen. Heb. xi. 1. Thus men know the Trinity of persons of the Godhead; that Jesus Christ is the Son of God; that he that believes in him will have eternal life: the resurrection of the dead. And if God should tell a saint that he has grace, he might know it by believing the word of God. But it is not this way, that godly men do know that they have grace. It is not revealed in the word, and the Spirit of God doth not testify it to particular persons.” Stoddards Nature of Saving Conversions. p. 83, 84.

[457] Men may have the knowledge of their own conversion: the knowledge that other men have of it is uncertain because no man can look into the heart of another and see the workings of grace there Stoddard’s Nature of Saving Conversion chap. xv. at the beginning.

[458] Mr Stoddard observes That all viable signs are common to converted and unconverted men and a relation of experiences among the rest Appeal to the Learned p. 75. “O how hard is it for the eye of man to discern betwixt chaff and wheat and how many upright hearts are now censured whom God will clear! how many false hearts are now approved whom God will condemn! Men ordinarily have no convictive proofs but only probable symptoms which at most beget but a conjectural knowledge of another’s state. And they that shall peremptorily judge either way may possibly wrong the generation of the upright or on the other side absolve and justify the wicked And truly considering what hath been said it is no wonder that dangerous mistakes are so frequently made in this matter. Flavel’s Husbandry Spiritualized chap. xii.

[459] ‡ “Be not offended if you see great cedars fall, stars fall from heaven, great professors die and decay: do not think they be all such: do not think that the elect shall fall. Truly, some are such that when they fall one would think a man truly sanctified might fall away as the Arminians think: 1 John ii. 19. They were not of us. I speak this because the Lord is shaking: and I look for great apostasies: for God is trying all his friends, through all the christian world. In Germany what profession was there! who would have thought it? The Lord who delights to manifest that openly which was bid secretly sends a sword and they fall.” Shepard’s Parab. Part I. p. 118, 119. “The saints may approve thee and God condemns thee; Rev. iii. 1. Thou hast a name that thou livest, and art dead. Men may say, There is a true Nathaniel; and God may say, There is a self-cozening Pharisee. Reader, thou hast heard of Judas and Demas, of Ananias and Sapphira, of Hymeneus and Philetus, once renowned and famous professors and thou hast heard how they proved at last.” Flavel’s Touchstone of Sincerity chap. ii. sect. 5.

[460] A time of outpouring of the Spirit of God, reviving religion, and producing the pleasant appearances of it, in new converts, is in Scripture compared to this very thing, viz, the spring-season, when the benign influences of the heavens cause the blossoms to put forth. Cant ii. 11, 12.

[461] Husbandry Spiritualized, chap. xii.

[462] 1 Cor. iv. 3, 4.

[463] “The way to know your godliness, is to renew the visible exercises of grace.”—“The more visible exercises of grace are renewed, the more certain you will be. The more frequently these actings are renewed, the more abiding and confirmed your assurance will be.”—“The more men’s grace is multiplied the more their peace is multiplied; 2 Pet. i. 2. ‘Grace and peace be multiplied unto you, through the knowledge of God and Jesus Christ our Lord.’” Stoddard’s Way to know Sincerity and Hypocrisy, p. 139, and 142.

[464] 1 Cor. iii. 1.

[465] That by carnal the apostle means corrupt and unsanctified, is abundantly evident, by Rom. vii. 25. & viii 1, 4-12,13. Gal. v. 16. to the end. Col. ii. 18.

[466] As Num. xxiv. 2. 1 Sam. x 10. and 1 Sam. xi. 6. xi. 6. and xvi. 14. 1 Cor. xiii. 1, 2, 3. Heb. vi. 4, 5, 6. and many others.

[467] “Conceits and whimsies abound most in men of weak reason; children, and such as are cracked in their understanding, have most of them; strength of reason banishes them, as the sun does mists and vapours. But now the more rational any gracious person is, by so much more is he fixed and settled, and satisfied in the grounds of religion: yea, there is the highest and purest reason in religion; and when this change is wrought upon men, it is carried on in a rational way, Isa. i. 18. John xix. 9.“ Flavel’s Preparation for Sufferings, chap. vi.

[468] “If any man should see and behold Christ really, immediately, this is not the saving knowledge of him. I know the saints do know Christ as if immediately present: they are not strangers by their distance: if others have seen them more immediately, I will not dispute it. But if they have seen the Lord Jesus as immediately as if here on earth, yet Capernaum saw him so; nay some of them were disciples for a time, and followed him. John vi. And yet the Lord was hid from their eyes. Nay, all the world shall see him in his glory, which shall amaze them; and yet this is far short of having the saving knowledge of him, which the Lord doth communicate to the elect. So that though you see the Lord so really, as that you become familiar with him, yet, Luke xiii. 26. Lord, have we not eat and drank, &c. — and so perish.” Shepard’s Parable of the Ten Virgins, P. I. p. 197, 198.

[469] “Satan is transformed into an angel of light: and hence we have heard that some have heard voices; some have seen the very blood of Christ dropping on them, and his wounds in his side; some have seen a great light shining in the chamber; some wonderfully affected with their dreams: some in great distress have had inward witness. Thy sins are forgiven; and hence such liberty and joy, that they are ready to leap up and down the chamber. O adulterous generation! this is natural and usual with men, they would fain see Jesus, and have him present to give them peace; and hence papists have his images—Woe to them that have no other manifested Christ, but such an one.” Shepard’s Parable of the Ten Virgins. P. I. 198.

[470] “Consider how difficult, yea and impossible, it is to determine that such a voice, vision, or revelation is of God, and that Satan cannot feign or counterfeit it; seeing he hath left no certain marks by which we may distinguish one spirit from another.” Flavel’s Causes and Cures of Mental Errors, Cause 14.

[471] See Deut. xiii. 1. 1 Kings xxii. 22. Isa. xxviii. 7. Ezek xiii. 7. Zech. xiii. 4.

[472] There is a remarkable passage of Mr. John Smith, in his discourse on the shortness of a Pharisaic righteousness, p. 370, 371. of his select discourses, describing that sort of religion which is built on such a foundation as I am here speaking of. I cannot forbear transcribing the whole of it. Speaking of a sort of Christians, whose life is nothing but a strong energy of fancy, he says, “Lest their religion might too grossly discover itself to be nothing else but a piece of art, there may be sometimes such extraordinary motions stirred up within them, which may prevent all their own thoughts, that they may seem to be a true operation of the divine life; when yet all this is nothing else but the energy of their own self-love, touched with some fleshly apprehensions of divine things, and excited by them. There are such things in our christian religion, when a carnal, unhallowed mind takes the chair, and gets the expounding of them, may seem very delicious to the fleshly appetites of men; some doctrines and notions of free grace and justification, the magnificent titles of sons of God and heirs of heaven, ever-flowing streams of joy and pleasure that blessed souls shall swim in to all eternity, a glorious paradise in the world to come, always springing up with well-scented and fragrant beauties, a new Jerusalem paved with gold, and bespangled with stars, comprehending in its vast circuit such numberless varieties, that a busy curiosity may spend itself about to all eternity. I doubt not but that sometimes the most fleshly and earthly men, that fly in their ambition to the pomp of this world, may be so ravished with the conceits of such things as these, that they may seem to be made partakers of the powers of the world to come. I doubt not but that they might be much exalted with them, as the souls of crazed or distracted persons seem to be sometimes, when their fancies play with those quick and nimble spirits, which a distempered frame of body, and unnatural heat in their beads, beget within them. Thus may these blazing comets rise up above the moon, and climb higher than the sun; which yet, because they have no solid consistence of their own, and are of a base and earthly alloy will soon vanish and fall down again, being only borne up by an external force. They may seem to themselves to have attained higher than those noble Christians, that are gently moved by the natural force of true goodness: they seem to be pleniores Deo. (i. e. more full of God,) than those that are really informed and actuated by the divine Spirit, and do move on steadily and constantly in the way towards heaven. As the seed that was sown in stony ground, grew up and lengthened out its blade faster, than that which was sown in the good and fruitful soil. And as the motions of our sense, and fancy, and passions, while our souls are in this mortal condition, sunk down deeply into the body, are many times more vigorous, and make stronger impressions upon us, than those of the higher powers of the soul, which are more subtle, and remote from these mixt animal perceptions: that devotion which is there seated, may seem to have more energy and life in it, than that which gently, and with a more delicate kind of touch, spreads itself upon the understanding, and from thence mildly derives itself through our wills and affections. But however the former may be more boisterous for a time, yet this is of a more consistent, spermatical, and thriving nature. For that proceeding indeed from nothing but a sensual and fleshly apprehension of God and true happiness, is but of a flitting and fading nature; and as the sensible powers and faculties grow more languid, or the sun of divine light shines more brightly upon us, these earthly devotions, like our culinary fires, will abate their heat and fervour. But a true celestial warmth will never be extinguished, because it is of an immortal nature; and being once seated vitally in the souls of men, it will regulate and order all the motions of it in a due manner; as the natural heat, radicated in the hearts of living creatures, hath the dominion and economy of the whole body under it. True religion is no piece of artifice; it is no boiling up of our imaginative powers, nor the glowing heats of passion; though these are too often mistaken for it, when in our jugglings in religion we cast a mist before our own eyes; but it is a new nature, informing the souls of men; it is a God-like frame of spirit, discovering itself most of all in serene and clear minds, in deep humility, meekness, self-denial, universal love to God and all true goodness, without partiality, and without hypocrisy, whereby we are taught to know God, and knowing him, to love him, and conform ourselves as much as may be to all that perfection which shines in him ”

[473] Mr. Stoddard in his Guide to Christ, p. 8. says, that “sometimes men, after they have been in trouble awhile, have some promises come to them, with a great deal of refreshing; and they hope God has accepted them:” And says, that “In this case, the minister may tell them, that God never gives a faith of assurance, before he gives a faith of dependence; for he never manifests his love, until men are in a state of favour and reconciliation, which is by faith of dependence. When men have comfortable scriptures come to them, they are apt to take them as tokens of God’s love; but men must be brought into Christ, by accepting the offer of the gospel, before they are fit for such manifestations. God’s method is, first to make the soul accept of the offers of grace, and then to manifest his good estate unto him.” And p. 76. speaking of them “that scorn to be brought to lie at God’s foot, and give an account of their closing with Christ, and that God revealed Christ to them, and drawn their hearts to him, and that they do accept of Christ,” he says, “In this case, it is best to examine whether by that light that was given him, he saw Christ and salvation offered to him, or whether he saw that God loved him, or pardoned him: for the offer of grace and our acceptance goes before pardon, and therefore, much more, before the knowledge of it. Mr. Shepard, in his Parable of the Ten Virgins, Part II. p. 15. says, that “Grace and the love of Christ (the fairest colours under the sun) may be pretended; but if you shall receive, under this appearance, that God witnesseth his love, first by an absolute promise, take heed there; for under this appearance you may as well bring in immediate revelations, and from thence come to forsake the Scriptures. And in Part I. p. 66. he says, “Is Christ yours? Yes, I see it. How? By any word or promise? No: this is delusion.” And p. 136. speaking of them that have no solid ground of peace, he reckons, “Those that content themselves with the revelation of the Lord’s love, without the sight of any work, or not looking to it” And says presently after, “The testimony of the Spirit does not make a man more a Christian, but only evidenceth it; as it is the nature of a witness, not to make a thing to be true, but to clear and evidence it.” And p. 140. speaking of them that say they have the witness of the Spirit, that makes a difference between them and hypocrites, he says. “The witness of the Spirit makes not the first difference: for first a man is a believer, and in Christ, and justified, called, and sanctified, before the Spirit does witness it; else the Spirit should witness to an untruth and lie.”

[474] Mr. Shepard, in his Sound Believer, p. 159. of the late impression at Boston, says, “Embrace in thy bosom, not only some few promises, but all.” And then he asks the question, “When may a Christian take a promise without presumption, as spoken to him?” He answers, “The rule is very sweet, but certain: when he takes all the Scripture, and embraces it as spoken unto him. he may then take any particular promise boldly. My meaning is, when a Christian takes hold and wrestles with God for the accomplishment of all the promises of the New Testament, when he sets all the commands before him, as a compass and guide to walk after, when he applies all the threatenings to drive him nearer unto Christ the end of them. This no hypocrite can do; this the saints shall do; and by this they may know when the Lord speaks in particular unto them.”

[475] “Some Christians have rested with a work without Christ, which is abominable: but after a man is in Christ, not to judge by the work, is first not to judge from the word. For though there is a word, which may give a man a dependence on Christ, without feeling any work, nay when he feels none, as absolute promises; yet no word giving assurance, but that which is made to some work. He that believeth, or is poor in spirit, &c. until that work is seen, has no assurance from that promise.” Shepard’s Parable of the Ten Virgins, Part I. p. 86. “If God should tell a saint that he has grace, he might know it by believing the word of God: but it is not in this way that godly men do know that they have grace: it is not revealed in the word, and the Spirit of God doth not testify it to particular persons.” Stoddard’s Nature of saving Conversion, p. 84, 85.

[476] The late venerable Stoddard in his younger time, falling in with the opinion of some others, received this notion of the witness of the Spirit, by way of immediate suggestion: but in the latter part of his life, when he had more thoroughly weighed things, had experience of it: but they may easily mistake; when the Spirit of God doth eminently stir up a spirit of faith, and sheds abroad the love of God in the heart, it is easy to mistake it for a testimony. And that is not the meaning of Paul’s words. The Spirit reveals things to us, by opening our eyes to see what is revealed in the word; but the Spirit doth not reveal new truths, not revealed in the word. The Spirit discovers the grace of God in Christ, and thereby draws forth special actings of faith and love, which are evidential; but it doth not work in way of testimony. If God do but help us to receive the revelations in the word, we shall have comfort enough without new revelation’s.”

[477] See Chambers’s Dictionary, under the word ENGRAVING.

[478] Mr. Shepard is abundant in militating against the notion of men’s knowing their good estate by an immediate witness of the Spirit, without judging by any effect or work of the Spirit wrought on the heart, as an evidence and proof that persons are the children of God. Parab. P. I. p. 134, 135, 137, 176, 177, 215, 216. P. II. 168. 169. Again, in his Sound Believer, there is a long discourse of sanctification as the chief evidence of justification, from p. 221, for many pages following; I shall transcribe but a very small part of it. “Tell me, how you will know that you are justified. You will say, by the testimony of the Spirit And cannot the same Spirit shine upon your graces, and witness that you are sanctified, as well? 1 John iv. 13, 24. 1 Cor. ii. 12. Can the Spirit make the one clear to you, and not the other? Oh beloved, it is a sad thing, to hear such questions, and such cold answers also, that sanctification possibly may be an evidence. May be! Is it not certain?” Mr. Flavel also much opposes this notion of the witness of the Spirit by immediate revelation. Sacramental Meditations, med. 4. speaking of the sealing of the Spirit, he says, “In sealing the believer, he doth not make use of an audible voice, nor the ministry of angels, nor immediate and extraordinary revelations; but he makes use of his own graces, implanted in our hearts, and his own promises, written in the Scripture: and in this method, he usually brings the doubting, trembling heart of a believer to rest and comfort” Again, ibid. “Assurance is produced in our souls by the reflexive arts of faith: the Spirit helps us to reflect upon what hath been done by him formerly upon our hearts; hereby we know that we know him, 1 John ii. 3. To know that we know, is a reflex act. Now it is impossible there should be a reflex, before there hath been a direct act. No man can have the evidence of his faith, before the habit is infused, and the vital act performed. The object matter, to which the Spirit seals, is his own sanctifying operation.” Afterwards, ibid, he says, “Immediate ways of the Spirit’s sealing are ceased. No man may now expect, by any new revelation, or sign from heaven, by any voice, or extraordinary inspiration, to have his salvation sealed; but must expect that mercy in God’s ordinary way and method, searching the Scriptures, examining our own hearts, and waiting on the Lord in prayer. The learned Gerson gives an instance of one that had been long upon the borders of despair, and at last sweetly assured and settled: he answered, Non ex nova aliqua revelatione; not by any new revelation, but by subjecting my understanding to, and comparing my heart with, die written word. And Mr. Roberts, in his treatise of the covenants, speaks of another, that so vehemently panted after the sealings and assurance of the love of God to his soul, that for a long time be earnestly desired some voice from heaven; and sometimes, walking in the solitary fields, earnestly desired some miraculous voice from the trees or stones there. This was denied him; but in time, a better was afforded, in a scriptural way.” Again, ibid. “This method of sealing, is beyond, all other methods in the world. For in miraculous voices and inspirations, it is impossible there may subesse falsum, be found some cheat, or impostures of the devil: but the Spirit’s witness in the heart, suitable to the revelation in the Scripture, cannot deceive us.”

[479] Luke xxiv. 49. Acts i. 4. and chap. ii. 38, 39. Gal. iii. 14. Eph. i. 13.

[480] Compare John vii. 37, 38, 39. and John iv. 14. with Rev. xxi. 6. and Rev. xxii. 1, 17. Rev. xxii. 1, 17. xxii. 1, 17.

[481] “After a man is in Christ, not to judge by the work, is not to judge by the Spirit For the apostle makes the earnest of the Spirit to be the teal. Mow, earnest is part of the money bargained for; the beginning of heaven, of the light and life of it. He that sees not that the Lord is his by that, sees no God his at all. Oh therefore, do not look for a spirit, without a word to reveal, nor a word to reveal, without seeing and feeling of some work first I thank the Lord, I do but pity those that think otherwise. If a sheep of Christ, oh, wander not.” Shepard’s Par. P. I. p. 86.

[482] “There is a natural love to Christ, as to one that doth thee good, and for thine own ends; and spiritual, for himself, whereby the Lord only is exalted.” Shepard’s Par. of the Ten Virgins, P. I. p. 25

[483] “There is a seeing of Christ after a man believes, which is Christ in his love, &c. But I speak of that first sight of him that precedes the second act of faith: and it is an intuitive, or real sight of him, as he is in his glory.” Shepard’s Par. of the Ten Virgins, Part I. p. 74.

[484] Dr. Owen on the Spirit, p. 199, speaking of a common work of the Spirit, says, “The effects of this work on the mind, which is the first subject affected with it, proceeds not so far as to give it delight, complacency, and satisfaction, in the lovely spiritual nature and excellencies of the things revealed unto it The true nature of saving illumination consists in this, that it gives the mind such a direct intuitive insight and prospect into spiritual things, as that in their own spiritual nature they suit, please, and satisfy it; so that it is transformed into them, cast into the mould of them, and rests in them; Rom. vi. 17. chap. xii. 2. 1 Cor. ii. 13, 14. 2 Cor. iii. 18. chap. iv. 6. This the work we have insisted on, reacheth not unto. For notwithstanding any discovery that is made therein of spiritual things unto the mind, it finds not an immediate, direct, spiritual excellency in them; but only with respect unto some benefit or advantage, which is to be attained by means thereof. It will not give such a spiritual insight into the mystery of God’s grace by Jesus Christ, called his glory shining in the face of Christ, 2 Cor. iv. 6. as that the soul, in its first direct view of it, should, for what it is in itself, admire it, delight in it, approve it, and find spiritual solace, with refreshment, in it. But such a light, such a knowledge, it communicates, as that a man may like it well in its effects, as a way of mercy and salvation.”

[485] Psal. cxix. 140.

[486] “To the right closing with Christ’s person, this is also required, to taste the bitterness of sin, as the greatest evil; else a man will never close with Christ, for his holiness in him, and from him, as the greatest good. For we told you, that that is the right closing with Christ for himself, when it is for his holiness. For ask a whorish heart, what beauty he sees in the person of Christ: he will, after he has looked over his kingdom, his righteousness, all his works, see a beauty in them, because they do serve his turn, to comfort him only. Ask a virgin, he will see his happiness in all; but that which makes the Lord amiable is his holiness, which is in him to make him holy too. As in marriage, it is the personal beauty draws the heart And hence I have thought it reason, that he that loves the brethren for a little grace, will love Christ much more.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 84.

[487] See Exod. ix. 16 and chap. xiv. 18 and xv. 16. Psal lxvi. 3. and xlvi.10. and other places innumerable.

[488] “Many that have had mighty strong affections at first conversion, afterwards become dry, and wither, and consume, and pine, and die away: and now their hypocrisy is manifest; if not to all the world by open profaneness, yet to the discerning eye of living Christians, by a forMal. barren, unsavoury, unfruitful heart, and course; because they never bad light to conviction enough as yet—It is strange to see some people carried with mighty affection against sin and bell, and after Christ And what is the bell you fear? A dreadful place. What is Christ? They scarce know so much as devils do; but that is all. Oh trust them not! Many have, and these will fall away to some lust, or opinion, or pride, or world; and the reason is. they never had light enough, John v. 35. John was a burning and shining high, and they did joy in him for a season; yet glorious as it was, they saw not Christ by it, especially not with divine light It is rare to see Christians full both of light and affection. And therefore consider of this; many a man has been well brought up, and is of a sweet loving nature, mild, and gentle, and harmless, likes and loves the best things, and his meaning, and mind, and heart is good, and has more in heart than in show; and so hopes all shall go well with him. I say, there may lie greatest hypocrisy under greatest affections; especially if they want light. You shall be hardened in your hypocrisy by them. I never liked violent affections and pangs, but only such as were dropped in by light: because those come from an external principle, and last not but these do.—Men are not affrighted by the light of the sun, though clearer than the lightning— Shepard’s Parable, Part I p. 146.

[489] Phil. iii. 8.

[490] “Take heed of contenting yourselves with every kind of knowledge. Do not worship every image of your own heads; especially you that fall short of truth, or the knowledge of it. For when you have some, there may be yet that wanting, which may make you sincere. There are many men of great knowledge, able to teach themselves, and others too: and yet their hearts are unsound. How comes this to pass? Is it because they have so much light? No; but because they want much. And therefore content not yourselves with every knowledge. There is some knowledge which men have by the light of nature, (which leaves them without excuse,) from the book of creation; some by power of education: some by the light of the law, whereby men know their sin and evils; some by the letter of the gospel; and so men may know much, and speak well; and so in seeing, see not: some by the Spirit, and may see much, so as to prophesy in Christ’s name, and yet bid depart. Matt vii. Now there is a light of glory, whereby the elect see things in another manner: to tell you how, they cannot: it is the beginning of light in heaven: and the same Spirit that fills Christ, filling their minds, that they know, by this anointing, all things: which if ever you have you must become babes and fools in your own eyes. God will never write his law in your minds, until all the scribblings of it are blotted out. Account all your knowledge loss for the gaining of this. It is sad to see many a man pleasing himself in his own dreaming delusions; yet the poor creature in seeing, sees not: which is God’s heavy curse upon men under greatest means, and which lays all waste and desolate.” Shepard’s Parable. Part. I. p. 147.

[491] Calvin, in his Institutions. Book I. chap. ix. § 1. says. “It is not the office of the Spirit that is promised us, to make new and before unheard of revelations, or to coin some new kind of doctrine, which tends to draw us away from the received doctrine of the gospel; but to seal and confirm to us that very doctrine which is by the gospel.” And in the same place he speaks of some, that in those days maintained the contrary notion, pretending to be immediately led by the Spirit, as persons that were governed by a most haughty self-conceit; and not so properly to be looked upon as only labouring under a mistake, as driven by a sort of raving madness.

[492] Chamber’s Dictionary, under the word TASTE.

[493] Such as the Anabaptists. Antinomians, and Familists, the followers of N. Stork, Th. Muncer, Jo. Becold, Henry Pleifer, David George, Casper Swenckfield, Henry Nicolas, Johannes Agricola Eislebius; and the many wild enthusiasts that were in England in the days of Oliver Cromwell; and the followers of Mrs. Hutchinson, in New England; as appears by the particular and large accounts given of all these sects, by that eminently holy man, Mr. Samuel Rutherford, in his Display of the Spiritual Antichrist And in such things as these consisted the experiences of the late French prophets, and their followers.

[494] “The imagination is that room of the soul, wherein the devil doth often appear. Indeed (to speak exactly) the devil hath no efficient power over the rational part of a man: he cannot change the will, he cannot alter the heart of a man. So that the utmost he can do, in tempting a man to sin. is by suasion and suggestion only. But then how doth the devil do this? Even by working upon the imagination. He observeth the temper and bodily constitution or a man; and thereupon suggests to his fancy, and injects his fiery darts thereinto, by which the mind and will come to be wrought upon. The devil then, though he hath no imperious efficacy over thy will, yet because he can thus stir and move thy imagination, and thou being naturally destitute of grace, canst not withstand these suggestions; hence it is that any sin in thy imagination, tough but in the outward works of thy soul, yet doth quickly lay hold on all. And indeed, by this means do arise those horrible delusions, that are in many erroneous ways of religion: all is because their imaginations are corrupted. Yes, how often are these diabolical delusions of the imagination taken for the gracious operations of God’s Spirit!—It is from hence that many have pretended to enthusiasms—they leave the Scriptures, and wholly attend to what they perceive and feel within them.” Burgess On Original Sin. p. 369. The great Turretine, speaking on that question. What is the power of angels? says, “As to bodies there is no doubt, but that they can do a great deal upon all sorts of elementary and sublunary bodies, to move them locally, and variously to agitate them. It is also certain, that they can act upon the external and internal senses, to excite them, or to bind them. But as to the rational soul itself, they can do nothing immediately upon that; for to God alone, who knows and searches the hearts, and who has them in his hands, does it also appertain to bow and move them whithersoever he will. But angels can act upon the rational soul, only mediately, by imaginations.” Theolog. Elench. Loc. VII. Quest. 7.

[495] 2 Cor. iii. 18.

[496] John i. 14.

[497] Calvin, in his Institutions, Book II. chap. 2. § 11. says, “I was always exceedingly pleased with that saying of Chrysostom.’ The foundation of our philosophy is humility;’ and yet more pleased with that of Augustine, ‘As,’ says he, ‘the rhetorician being asked, what was the first thing in the rules of eloquence, he answered, Pronunciation: what was the second, pronunciation; what was the third, still he answered, pronunciation. So if you should ask me concerning the precepts of the christian religion, I would answer, firstly, secondly, and thirdly, and for ever, Humility?’ ”

[498] “Albeit the Pythagoreans were thus famous for Judaic mysterious wisdom, and many moral as well as natural accomplishments; yet were they not exempted from boasting and pride; which was indeed a vice most epidemic, and as it were congenial, among all the philosophers; but in a more particular manner, among the Pythagoreans. So Hornius Hist. Philosoph. L. 3. chap. II. The manners of the Pythagoreans were not free from boasting. They were all  such as abounded in the sense and commendation of their own excellencies, and boasting even almost to the degree of immodesty and impudence, as great Heinsius ad Horat. has rightly observed. Thus indeed does proud nature delight to walk in the sparks of its own fire. And although many of these old philosophers could. by the strength of their own lights and heats, together with some common elevations and raisures of spirit, (peradventure from a more than ordinary, though not special and saving, assistance of the Spirit.) abandon many grosser vices; yet they were all deeply immersed in that miserable cursed abyss of spiritual pride: so that all their natural, and moral, and philosophic attainments, did feed, nourish, strengthen, and render most inveterate, this hell-bred pest of their hearts. Yea, those of them that seemed most modest, as the Academics, who professed they knew nothing, and the Cynics, who greatly decried, both in words and habits, the pride of others, yet even they abounded in the most notorious and visible pride. So connatural and morally essential to corrupt nature, is this envenomed root, fountain, and plague of spiritual pride; especially where there is any natural, moral, or philosophic excellence to feed the same. Whence Austin rightly judged all these philosophic virtues to be but splendid sins.” Gales’s Court of the Gentiles, Part II. B. ii. chap. x. § 17.

[499] “Take not every opinion and doctrine from men or angels, that bears a fair show of advancing Christ; for they may be but the fruits of evangelical hypocrisy and deceit; that being deceived themselves, may deceive others too; Matt. vii. 15. Beware of them that come in sheep’s clothing; in the Innocency, purity, and meekness of Christ and his people: but inwardly are wolves, proud, cruel, censorious, speaking evil of what they know not. By their fruits ye shall know them. Do not think, beloved, that Satan will not seek to send delusions among us. And do you think these delusions will come out of the popish pack, whose inventions smell above-ground here? No, he must come, and will come, with more evangelical, fine-spun devices. It is a rule observed amongst Jesuits, at this day, if they would conquer religion by subtlety, never oppose religion with a cross religion; but set it against itself. So oppose the gospel by the gospel. And look, as churches pleading for works, and new invented devised works; so when faith is preached, men will have their new inventions of faith. I speak not this against the doctrine of faith, where it is preached; but am glad of it: not that I would have men content themselves with every form of faith: for I believe that most men’s faith needs confirming or trying. But I speak to prevent danger on that hand.” Shepard Parable, Part I. p. 122.

[500] “There be two things wherein it appears that a man has only common gifts, and no inward principle: 1. These gifts ever puff up, and make a man something in his own eyes; as the Corinthian knowledge did; and many a private man thinks himself fit to be a minister.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 181, 182.

[501] Calvin, in his Institutions, B. III. chap. xii. § 7, speaking of this Pharisee, observes, “That in his outward confession, he acknowledges that the righteousness that he has is the gift of God: but (says he) because he trusts that he is righteous, he goes away out of the presence of God, unacceptable and odious.”

[502] Luther, as his words are cited by Rutherford, in his Display of the spiritual Antichrist. p. 143, 144, says thus, “So is the life of a Christian, that he that has begun seems to himself to have nothing; but strives and presses forward, that he may apprehend. Whence Paul says, I count not myself to have apprehended. For indeed nothing is more pernicious to a believer, than that presumption, that he has already apprehended, and has no further need of seeking. Hence also many fall back, and pine away in spiritual security and slothfulness. So Bernard says, To stand still in God’s way, is to go back. Wherefore this remains to him that has begun to be a Christian, to think that he is not yet a Christian, but to seek that he may be a Christian, that he may glory with Paul, I am not, but I desire to be; a Christian not yet finished, but only in his beginnings. Therefore he is not a Christian, that is, he that thinks himself a finished Christian, and is not sensible how he falls short. We reach after heaven, but are not in heaven. Woe to him that is wholly renewed, that is, that thinks himself to be so. That man, without doubt, has never so much as begun to be renewed, nor did he ever taste what it is to be a Christian.”

[503] It is an observation of Mr. Jones, in his excellent treatise of the canon of the New Testament, that the evangelist Mark—who was the companion of St. Peter, and is supposed to have written his gospel under the direction of that apostle —when he mentions Peter’s repentance after his denying his Master, does not use such strong terms to set it forth as the other evangelists: he only uses these words, When he thought thereon, he wept,” Mark xiv. 72. whereas the other evangelists say thus. He went out and wept bitterly.” Matt. xxvi. 75. Luke xxii. 62.

[504] “This spirit ever keeps a man poor and vile in his own eyes, and empty —When the man hath got some knowledge, and can discourse pretty well, and hath some tastes of the heavenly gift, some sweet illapses of grace, and so his conscience is pretty well quieted: and if he hath got some answer to his prayers, and hath sweet affections, he grows full: and having ease to his conscience, casts off sense, and daily groaning under sin. And hence the spirit of prayer dies: he loses his esteem of God’s ordinances; feels not such need of them; or gets no good, feels no life or power by them. This is the woful condition of some; but yet they know it not. But now he that is filled with the Spirit, the Lord empties him; and the more, the longer he lives. So that though others think he needs not much grace; yet he accounts himself the poorest” Shepard’s Parable of the Ten Virgins, Part II. p. 132. “After all fillings, be ever empty, hungry, and feeling need, and praying for more.” Ibid. p. 151. “Truly, brethren, when I see the curse of God upon many Christians, that are now grown full of their parts, gifts, peace, comforts, abilities, duties, I stand adoring the riches of the Lord’s mercy, to a little handful of poor believers; not only in making them empty, but in keeping them so all their days.” Shepard’s Sound Believer, the late edition in Boston, p. 158,159.

[505] “I would not judge of the whole soul’s coming to Christ, so much by sudden pangs, as by an inward bent. For the whole soul, in affectionate expressions and actions, may be carried to Christ; but being without this bent, and change of affections, is unsound.”—Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 203.

[506] “It is with the soul, as with water; all the cold may be gone, but the native principle of cold remains still. You may remove the burning of lusts, not the blackness of nature. Where the power of sin lies, change of conscience from security to terror, change of life from profaneness to civility, and fashions of the world, to escape the pollutions thereof, change of lusts, nay quenching them for a time: but the nature is never changed, in the best hypocrite that ever was.”—Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 194.

[507] “Do you think the Holy Ghost comes on a man, as on Balaam, by immediate acting, and then leaves him, and then he has nothing?— Shepard’s Parable. Part I. p. 126.

[508] Mr. Shepard, speaking of hypocrites affecting applause, says, “Hence men forsake their friends, and trample under foot the scorns of the world; they have credit elsewhere. To maintain their interest in the love of godly men, they will suffer much.” Parable of Ten Virgins. Part I. p. 180.

[509] Psal. xxxvii. 21.

[510] Psal. cxii. 5.

[511] “These are hypocrites that believe, but fail in regard of the use of the gospel, and of the Lord Jesus. And these we read of, Jude 3. viz. of some men that did turn grace into wantonness. For therein appears the exceeding evil of a man’s heart, that not only the law, but also the glorious gospel of the Lord Jesus, works in him all manner of unrighteousness. And it is too common for men at the first work of conversion. On then to cry for grace and Christ, and afterwards grow licentious, live and lie in the breach of the law, and take their warrant for their course from the gospel.”— Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 126. Again, p. 232. Mr. Shepard speaks of such hypocrites as those, “who, like strange eggs being put into the same nest, where honest men have lived, they have been hatched up; and when they are young, keep their nest, and live by crying and opening their mouths wide after the Lord, and the food of his word; but when their wings are grown, and they have got some affections, some knowledge, some hope of mercy, are hardened thereby to fly from God.” And adds, “Can that man be good, whom God’s grace makes worse?” Again. Part II. p. 167. “When men fly to Christ in times of peace, that so they may preserve their sins with greater peace of conscience; so that sin makes them fly to Christ, as well as misery; not that they may destroy and abolish sin, but they may be preserved in their sins with peace; then men may be said to apprehend Christ only by a seeming faith.—Many an heart secretly saith this. If I can have my sin, and peace, and conscience quiet for the present, and God merciful to pardon it afterward; hence he doth rely (as be saith) only on the mercy of God in Christ: and now this hardens and blinds him, and makes him secure, and his faith is sermon proof, nothing stirs him—And were it not for their faith they should despair, but this keeps them up. And now they think if they have any trouble of mind, the devil troubles them; and so make Christ and faith protectors of sin, not purifiers from sin: which is most dreadful; turning grace to wantonness. as they did sacrifice. So these would sin under the shadow of Christ, because the shadow is good and sweet, Mic. iii. 11. They had subtle sly ends in good duties; for therein may lie a man’s sin: yet they lean upon the Lord.— When money-changers came into the temple. You have made it a den of thieves. Thieves when hunted fly to their den or cave, and there they are secure against all searchers, and hue and cries: so here. But Christ whipped them out. So when men are pursued with cries and fears of conscience, away to Christ they go as to their den: not as saints, to pray and lament out the life of their sin there; but to preserve their sins. This is vile; will the Lord receive such?”

[512] Dr. Ames, in his Cases of Conscience, Book III. chap. iv. speaks of a holy modesty in the worship of God, is one sign of true humility.

[513] “Renewed care and diligence follow the sealings of the Spirit. Now is the soul at the foot of Christ, as Mary was at the sepulchre, with fear and great joy. He that travels the road with a rich treasure about him, is afraid of a thief in every bush.” Flavel’s Sacramental Meditation, Med. 4.

[514] “If repentance accompanies faith, it is no presumption to believe. Many know the sin, and hence believe in Christ, trust in Christ, and there is an end of their faith. But what confession and sorrow for sin? what more love to Christ follows this faith? Truly none. Nay, their faith is the cause why they have none. For they think, if I trust in Christ to forgive me, he will do it; and there is an end of the business. Verily this hedge faith, this bramble-faith, that catches hold on Christ, and pricks and scratches Christ, by more impenitency, more contempt of him, is mere presumption; which shall one day be burnt up and destroyed by the fire of God’s Jealousy. Fye upon that faith, that serves only to keep a man from being tormented before his time! Your sins would be your sorrows, but that your faith quiets you. But if faith be accompanied with repentance, mourning for sin, more esteem of God’s grace in Christ; so that nothing breaks thy heart more than the thoughts of Christ’s unchangeable love to one so vile, and this love makes thee love much, and love him the more; as thy sin increaseth, so thou desirest thy love’s increase; and now the stream of thy thoughts run, how thou mayst live to him that died for thee: this was Mary’s faith, who sat at Christ’s feet weeping, washing them with her tears,and loving much, because much was forgiven.”—Shepard’s Sound Believer, p. 128.129. “You shall know godly sorrow (says Dr. Preston, in his discourse on Paul’s conversion) by the continuance of it; it is constant: but worldly sorrow is but a passion of the mind; it changes, it lasts not. Though for the present it may be violent and strong, and work much outwardly: yet it comes but by fits, and continues not: like a land-flood, which violently, for the present, overflows the banks; but it will away again; it is not always thus. But godly sorrow is like a spring, that still keeps running both winter and summer, wet and dry, in heat and cold, early and late. So this godly sorrow is the same in a regenerate man still; take him when you will, he is still sorrowing for sin. This godly sorrow stands like the centre of the earth, which removes not, but still remains.” “I am persuaded, many a man’s heart is kept from breaking and mourning, because of this. He saith (it may be) that he is a vile sinner; but I trust in Christ, &c. If they do go to Christ to destroy their sin, this makes them more secure in their sin. For (say they) I cannot help it, and Christ must do all. Whereas faith makes the soul mourn after the Lord the more.” Shepard’s Parable of the Ten Virgins, Part II. p. 168.

[515] Psal. cxix. 104.

[516] Dr. Owen (on the Spirit, Book III. chap. ii. § 18.) speaking of a common work of the Spirit, says, “This work operates greatly on the affections: we have given instances, in fear, sorrow, joy, and delight, about spiritual things, that are stirred up and acted thereby: but yet it comes short in two things, of a thorough work upon the affections themselves. For, 1st, It doth not fix them. And, 2dly, It doth not fill them. 1. It is required that our affections be fixed on heavenly and spiritual things and true grace will effect it; Col. iii. 1, 2. “If ye be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God. Set your affections on things above.” The joys, the fears, the hopes, the sorrows, with reference to spiritual and eternal things, which the work before mentioned doth produce, are evanid, uncertain, unstable, not only as to the degrees, but as to the very being of them. Sometimes they are as a river ready to overflow its banks, men cannot but be pouring them out on all occasions; and sometimes as waters that fail, no drop comes from them. Sometimes they are hot, and sometimes cold; sometimes up, and sometimes down; sometimes all heaven, and sometimes all world; without equality, without stability. But true grace fixeth the affections on spiritual things. As to the degrees of their exercise, there may be and is in them a great variety, according as they may be excited, aided, assisted by grace and the means of it; or obstructed and impeded, by the interposition of temptations and diversions. But the constant bent and inclination of renewed affections, is unto spiritual things; as the Scripture every where testifieth, and as experience doth confirm. “There is (says Dr. Preston) a certain love, by fits, which God accepts not; when men come and offer to God great promises, like the waves of the sea, as big as mountains: Oh, they think, they will do much for God! But their minds change; and they become as those high waves, which at last fall level with the other waters. If a man should proffer thee great kindnessesminds change; and they become as those high waves, which at last fall level with the other waters. If a man should proffer thee great kindnesses; and thou shouldst afterwards come to him to make use of him, and he should look strangely upon thee, as if he were never acquainted with thee; how wouldst thou esteem of such love? If we are now on, now off, in our love. God will not esteem of such love.” Discourse on the Divine Love of Christ. Mr. Flavel, speaking of these changeable professors, says, ” These professors have more of the moon than of the sun; little light, less beat, and many changes. They deceive many, yea, they deceive themselves, but cannot deceive God. They want that ballast and establishment in themselves, that would have kept them tight and steady.” Touchstone of Sincerity, chap. ii. § 2.

[517] “The Lord is neglected secretly, yet honoured openly; because there is no wind in their chambers to blow their sails; and therefore there they stand still. Hence many men keep their profession, when they lose their affection. They have by the one a name to live, (and that is enough,) though their hearts be dead. And hence so long as you love and commend them, so long they love you; but if not, they will forsake you. They were warm only by another’s fire, and hence having no principle of life within, soon grow dead. This is the water that turns a Pharisee’s mill.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 180. ” The hypocrite (says Mr. Flavel) is not for the closet, but the synagogue. Matt vi. 5, 6. It is not his meat and drink to retire from the clamour of the world, to enjoy God in secret” Touchstone of Sincerity, chap. vii. § 2. Dr. Ames, in his Cases of Conscience, Lib. III. chap. v. speaks of it as a thing by which sincerity may be known, “That persons be obedient in the absence, as well as in the presence, of lookers on; in secret, as well, yea more, than in public;” alleging Phil. ii. 12. andMatt vi. 6.

[518] Mr. Flavel, in reckoning up those things, wherein the sorrow of saints is distinguished from the sorrow of hypocrites, about their sins, says, “Their troubles for sin are more private and silent troubles than others are; their sore runs in the night” Touchstone of Sincerity, chap. vi. § 5.

[519] “It is usual to see a false heart most diligent in seeking the Lord, when he has been worst, and most careless when it is best. Hence many at first conversion, sought the Lord earnestly: afterwards affections and endeavours die; that now they are good as the word can make them.—An hypocrite’s last end is to satisfy himself: hence he has enough. A saint’s is to satisfy Christ: hence he never has enough.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 157. Many a man, it may be, may say, I have nothing in myself, and all is in Christ; and comfort himself there; and so falls asleep. Hands off! and touch not this ark, lest the Lord slay thee: a Christ of clouts would serve your turn as well.” Ibid. p. 71. “An hypocrite’s light goes out, and grows not. Hence many ancient slanders take all their comfort from their first work, and droop when in old age.” Ibid. p. 77. And p. 93, 94. Mr. Shepard, mentioning the characters of those that have a dead hope, says, “They that content themselves with any measure of holiness and grace, they look not for Christ’s coming and company. For saints that do look for him, though they have not that holiness and grace they would have, yet they rest not satisfied with any measure; 1 John iii. 3. “He that hath this hope, purifieth himself as he is pure.”—That saints content not themselves with any dressings, until made glorious, and so fit for fellowship with that spouse.—When a man leaves not, until he gets such a measure of faith and grace, and now when he has got this, contents himself with this, as a good sign that he shall be saved, he looks not for Christ. Or when men are heavily laden with sin; then close with Christ; and then are comforted, sealed, and have joy that fills them; and now the work is done. —And when men shall not content themselves with any measure; but wish they had more, if grace would grow, while they tell clocks and sit idle; and so God must do all: but do not purge themselves, and make work of it.” Again, p. 109. “There is never a hypocrite living, but closeth with Christ for his own ends: for he cannot work beyond his principle. Now when men have served their own turns out of another man, away they go, and keep that which they have. An hypocrite closeth with Christ, as a man with a rich shop; he will not be at cost to buy all the shop, but so much as serves his turn. Commonly men in horror, seek so much of Christ as will ease them; and hence profess, and hence seek for so much of Christ as will credit them; and hence their desires after Christ are soon satisfied. Appetitus finis est infinitus.” Woe to thee that canst paint such a Christ in thy head, and receive such a Christ into thy heart, as must be a pander to your sloth. The Lord will revenge this wrong done to his glory, with greater sorrows than ever any felt: to make Christ not only meat and drink to feed, but clothes to cover your sloth—Why what can we do? what can we do?—Why as the first Adam conveys not only guilt, but power; so the second conveys both righteousness and strength.” Ibid. p. 158. “When the Lord hath given some light and affection, and some comfort and some reformation, now a man grows full here. Saints do for God; and carnal hearts do something too; but a little fills them, and quiets them, and so damns them. And hence men at the first work upon them, are very diligent in the use of means; but after that, they be brought to neglect prayer, sleep out sermons, and to be careless, sapless, lifeless.” Ibid. p. 210. “It is an argument of want of grace, when a man saith to himself, as the glutton said to his soul, “Take thy rest, for thou hast goods laid up for many years.” So thou hast repentance and grace, and peace enough for many years: and hence the soul takes its rest, grows sluggish and negligent. Oh, if you die in this case, this night thy soul will be taken away to hell.” Ibid. p. 227.

[520] “He that pretends to godliness, and turns aside to crooked ways, is an hypocrite: for those that are really godly, do live in a way of obedience; Psal. cxix. 1, 2, 3. “Blessed are the undefiled in the way, that walk in the law of the Lord.—They also do iniquity.” Luke i. 6. “They were both righteous before God, walking in all the commandments of the Lord blameless.” But such as live in ways of sin, are dissemblers: for all such will be rejected in the day of judgment; Matth. vii. 23. “Depart from me ye that work iniquity”. The like we have Luke xiii. 27. If men live in a way of disobedience, they do not love God; for love will make men keep God’s commandments: 1 John v. 3. “Herein is love, that we keep his commandments: and his commandments are not grievous.” If men live in a way of disobedience, they have not a spirit of faith; for faith sanctifies men; Acts xxvi. 18. “Sanctified by faith that is in me.” If men live in a way of disobedience, they are not Christ’s sheep; for his sheep hear his voice; John x. 27. Men that live in a way of disobedience are not born of God; 1 John iii. 9. “He that is born of God, sinneth not” Men that live in a way of disobedience are the servants of sin; John viii. 34. “He that committeth sin, is the servant of sin.”—A course of external sin is an evidence of hypocrisy; whether it be a sin of omission or commission.—If men live in the neglect of known duties, or in the practice of known evils, that will be their condemnation; let the sin be what it will; let it be profaneness, uncleanness, lying, or injustice.—If men allow themselves in malice, envy, wanton thoughts, profane thoughts, that will condemn them; though those corruptions do not break out in any scandalous way. These thoughts are an evidence of a rotten heart; Tit. iii. 3. “We ourselves were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful, and hating one another.” If a man allows himself, though he thinks he doth not, in malice and envy, he is an hypocrite: though his conscience disallows it, yet if his heart allows it, he is no saint— Some make pretences to godliness, whereby they do not only deceive others, but (which is a great deal worse) deceive themselves also: but this will condemn them, that they live in a course of sin. and so must go with ungodly men;. Ps. xxv. 5. “As for such as turn aside unto their crooked ways, the Lord will lead them forth with the workers of iniquity.” If there be a great change in a man’s carriage, and he be reformed in several particulars, yet if there be one evil way, the man is an ungodly man; where there is piety there is universal obedience. A man may have great infirmities, yet be a godly man. So it was with Lot, David, and Peter: but if he lives in a way of sin, he does not render his godliness only suspicious, but it is full evidence against him. Men that are godly have respect to all God’s commandments, Psal. cxix. 6. There be a great many commands, and if there be one of them that a man has not respect unto, he will be put to shame another day. If a man lives in one evil way. he is not subject to God’s authority: but then he lives in rebellion; and that will take off all his pleas, and at once cut off all his pretences; and he will be condemned in the day of judgment.—One way of sin is exception enough against the man’s salvation. Though the sin that he lives in be but small: such persons will not be guilty of perjury. stealing, drunkenness, fornication; they look upon them to be heinous things, and they are afraid of them; but they do not much matter it, if they oppress a little in a bargain, if they commend a thing too much when they are about to sell it, if they break a promise, if they spend the Sabbath unprofitably, if they neglect secret prayer, if they talk rudely and reproach others; they think these are but small things, if they can keep clear of great transgressions, they hope that God will not insist upon small things.—But indeed all the commands of God are established by divine authority: a small shot may kill a man, as well as a cannon bullet: a small leak may sink a ship. If a man lives in small sins, that shows he has no love to God, no sincere care to please and honour God. Little sins are of a damning nature, as well as great: if they do not deserve so much punishment as greater. yet they do deserve damnation. There is contempt of God in all sins; Matt. v. 19. “He that, shall break one of the least of these commands, and shall teach men so, shall be called the least in the kingdom of God.” Prov. xix. 16. “He that keepeth the commandment, keepeth his own soul; but he that despiseth his way, shall die.” If a man says, this is a great command, and so lays weight on it and another is a little commandment, and so does not regard it, but will allow himself to break it, he is in a perishing condition.”—Stoddard’s Way to Know Sincerity and Hypocrisy.

[521] Deut. v. 29. Deut. xxxii. 18, 19, 20. 1 Chron. xxviii. 9. Psal. lxxviii. 7, 8. 10, 11, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 56, &c. Psal. cvi. 3, 12-15. Psal. cxxv. 4, 5. Prov. xxvi. 11. Isa. lxiv. 5. Jer. xvii. 13. Ezek. iii. 20. and xviii. 24. and xxxiii. 12, 13. Matt. x. 22. and xiii. 4-8. with verses 19-23. and xxv. 8. and xxiv. 12, 13. Luke ix. 62. and xii. 35. &c. and xxii. 28. and xvii. 32. John viii 30, 31. and xv. 6, 7, 8, 10, 16. Rom. ii. 7. and xi. 22. Col. i. 22, 23. Heb. iii. 6, 12,14. and 11,12. and x 35, &c. James i. 25. Rev. ii. 13, 26. and Rev. 10. 1 Tim. ii. 15. 2 Tim. iv. 4-8.

[522] Gen. xxii. 1. Exod. xv. 25. and xvi. 4. Deut viii. 2, 15, 16. and xiii. 3. Jude. ii 22. and iii. 1, 4. Job xxiii. 10. Psal. lxvi. 10. 11. Ezek. iii. 20. Dan. xii. 10. Zech. xiii. 9. Matt. viii. 19, 20. and xviii. 21, 22. Luke i. 35. 1 Cor. xi. 19. 2 Cor. viii. 8. Jam. i. 12. 1 Pet. iv. 12. 1 John ii.19. Heb. xi. 17. Rev. iii. 10.

[523] “One way of sin is exception enough against men’s salvation, though their temptations be great. Some persons delight in iniquity; they take pleasure in rudeness, and intemperate practices: but there be others, that do not delight in sin; when they can handsomely avoid it, they do not choose it; except they be under some great necessity, they will not do it They are afraid to sin; they think it is dangerous, and have some care to avoid it: but sometimes they force themselves to sin; they are reduced to difficulties, and cannot tell how well to avoid it: it is a dangerous thing not to do it. If Naaman do not bow himself in the house of Rimmon, the king will be in a rage with him, take away his office, it may be take away his life, and so he complies; 2 Kings v. 18.—So Jeroboam forced himself to set up the calves at Dan and Bethel: he thought that if the people went up to Jerusalem to worship, they would return to Rehoboam, and kill him; therefore he must think of some expedient to deliver himself in this strait; 1 Kings xii. 27, 28. He was driven by appearing necessity to take this wicked course.— So the stony-ground hearers were willing to retain the profession of the true religion; but the case was such, that they thought they could not well do it; Matt. xiii. 21. “When tribulation or persecution ariseth because of the word, by and by he is offended.” So Achan and Gehazi had singular opportunities to get an estate; if they live twenty years they are not like to have such an advantage; and they force themselves to borrow a point, and break the law of God. They lay a necessity on estate, and liberty, and life, but not upon obedience. If a man be willing to serve God in ordinary cases, but excuse himself when there be great difficulties, he is not godly. It is a small matter to serve God when men have no temptation; but Lot was holy in Sodom, Noah was righteous in the old world. Temptations try men, but they do not force men to sin: and grace will establish the heart in a day of temptation.—They are blessed that do endure temptation, James i. 12. But they are cursed that fall away in a day of temptation.” Stoddard’s Way to know Sincerity and Hypocrisy.

[524] “Hence we learn what verdict to pass and give in concerning those men that decay and fall off from the Lord. They never had oil in the vessel; never had a dram of grace in their heart. Thus 1 John ii. 19. “If they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us.” It seems they were such men, which were so eminent and excellent, as that there were no brands nor marks upon them, to give notice to the churches, that they were marked out for apostacy; but were only discovered to be unsound, by their apostacy; and this was argument good enough.” Shepard’s Parable. Part I. p. 226.

[525] “When a man’s rising is the cause of his fall, or seals a man up in his fall, or at least the cause through his corruption. Ex. Gr. Time was, a man lived a loose, careless, carnal life; by the ministry of some word, or reading of some book, or speaking with some friend, he comes to be convinced of his misery and woful condition, and sees no good nor grace in himself; he hath been even hitherto deceived: at last he comes to get some light, some taste, some sorrows, some heart to use the means, some comfort and mercy, and hope of life: and when it is thus with him, now he falls; he grows full and falls; and this rising is the cause of his fall; his light is darkness and death to him; and grows to a form of knowledge; his rising makes him fall to formality, and then to profaneness; and so his tasting satisfies him; his sorrows empty his heart of sorrows for sin; and his sorrows for his falls harden his heart in his falls; and all the means of recovering him harden him.—Look as it is in diseases; if the physic and meat turn to be poison, then there is no hope of recovery; a man is sick to death now. The saint’s little measure makes him forget what is behind.” Shepard’s Parable. Part I. p. 226.

[526] Matt v. 29, 30. Chap. vi. 24. Chap. viii. 19-22. Chap. iv. 18-22. Chap. x. 37, 38, 39. Chap. xiii. 44. 45. 46. Chap. xvi. 24. 25, 26. Chap. xviii. 8, 9. Chap. xix. 21, 27. 28, 29. Luke v. 27, 28. Chap. x. 42. Chap. xii. 33, 34. Chap. xiv. 16-20, 25-33. Chap. xvi. 13. Acts iv. 34, 35. with Chap. v. 1-11. Rom. vi. 3-8. Gal. ii. 20. Chap. vi. 14. Philip. iii. 7-10. Jam. i. 8. 9.10. Chap. iv. 4. 1 John ii. 15. Rev. xiv. 4. Gen. xii. 1-4. with Heb. xi. 8, 9, 10. Gen. xxii. 12. and Heb. xi. 17. Chap. xi. 24-27. Deut xiii. 6. and Chap. xxxiii. 9. Ruth. i. 6-16. with Psal. xlv. 10, 11. and 2 Sam. xv. 19-22. Psal. lxxxiii. 25. Psal. xvi. 5, 6. Lam. iii. 24. Jer. x. 16.

[527] “To profess to know much is easy; but to bring your affections into subjection, to wrestle with lusts, to cross your wills and yourselves, upon every occasion, this is hard. The Lord looketh that in our lives we should be serviceable to him, and useful to men. That which is within, the Lord and our brethren are never the better for it: but the outward obedience, flowing thence, glorifieth God, and does good to men. The Lord will have this done. What else is the end of our planting and watering, but that the trees may be filled with sap? And what is the end of that sap, but that the trees may bring forth fruit? What careth the husbandman for leaves and barren trees?”—Dr. Preston of the Church’s Carriage.

[528] “What is the end of every grace, but to mollify the heart, and make it pliable to some command or other? Look, how many commandments, so many graces there are in virtue and efficacy, although not so many several names are given them. The end of every such grace is to make us obedient; as the end of temperance is chastity, to bow the heart to these commands. Be ye sober, &c. not in chambering and wantonness, &c. When the Lord commandeth us not to be angry with our brother, the end of meekness, and why the Lord infuseth it, is to keep us from unadvised rash anger. So faith, the end of it is to take Jesus Christ, to make us obedient to the command of the gospel, which commands us to believe in him. So as all graces do join together, but to frame and fashion the soul to obedience; then so much obedience as is in your lives, so much grace in your hearts, and no more. Therefore ask your hearts, how subject you are to the Lord in your lives? It was the counsel that Francis Spira gave to them about him, saith he, Learn all of me to take heed of severing faith and obedience: I taught justification by faith, but neglected obedience; and therefore is this befallen me. I have known some godly men, whose comfort on their death-beds hath been not from the inward acts of their minds, which apart considered, might be subject to misapprehensions, but from the course of obedience in their lives, issuing thence. Let Christians look to it, that in all their conversation, as they stand in every relation, as scholars, tradesmen, husbands, wives, look to this, that when they come to die, they have been subject in all things. This will yield comfort.” Dr. Preston’s Church’s Carriage.

[529] “No unregenerate man, though he go never so far, let him do never so much, but he lives in some one sin or other, secret or open, little or great Judas went far, but he was covetous: Herod went far, but he loved his Herodias. Every dog hath his kennel; every swine hath his swill; and every wicked man his lust.” Shepard’s Sincere Convert, 1st edition, p. 96. “There is never an unsound heart in the world, but as they say of witches, they have some familiar that sucks them, so they have some lust that is beloved of them, some beloved there is they have given a promise to never to forsake.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 15. “No man that is married to the law, but his fig-leaves cover some nakedness. All his duties ever brood some lust. There is some one sin or other the man lives in; which either the Lord discovers, and he will not part with, as the young; man; or else is so spiritual, he cannot see all his life-time. Read through the strictest of all, and see this, Matt xxiii. Painted sepulchres. Paul that was blameless, yet (Eph. ii. 3. Tit. iii. 3.) served divers lusts and pleasures. And the reason is, the law is not the ministration of the Spirit, 2 Cor. iii. 8. 9. which breaks off from every sin. There is no law that can give life. Gal. iii. 21. and hence many men have strong resolutions, and break all again. Hence men sin and sorrow, and pray again, and then go with more ease in their sin. Examine thyself; is there any living lust with thy righteousness? It is sure, it is a righteousness thou art married to, and never wert yet matched to Christ.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 19, 20. “No hypocrite, though he closeth with Christ, and for a time grow up in knowledge of and communion with Christ, but he hath at that time hidden lusts and thorns that overgrow his growings, and choke all at last, and in conclusion meditates a league between Christ and his lusts, and seeks to reconcile them together.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 109. ”— Their faith is in such a party, as never was yet thoroughly rent from sin. And here is the great wound of the most cunning hypocrites living. Let a man be cast down as low as hell with sorrow, and lie under chains, quaking; in apprehension of terror to come; let a man then be raised up to heaven in joy, not able to live: let a man reform and shine like an earthly angel: yet if not rent from lust, that either you did never see it, or if so, you have not followed the Lord to remove it, but proud, dogged, worldly, sluggish still, false in your dealings, cunning in your tradings, devils in your families, images in your churches; you are objects of pity now, and shall be of terror at the great day. For where sin remains in power, it will bring faith, and Christ, and joy into bondage and service of itself.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 125. “Methinks it is with the best hypocrites, as it is with divers old merchants: they prize and desire the gain of merchandise; but to be at the trouble to prepare the ship, to put themselves upon the hazard and dangers of the ship, to go and fetch the treasure that they prize, this they will never do. So many prize and desire earnestly the treasures of heaven; but to be at the trouble of a heaven-voyage to fetch this treasure, to pass through the valley of Baca, tears, temptations, the powers of darkness, the breaches. opposition, and contradictions of a sinful unbelieving heart, good and evil report, to pass from one depth and wave to another, this the best hypocrite fails in; and hence loses all at last. And this I conceive to be one of the great differences between the strong desires and esteems of hypocrites and saints.— Look, as it is with men that have two trades, or two shops; one is as much as ever they can follow or tend: they are forced at last to put off one, and they must neglect one; so here. That spirit of sloth and slumber, which the Lord ever leaves the best hypocrite to, so mightily oppresseth all their senses, that they cannot use effectually all means to accomplish their ends. And hence a man desires the end, but has it not; Prov. xiii. 4.“ Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 150, 151. “Read through all the Scripture; constantly, never any hypocrites but they had this brand. Matt vii. 23. you workers of iniquity. Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 195. “A carnal man may hit upon some good duty that God commands, and refrain from some sin that God forbids; but to go through, he cannot: to take up reproach and disgrace, to lose his credit, to forsake his friends, to lose honour, and riches, and pleasures; this he will not do, until he be humbled.” Dr. Preston on Paul’s Conversion. “So it is with men, because they want humiliation. Therefore their profession and they do not continue, but part willingly one from another. They will do some things, but not all things: and they will forego some things, but not all things.—And therefore our Saviour saith, Luke xiv. “He that will not forsake all for my sake, is not worthy of me.” He is not worth the saying, that prizes not me above all things whatsoever. And a man will not prize Christ, nor forsake all things for Christ, until he be humbled.” Ibid.

[530] “The counterfeit and common grace of foolish virgins, after some time of glorious profession, will certainly go out and be quite spent. It consumes in the using, and shining, and burning.—Men that have been most forward, decay; their gifts decay, life decays.—It is so, after some time of profession: for at first, it rather grows than decays and withers: but afterward they have enough of it, it withers and dies.—The Spirit of God comes upon many hypocrites, in abundant and plentiful measure of awakening grace; it comes upon them, as it did upon Balaam, and as it is in overflowing waters, which spread far, and grow very deep, and fill many empty places.—Though it doth come upon them so, yet it doth never rest within, so as to dwell there, to take up an eternal mansion for himself.—Hence it doth decay by little and little; until at last it is quite gone. As ponds filled with rain-water, which comes upon them; not spring water, that riseth up within them: it drys up by little and little, until quite dry.” Shepard’s Parable, Part II. p. 58, 59. “Some men may apprehend Christ, neither out of fear of misery nor only to preserve some sin; but God lets in light and heat of the blessed beams of the glorious gospel of the Son of God: and therefore there is mercy, rich, free, sweet, for damned, great, vile sinners: Good Lord, saith the soul, what a sweet ministry, word, God, and gospel is this! and there rests. This was the frame of the stony-ground; which heard the word, and received it with joy, and for a time believed. And this is the case of thousands, that are much affected with the promise and mercy of Christ, and hang upon free grace for a time: but as it is with sweet smells in a room, they continue not long: or as flowers, they grow old and withered, and then fall. In time of temptation, lust, and world, and sloth, is more sweet than Christ, and all his gospel is.” Shepard’s Parable, Part II. p. 168. “Never any carnal heart, but some root of bitterness did grow up at last in this soil.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 195. ” We shall see in experience: take the best professors living; though they may come, as they and others judged, to the Lord, and follow the Lord; yet they will in time depart. The Spirit never was given effectually to draw them, nor yet to keep them.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 205.

[531] Heb. vi. 10.

[532] Scripture-doctrine of Salvation, Sermon I. p. 11.

[533] “Look upon John. Christ’s beloved disciple and bosom companion; he had received the anointing to know him that is true, and he knew that he knew him, 1 John ii. 3. But how did he know that? He might be deceived; (as it is strange to see what a melancholy fancy will do, and the effects of it; as honest men are reputed to have weak brains, and never saw the depths of the secrets of God:) what is his last proof? Because we keep his commandments” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 131. “A man may know his present union to the Lord Jesus, by a work; 1 John ii. 4. He that saith, I know him, and keeps not his commandments, is a liar.—Yes, that is true negatively; but may a man, ought a man, to see or know his union positively by this? Ans. ver. 5. Many said they did know and love the Lord, but he that keeps his words.—O they are sweet! It is heaven to cleave to him in every command: it is death to depart from any command: hereby know we that we are in him. If it were possible to ask of angels, how they know they are not devils, they would answer, the Lord’s will is ours.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 134. “If the question be, Whom doth the Lord Jesus love? you need not go to heaven for it, the word is nigh thee. Those that love Christ. Who are those? Those that keep his commandments.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 138. “Will you have Christ to sit in heaven, and not look that he subdue your lusts by the work of his grace, and so sway your hearts? You despise his kingdom then. Do you seek for pardon in the blood of Christ, and never look for the virtue and end of that blood to wash you and make you without spot, &c.? You despise his priesthood and blood then. Do you look for Christ to do work for you, and you not do Christ’s work, and bring forth fruit to him? You despise his honour then. John xv. 8. If I were to discover a hypocrite, or a false heart, this I would say, It is he that shall set up Christ, but loathe his work.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 140.

[534] “I am persuaded, as Calvin is, that all the several trials of men, are to show them to themselves, and to the world, that they be but counterfeits; and to make saints known to themselves the better.—Rom. v. 5. Tribulation works trial, and that hope. Prov. xvii. 3. If you will know whether it will hold weight, the trial will tell you.—Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 191.

[535] Dr. Sibbs, in his Bruised Reed, says, “When Christ’s will cometh in competition with any worldly loss or gain, yet if then, in that particular case, the heart will stoop to Christ, it is a true sign. For the truest trial of the power of grace, is in such particular cases as touch us nearest; for there our corruption maketh the greatest head. When Christ came home to the young man in the gospel, he lost a disciple of him.” Mr. Flavel speaks of a holy practice under trials, as the greatest evidence of grace. “No man (says he) can say what he is, whether his grace be true or false, until they be tried, and examined by those things, which are to them as fire is to gold.” Touchstone of Sincerity, chap. iv. sect. 1. Again, speaking of great difficulties and sufferings in the way of duty, wherein a person must actually part with what is dearest of a worldly nature, or with his duty; he says, “That such sufferings as these will discover the falseness and rottenness of men’s hearts, cannot be doubted; if you consider, that this is the fire designed by God for this very use and purpose, to separate the gold from the dross. So you will find it, 1 Pet. iv. 12.—Beloved, think it not strange concerning the fiery trial that is to try you, i. e. The very design and aim of Providence in permitting and ordering them, is to try you. Upon this account you find the hour of persecution (in a suitable notion) called the hour of temptation or probation. Rev. iii. 10. For then, professors are sifted to the very bran, searched to the very bottom principles. This is ‘the day that burns as an oven; all that do wickedly shall be as stubble,’ Mal. iv. i. For in that day the predominant interest must appear and be discovered, it can be concealed no longer. ’ No man can serve two masters,’ saith Christ, Luke xvi. 13. A man may serve many masters, if they all command the same thing, or things subordinate to each other: but he cannot serve two masters, if their commands clash and interfere with each other; and such are the commands of Christ and the flesh in a suffering hour:-thus the two interests come in full opposition. And now have but patience and wait a little, and you will discern which is predominant. A dog follows two men, while they both walk one way, and you know not which of the two is his master: stay but a little, until their path parts, and then you shall quickly see who is his master: so it is in this case.” Ibid, chap viii. § 3. And in another chapter he says. “Great numbers of persons are deceived and destroyed by trusting to seeming untried grace. This was the miserable condition of the Laodicean professors; they reckoned themselves rich, but were really poor: all is not gold that glisters: their gold (as they accounted it) was never tried in the fire. If a man’s whole estate lay in some precious stone, suppose a rich diamond, how is he concerned to have it thoroughly tried, to see whether it will bear a smart stroke with the hammer, or fly like a Bristol diamond!” ibid. chap. x. § 3. Again, in the same place, “The promises of salvation are made over to tried grace, and that only as will endure the trial.” “The Lord will try you. God hath his trying times; and they were never sent, but to discover who were dross, who were gold. And the main end of all God’s trials, is to discover this truth that I now am pressing upon you. Some have a thorough work; and now the trial discovers the truth, as in Abraham, Heb. xi. 17. Some have a superficial work, and they fall in trial, as in Saul; and it doth discover it was but an overly work. For this is the question God makes. Is it thorough, or no? Ay, saith the carnal heart; Yes. saith a gracious heart. Hence it is strange to see what men will do when a trial comes.” Shepard’s Parable, Part I. p. 219. “There is an hour of temptation which tries men, which will discover men indeed.” Shepard’s Parable, Part II. p. 60.

[536] “It is a sure rule, (says Dr. Preston,) that what the Scriptures bestow much words on, we should have much thought on; and what the Holy Ghost urgeth most, we should prize most.”—Church’s Carriage.

[537] As is manifest by Matt. xviii. 31. to the end. Chap. xx. 8-15. Chap. xxii. 11, 12, 13. Chap. xxv. 19-30. and ver. 35, to the end. Luke xix. 15-23.

[538] Sec Matt. xxv. at the latter end. See also Rom. ii. 6-13. Jer. xvii. 10. Job xxxiv. 11. Prov. xxiv. 12. Jer. xxxii. 19. Rev. xxii. 12. Matt. xvi. 27. Rev. ii. 23. Ezek. xxxiii. 20. 1 Pet. i. 17.

[539] “That which God maketh a rule of his own judgment, as that by which he judgeth of every man, that is a sure rule for every man to judge himself by. That which we shall be judged by at the last day is a sure rule to apply to ourselves for the present. Now by our obedience and works he judgeth us. He will give to every man according to his works.” Dr. Preston’s Church’s Carriage.

[540] “Our real taking of Christ, appears in our actions and works: Isa. i. 19. ‘If ye consent and obey, ye shall eat the good things of the land.’ That is, If ye will consent to take JEHOVAH for your Lord and King: if ye give consent; there is the first thing; but that is not enough: but if ye also obey. The consent that standeth in the inward act of the mind, the truth of it will be seen in your obedience, in the acts of your lives. If ye consent and obey, ye shall eat the good things of the land; that is, you shall take of all that he hath that is convenient for you: for then you are married to him in truth, and have an interest in all his goods.” Dr. Preston’s Church’s Carriage.

[541] Psal. lxiii. 1, 2.

[542] Psal. cxix. 111, 112.

[543] 2 King xx. 3.

[544] “The more these visible exercises of grace are renewed, the more certain you will be. The more frequently these actings are renewed, the more abiding and confirmed your assurance will be. A man that has been assured of such visible exercises of grace, may quickly after be in doubt, whether he was not mistaken. But when such actings are renewed again and again, he grows more settled and established about his good estate. If a man see a thing once, that makes him sure; but if afterwards he fear he was deceived, when he comes to see it again, he is more sure he was not mistaken. If a man read such passages in a book, he is sure it is so. Some months after, some may bear him down, that he was mistaken, so as to make him question it himself: but when he looks, and reads it again, he is abundantly confirmed. The more men’s grace is multiplied, the more their peace is multiplied; 2 Pet i. 2. “Grace and peace be multiplied unto you, through the knowledge of God and Jesus our Lord.” Stoddard’s Way to know Sincerity and Hypocrisy.

[545] Rev. xxii. 16, 17.

[546] “You say you know Christ, and the love and good-will of Christ towards you, and that he is the propitiation for your sins. How do you know this? ‘He that saith I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar,’ 1 John ii. 4. True, might some reply, he that keeps not the commands of Christ, hath thereby a sure evidence that he knows him not, and that he is not united to him: but is this any evidence that we do know him, and that we are united to him, if we do keep his commandments? Yes, verily, saith the apostle, “Hereby we do know that we know him, if we keep his commandments.” And again, ver. 5. “Hereby know we that we are in him.” What can be more plain? What a vanity is it to say, that this is running upon a covenant of works?—O beloved, it is a sad thing to hear such questions and such cold answers also, that sanctification possibly may be an evidence. May be? Is it not certain? Assuredly, to deny it, is as bad as to affirm that God’s own promises of favour are not sure evidences thereof, and consequently that they are lies and untruths.—Our Saviour, who was no legal preacher, pronounceth, and consequently evidenceth, blessedness, by eight or nine promises, expressly made to such persons, as had inherent graces, Matt. v. 3, 4, &c.’’—Shepard’s Sound Believer p. 221, 222, 223.

[547] These Letters were first printed in the “Quarterly Magazine.” Edinb.

[548] This is evident by many scriptures; as. Lev. xxvi. 40-42. Deut xxxii. 36-39. 1 Kings viii. 21, 22. chap. i. 4-8. Ezek. xx. 35, 36. 37. Hos. v 15. with chap. vi. 1-3. chap. xiii. 9, 10, chap. xiv. throughout

[549] Isa. xxxv. 1.

[550] The Springfield Contention relates to the settlement of a minister there, which occasioned too warm debates between some, both pastors and people, that were for it, and others that were against it, on account of their different apprehensions about his principles, and about some steps that were taken to procure his ordination.

[551] It must be noted, that it has never been our manner, to observe the evening that follows the sabbath, but that which precedes it, as part of the holy time.

[552] Rom. iii. 19.

[553] Mark iv. 26, 27, 28.

[554] She was living in March, 1789, and maintained the character of a true convert.

[555] It is evident that the Holy Spirit, in those expressions in Psal. xix. 4, 6. has respect to something else besides the natural sun, and that a regard is had to the Sun of righteousness, who by his light converts the soul, makes wise the simple, enlightens the eyes, and rejoices the heart; and by his preached gospel enlightens and warms the world of mankind; by the psalmist’s own application in ver. 7, and the apostle’s application of ver. 4. in Rom. x. 18.

[556] In these expressions our excellent author is not sufficiently guarded.—Our knowing or not knowing persons to be reprobates, in any sense of that term, is no sufficient standard of obligation to hate or to love them, in the way of benevolence. The obligation to love or to hate is founded on the nature of the object, as good or bad. But here we are liable to err, for want of discriminating between a person and his criminal qualities. Now every criminal object should be regarded by us a being possessed of physical powers; but this existence and these powers, being the product of divine bounty, deserve our benevolent approbation, not our hatred. On the other hand, every criminal object, or agent, is chargeable with criminal designs and hateful qualities exclusively his own; and these alone deserve our hatred. In no other sense but this latter can it be truly said that God hates the workers of iniquity, wicked men, or even the devil. But if so, in no other sense or degree ought we to hate them. Had our author been scientifically acquainted with that principle which accounts for the true origin of moral evil, he would have seen the impropriety of his statement.—W.

[557] As Gen. xxi. 23-34; xxvi. 28-35; xxxi. 44, 53.. Josh ii. 12.. &c. 1 Sam. xx. 16, 17, 42.. 2 Kings xi. 4.. Eccl. viii. 2.. Ezek. xvi. 59; xvii. 16.. and many other places.

[558] See Num. xiv. 31.. Deut. i. 39; viii. 15, 16.. Josh. xxii. 2, 11-34; xxiii. 8.. Deut. iv. 4.. Josh. xxiv. 31.. Judg. ii. 17, 22.. Psal. lxviii. 14.. Jer. ii. 2, 3, 21; xxxi. 2, 3.. Hos. ix. 10..

[559] This distinction is too vague. A more satisfactory reason is, that the very nature of moral government requires this mode of treatment. See “An Essay on Equity and Sovereignty,” throughout.—W.

[560] On this “precise agreement and difference,” Dr. Owen has written with admirable clearness in his Exposition to the Epistle to the Hebrews and the prefixed exercitation.—W.

[561] Prid. Connect. Part I. p. 354—536. and 555, 556. 9th Edit. The word translated synagogues, Psal. lxxiv. 8. signifies assemblies; and is supposed by the generality of learned men to relate to another sort of assemblies.

[562] And this by the way answers another objection, which some have made, viz. That the way I plead for, tends to keep the church of Christ small, and hinder the growth of it. Whereas, I think, the contrary tends to keep it small, as it is the wickedness of its members, that above all things in the world prejudices mankind against it; and is the chief stumbling-block, that hinders the propagation of Christianity, and so the growth of the christian church. But holiness would cause the light of the church to shine so as to induce others to resort to it.

[563] This is now incorporated with the General Index.

[564] Whether I was mistaken in this, will appear in the sequel.

[565] I added this, because I supposed that such persons as judge themselves unconverted, if of my principles respecting qualifications for communion, would scruple coming, and could not come with a good conscience: but if they were of Mr. S—d’s principles, viz. That unconverted men might lawfully come, neither a man’s being of that opinion, nor his judging himself unconverted, would hinder my receiving him who exhibited proper evidence to the church of his being a convert.

[566] Mr. John Glass. in his Observes upon the original Constitution of the Christian Church, (p. 55, 5b.) says as follows. “You seem to have a great prejudice of what you call positive evidences, and judging upon them in the admission of church-members. And I am at some loss to understand what you mean by them, though I have heard the expression frequently, among people of your opinion, used to express some very ill thing. If you mean by positive evidences, infallible evidences of a thing that none but God infallibly knows, and can assure a man’s own conscience of, with respect to a man himself: I think it would be a very great evil for a man to require such evidence to found his judgment of charity, concerning another man’s faith and holiness, or concerning his being an object of brotherly love. And I think, he is bound by the law of Christ to form his judgment in this matter upon less evidence. But if you mean positive evidence in opposition to negative, which is no evidence, I must own, I know not how to form a judgment of charity without some positive evidence. And is not a credible profession something positive?—Is not a credible profession of the faith, love, and hope that is in Christ, or of Christianity, a positive evidence of a man’s being an object of brotherly love, which evidence ought to be the ground of my judgment of charity concerning him, that he is a Christian, a believer in Christ, a brother for whom Christ died? If it be otherwise, and if there be no evidence upon which I can charitably judge, that a man is a brother for whom Christ died? If it be otherwise, and if there be no evidence upon which I can charitably judge, that a man is a brother for whom Christ died. Then tell me, how I can evidence my love to Jesus Christ, in the labour of love towards my brother, whom I have seen; and my love to God, in my love to them that are begotten of him.”

[567] In stating the question, p. 5. b. I explained the requisite visibility, to be some outward manifestation, that ordinarily renders the thing probable. To the like purpose, is what I lay in p 10. c. and p. 11 a. b c. and p 12. a. b. c. And in p 106. c. I say expressly, “Not a certainty, but a profession and visibility of these things, must be the rule of the church’s proceeding.

[568] When I first proposed to a certain candidate for communion at Northampton, the publicly making this profession, viz. That he believed the truth of the gospel with all his heart, many of the people cried out, that I insisted on what no saint on earth could profess, and that this amounted to a profession of absolute perfection. Hence many reports spread about the country, that I insisted on perfection as a term of communion.

[569] Mr. W. cites Mr. Guthrie (pref. p. 4. c. e.) as on his side, when he speaks of such a profession, as that which is to be made.

[570] By this it appears, when Mr. W. speaks of the church’s rational judgment that persons have real holiness, and the like, he does not mean merely treating them as such, in public administrations, and external conduct: for here he speaks not of the external conduct, but of the apprehension of the understanding, and judgment of the mind; and this as the foundation of the affection of the heart.

[571] Mr. W—‘s words (p. 55. d. e) are pretty remarkable: “The reader (says he) will judge, whether the manner of Mr. Edwards’s treating the question, and representing the opinion of Mr. Stoddard and others, in the words I have quoted above, be not unaccountable; though this is neither the first nor the last time of his treating the matter in such a manner: as if Mr. Stoddard and his adherents supposed persons were to be admitted without any notion of their being godly, or any respect to such a character appearing on them, and that they themselves are without such a pretence.” — Whereas, Mr. Stoddard expressly maintains, that men may be duly qualified, and fit matter for church-membership, without saving grace. (Appeal, p. 15, 16.) And that they may and ought to come, though they know themselves to be in a natural condition. (Doct. of Instituted Churches. p. 21. See also his Sermon on the subject, p. 13.) And according to Mr. Stoddard, communicants are not so much as supposed godly persons. This (Appeal, p. 43.) he says expressly, that by the institution communicants at the Lord’s supper are not supposed to be real saints. And also asserts (Appeal, p. 76 ) that we are not obliged to believe visible saints to be real saints. And it seems by what he says in his Appeal, (p. 17.) the church may admit persons to communion, when at the same time they are aware that they are hypocrites. For there, in answer to Dr. Mather, who had cited certain texts to prove, that when hypocrites do come into the church, they come in unawares; he says, but neither of the places he cites proves that all hypocrites come in unawares. And in the next page he says, The discovery of men’s hypocrisy is not the reason of their being cast out. Still evidently on the same foundation, that some known hypocrites are fit to be admitted: for he says, (p. 15. d.) Such as being admitted may not be cast out, are fit to be admitted. And these things are agreeable to what I know Mr. Stoddard’s church and congregation have universally supposed to be his constant doctrine and practice among them. Thus it was, without one dissenting voice among them, during the twenty-four years that I lived with them. And now the reader is desired to judge, as Mr. W. would have him, whether my representing it to be the opinion of Mr. S and his adherents, that persons might be admitted into the church without any notion of their being godly, or any respect to such a character appearing on them, be unaccountable.—By these things it is evident. Mr. S—d’s scheme was far from being what Mr. W. represents it to be, and pretends to maintain as his. And if the question he had to controvert with me, were Mr. S—d’s question, as he asserts: yet he greatly mistakes the true state of the question, though that be given as the title of his book.

[572] Now let all that have been acquainted with the controversy between me and my people at Northampton, consider these things, which Mr. W. earnestly insists do belong to his scheme: and judge whether they be agreeable to the scheme which my opposers there have so vehemently and long contended for; yea, whether they are not very opposite to it; or whether in these things Mr. W. has not entirely yielded up, yea, vehemently asserted, the chief things concerning which they contested with me; and so, whether he has at all helped their cause by writing his book, or rather, on the contrary, has fought against them.

[573] See. Mr. W’s book, p. 106, &c.

[574] Ibid. p. 108, &c.

[575] P. 120, &c.

[576] P. 123, &c.

[577] P. 126, &c.

[578] P. 128, &c.

[579] P 131.

[580] P. 131, &c.

[581] See how Mr. W. expresses himself, p. 5. b. c.

[582] See especially, p. 3.

[583] P. 99, 100.

[584] The Apostle Paul says, 1 Cor. xiv. 7. “Even things without life, giving sound, whether pipe or harp, except they give a distinction in the sounds, how shall it be known what is piped or harped?” —Mr. Locke says. Hum. Und. Vol. 2. Edit 7. p. 103. “He that uses words of any language without distinct ideas in his mind, to which he applies them, does so far as he uses them in discourse, only make a noise without any sense or signification.”

[585] “To advance a dubious proposition, knowing it will be understood in a sense different from what you give it in your mind, is an equivocation, in breach of good faith and sincerity.” Chamber’s Dictionary, under the word Equivocation. ‡ Pref. (p. 3. d. e. and 5. d. p. 24 b. 25. b. 22. d. 27. a. 58. d. 69. d

[586] Mr. W. (p. 6. d. e.) speaks of a profession in terms of indiscriminate signification, when not contradicted in life, as The sole, entire evidence, which the church, as a church, is to have, by divine appointment, in order to that public judgment it is to make of the saintship of men.

[587] Pref. (p. 3. d. e. and 5. d. p. 24 b. 25. b. 22. d. 27. a. 58. d. 69. d.

[588] And yet now it seems, some such do serve but one master, and give up themselves to Christ to be led by him.

[589] Mr. Locke thus defines probability. (Hum. Und. 7th Edit 8vo. Vol. II. p. 273.) “Probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so: but is. or appears for the most part to be so; and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary. And Mr. W. himself (p. 139.) says, “It is moral evidence of gospel sincerity, which God’s word makes the church’s rule,” &c. Now does such an appearance, as we have reason at the same time to think is more frequently without gospel-holiness than with it, amount to moral evidence of gospel-sincerity.”

[590] Mr. Williams (p. 42.) owns that persons must make a profession wherein they make a show of being wise virgins, in order to come into the visible church. And (p. 35. e.) he owns, that all visible saints who are not truly pious, are hypocrites. Again, it may be observed, he abundantly insists, that men who have no more than common grace and moral sincerity, may lawfully come to sacraments; and yet by what he says, (p. 35. e.) they must profess more. So that men who have no more must profess more; and this, it seems, according to divine institution!—Again he says, (p. 35. a. b. c.) That one end God designed by appointing men to be brought into the church, is, that through divine grace they might effectually be brought to Christ, to give him the whole possession of their hearts; and yet in the very next paragraph (p. 35. e. and 36. a.) he speaks of it as unlawful for men to come to sacraments till they give up all their hearts to Christ.

[591] How small a proportion are there of the vast multitudes, that in the time of the late religious commotion through the land had their consciences awakened who give hopeful abiding evidences of a saving conversion to God!

[592] Here I would observe, that not only in the general do unsanctified men, notwithstanding their moral sincerity, thus live in the most heinous wickedness; but particularly, according to Mr. W.‘s own doctrine, their very attendance on the outward ordinances and duties of worship, is the vilest, most flagrant, and abominable impiety. In his sermons on Christ a King and Witness, (p. 77, 78.) he says, “If a man could perform all the outward acts of worship and obedience, which the Bible requires, from the beginning to the end of it. and not do them from faith in Christ, and love to God, and not express by them the thoughts, desires, and actings of his soul; they would be so far from being that obedience which Christ requires, that they would be a mocking of God, and hateful to him. These outward acts ought to be no other, and in religion are designed to stand for nothing else, but to be representations of a man’s soul, and the acts of that. And when they are not so. they are in their own nature a lie, and false pretence of something within, which is not there: Therefore the Lord abhors them, and reckons these false pretences the vilest wickedness.—Now when a man performs all outward obedience and worship, but it does not come from his heart, he practically denies the omniscience of Christ, while he puts before him a show and pretence of something for the reality; and so he belies his own profession. And all this, be it more or less, whatever it pretends to be of religion, instead of being that which Christ requires, is entirely different from it, yea. infinitely contrary to it. And those same actions, which when they are the language of the heart, and flow from it, are pleasing and acceptable to God and Jesus Christ, are true obedience to him; when they do not, are reckoned the most flagrant and abominable impiety, and threatened with the severest damnation of hell.”—Now, who can believe, that God has, by his own holy institution, made that sort of sincerity, which is nothing better than what is consistent with such a lying, vile, abominable, flagrantly wicked pretence and show of religion as this, the very thing that gives a right, even in his sight, to christian sacraments. I might here also observe, that if moral sincerity or common grace gives a right to sacraments in the sight of God, then that which (according to Mr. S - d’s doctrine before observed) is a spirit of lust, that which is contrary to, and at war with, and would destroy saving grace, is the thing which gives a right in the sight of God to christian sacraments.

[593] Mrs. Eunice Williams, brought up in Canada, among the Caghnawaga Indians, sister to the then pastor of the church in Mansfield, where this sermon was preached, upon a day of prayer kept on her account; she being, then in that place on a visit.

[594] It must be observed, that Mr. W. often speaks of the promise which an unregenerate man makes in covenanting with God, as his oath. P. 18. d. p.100. p 101. a. p. 129. a p. 130. c. p. 143. b.

[595] See my Inquiry, p. 33, 34.

[596] Ibid. p.37,38.

[597] Marks of a Work of the True Spirit, p. 101, 102.103,104. Thoughts on the Revival of Religion, from p. 292 to 303. Nature of Religious Affections, p. 85-87. Preface to Inquiry into Qualifications for Communion, p. 5.

[598] “The apostles looked on all those, whom they gathered into churches or christian congregations to eat the Lord’s supper, as having the truth dwelling in them: and so they behoved, every one of them, to look upon one another: seeing they could not love one another as brethren in the truth, without acknowledging that truth as dwelling in them. And so we see the apostles, in their writings to the churches, supposing all their members objects of this brotherly love.—Christ’s visible church then is the congregation of those whom the apostle could call the saints and faithful in Christ Jesus.”—Glass’s Notes on Scripture Texts, Numb. 5. p. 32.

[599] A good argument might also be drawn from the corruption of unsanctified men; for that they are all sounder the power of corruption, that they are not able to love saints, or any one else, with truly christian love. Agreeable to what Mr. Stoddard says in his three sermons, (p. 40 ) “Men are obliged to love their neighbours as themselves. But no natural men do in any measure live up to this rule; but men are great enemies one to another, hateful and hating one another. They do but little good one to another: they do a great deal of hurt one to another.” Now is it reasonable to suppose, that such men have the proper qualifications, by divine institution, for a lawful right to be members of the visible family of God?

[600] Mr. Stoddard owns, that the sacramental actions, both in baptism and the Lord’s supper, signify saving faith in Christ. Safety of App. p. 120. “By baptism is signified our fellowship with Christ in his sufferings. That is signified hereby, that we have an interest in the virtue of his sufferings, that his sufferings are made over unto us, and that we do participate in the good and benefit of them.——It was John the Baptist’s manner, before he baptized persons, to teach them that they must believe on Christ. And the apostles and apostolical men would not baptize any adult persons but such as professed to believe on Christ—He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved. Baptism is mentioned as the evidence of faith.”—So concerning the Lord’s supper, ibid. p. 122. e. 123. a. “In this ordinance we are invited to put our trust in the death of Christ Take, eat: this is my body: and drink ye all of it. When the body feeds on the sacramental bread and wine, the soul is to do that which answers unto it. The soul is to feed on Christ crucified; which is nothing else but the acting faith on him.”

[601] Thus that very eminent divine, and successful minister of Christ, the late Dr. Doddridge, in his Sermons on Regeneration, speaking of the means of regeneration (p. 251. e. 252. a.) says, “I do not mention the administration of sacraments, upon this occasion; because, though they have so noble and effectual a tendency to improve men’s minds in piety, and to promote christian edification; yet I do not remember to have heard of any instance, in which they have been the means of men’s conversion; which is the less to be wondered at, as they are appointed for a very different end.”

[602] So in p. 132. c. he exclaims against me thus; ” After all this, to repeat it again and again, that these persons have no visibility to reason of real, saintship, &c. I think, gives better ground to retort Mr. Edwards’s words

[603] If we have reason to expect it will be thus with ungodly parents, with respect to their children, then certainly such cannot reasonably expect ministers and churches should admit their children to baptism, in a dependence that they do give them up to God, and will bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, if they make no profession that implies more than moral sincerity; and none but what wicked men may as well make as the godly, and speak true.

[604] P. 10. d. 11 c. d. 30. e. 31. a. e. 35. e. 36. a. 53 b. 83. d. 125. b. and many other places.

[605] If it be said here, those who have been born of baptized ancestors, though they do not comply with the terms of the covenant, are in covenant, in this sense, that they have a right to the promises of the covenant conditionally, in case they will hereafter comply: I answer, So are all mankind in covenant, God may be said to have bound himself to them all conditionally; and many have these promises declared to them, that still remain Jews, Mahometans, or heathens.

[606] I did not say, that it was also a doctrine according to Scripture; for there was no occasion for this, among those with whom I had chiefly to do in this controversy; with whom I knew it was a point as much settled and uncontroverted, as any doctrine of Mr. S. whatever. And I know it to be the current doctrine of orthodox divines: who ever allow this doctrine to be implied in such texts as those. John xvii. 7. 1 John iv. 15, 16. Chap. v. 1, 10. and many others.

[607] See his serm. on Christ a King and Witness, (p. 84. e.) where he says, “notwithstanding the visible likeness of nominal and real Christians, there is a wide difference, as there is between the subjects of christ and the slaves of the devil.”

[608] Much of the controversy discussed in this book (and the preceding one) which was agitated with great warmth in the American churches, and which is not unfrequently started among congregational churches in Great Britain, seems to originate in the want of clearly stating the scriptural design of entering into full communion. If this be not previously settled, there is but little hope of a satisfactory adjustment. Without entering here into the minutia of proofs, the following particulars are submitted to the reader’s consideration, as probably calculated to aid his inquiries. 1. The chief end of every human society, as well as of every intelligent being, ought to be this. viz. To glorify God, or to represent him as glorious in all his perfections and ways. No human society, of whatever kind, is exempt from this obligation. For a society is only an aggregate of individuals; and as every individual is obliged to do this in all his actions, he is therefore thus obliged in his social capacity. This obligation arises from the respective natures of God and the creature, and it is clearly enjoined in the Holy Scripture. “Whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God”—But. 2. The distinguishing subordinate end or special design of any society, must designate its peculiar nature, whereby it is best adapted to promote that end. Though every society is bound to seek the one chief end, yet every social union is not adapted to answer all social ends. Societies of a religious, moral, charitable, scientific, or political design, must have members of a corresponding character, otherwise the proposed end cannot be answered. The qualifications of the members must have an aptitude to promote the design. 3. The distinguishing design of a society denominated a church, evidently, is to promote religion. Numbers are united by divine appointment, to maintain religion—to exhibit before the world real Christianity— to encourage those who seek the right way—to edify one another—and the like. Such particulars we gather from the sacred Scriptures. ” Striving together for the faith of the gospel.”—“That ye may be blameless and harmless, the sons of God (resembling him) without rebuke (or, cause of rebuke) in the minds of a crooked and perverse nation, among whom ye shine as lights in the world, holding forth the word of life.”-A church of Christ is appointed to shine in a dark world, to be blameless and harmless among the crooked and perverse, to imitate God, as far as practicable, while among the children of the wicked one, to give no offence to those who are without or those who are within the church, to hold forth, and hold fast, the word of life, by doctrine, by discipline, and by practice. “Him that is weak in the faith receive you, but not to doubtful disputations.” Provided a person be desirous of christian fellowship, and is possessed of so much knowledge, so much experienced efficacy of truth, and so much good conduct, as is calculated to answer, in a prevailing degree, the design of a church being at all formed, let him not be rejected. “Wherefore comfort yourselves together, and edify one another, even as also ye do?” This is done by mutual instructions, exhortations, prayers, and praises; by watchful discipline, and the exercise of religious gifts; by friendly offices, and acts of christian kindness. 4. The preceding particulars are produced only as instances; but in order accurately to ascertain the special end of christian fellowship, in full communion, all the passages contained in the New Testament relating to the subject ought to be included. For until the revealed special design for which a church of Christ is instituted be ascertained, it is obviously not possible to ascertain the precise nature of the society, and consequently the qualifications of its members. However, 5. We will suppose that, by an appeal to all the passages of the New Testament, the precise design is known; from whence the nature of a church is deduced: the question returns,—Is there any general rule that may form an invariable standard by which all qualifications of candidates may be measured? There undoubtedly is, for this plain reason, because a church is a society instituted for specific ends, revealed in the New Testament. Now as these ends are matter of divine record, and not of human opinion, the standard is invariable. 6. We will further suppose, that the general rule, by which to measure qualifications for full communion, is The scriptural design for which a gospel church in full communion is divinely instituted. No party, however they may differ about other things, can object to this rule, with any colour of reason. To deny its claim, they must either subvert the evident principles of all voluntary societies, or else hold, that a christian church is not instituted in the New Testament for any specific end. But this no reasonable person, much less a serious Christian, will maintain. Hence, 7. Those candidates for full communion, and only those, who are conformed to this rule, are fully qualified. But here it is of essential importance to observe, that though a rule is, and from its very nature must be, fixed and invariable, the qualifications of individuals are variable things, admitting of more or less conformity to it. The conjectures of men, however ingenious and plausible, cannot be admitted as a rule, because they are variable; but the rule must be deduced from the design itself of instituting a church, which is evidently a matter of pure divine pleasure, and which could not be known without a revelation from God. A rule, then, must be sought from the sacred oracles by an induction of particulars relating to the point in question, and from their harmonious agreement: and it is the business of every christian church, minister and member, to search the Scriptures in order to ascertain it. To contend about qualifications, before this is agreed upon, is to contend about the dimensions of different things, before a standard is fixed upon which to measure them. But the constituent parts of the qualifications in candidates cannot be found in Scripture: they must, most evidently, be sought in the characters of the individuals, which are indefinitely variable. To suppose that the character, or the actual attainment, of each candidate is revealed in Scripture, is too absurd to be maintained by any rational mind. Therefore, 8. What remains for a church to do in judging of qualifications, is to compare the proficiency of the candidate, with the scriptural rule. The former, admitting of indefinite degrees of approximation to the standard, must be learnt from the person himself, from his conduct, and from the testimony of others. His profession, his declared experience of divine truth, his deportment in society, in short, his general character, is to be viewed, in comparison with the evident design of God in forming a church. 9. Should it be objected, that different persons, or churches, might fix on a different standard, by adding more texts of Scripture out of which a various general result would arise; it is answered, that therefore this is the point to be first settled. When any disagree about the rule, they cannot of course agree about the qualifications. There are many texts, however, such as those above produced, concerning which there can be no disagreement. The rule therefore should be admitted, as far as it goes. A measure of a foot long may, as far as it goes, be a standard of straightness and of measure, as well as a yard or a fathom. Or, to change the comparison, a small measure of capacity may be equally accurate, to a certain degree, as a larger measure. Let the church of small attainments act charitably, and wait for brighter evidence. If any lack wisdom, let them ask of God, who giveth liberally. “Let us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded; and if in any thing ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheless, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing.” 10. The scriptural rule is not only invariable, but also perfect in its kind, as dictated by infinite wisdom for the noblest ends. But no human character, in the present state, is perfect, so as to comport universally with the standard. Therefore no candidate for communion is perfectly qualified; that is, his qualifications are only comparative. One may be qualified in a greater, and another in a smaller degree. One is qualified to fill his place eminently, another moderately well. One may be strong, and another weak in the faith. Yet he who is weak in the faith may be comparatively qualified. Therefore, 11. Since qualifications are so various, and admit of indefinite approximations to the perfect standard, or deviations from it, we are bound to accede to another conclusion, viz. That whatever kind or degree of qualification appears to befriend, rather than to oppose, to honour, rather than to discredit, the scriptural design of full communion, ought to be admitted by the church. When a candidate for communion is proposed to a church, its immediate business is to consult the scriptural design of communion; and then to consider how far the qualifications of the candidate appear to befriend and to honour it 12. From the premises it follows, that to reason from qualifications for communion in the Jewish church, to those for full communion in a gospel church, must needs be uncertain and inconclusive; except it could be first proved, that the revealed design of each was the same. But it requires no great labour to show by an induction of particulars, that the design was very different; and consequently, that what would be a suitable qualification for the one. would not be so for the other. 13. We may further infer, that when a church requires a probable evidence of grace as the measuring rule of admission, and directs nearly all its attention to ascertain this point, its proceedings are irregular, unscriptural, and therefore unwarrantable. The rule of judging, as before shown, must be found in the Scripture, and not in the candidate. 14. We may further infer from the preceding observations, that a probable evidence of grace in a candidate, is not the precise ground of the qualification, however desirable that evidence may be. Yet, because ordinarily, and most probably, the absence of saving grace implies the absence of the precise ground of answerableness to the scriptural design of full communion, such probable evidence is of great importance. However nice this distinction may appear to some, the want of attending to it seems to have constituted the chief difference between our author and his antagonists. And, in fair investigation, another question, different from what was agitated, ought to have been first settled, viz. Whether any person, who is not visibly the subject of saving grace, can “befriend, rather than oppose, can honour, rather than discredit, the scriptural design of full communion? ” Fairly to answer this question in the negative, it is not enough to prove, that such a person cannot fully answer the scriptural design. But it ought to be proved, that no person destitute of such probable evidence of saving grace, in any circumstances whatever, can be found, who might befriend and honour the scriptural design of communion, rather than the contrary. This is the real hinge of the controversy. 15. It is an unscriptural notion, too much taken upon trust, that the immediate business of a church, is to form an opinion respecting the spiritual state of a person before God; as. whether be is the subject of saving grace —whether he has a principle of sincerity—whether his motives are spiritually pure, &c. Whereas, a church ought not to act the part of a jury on the candidate’s real state towards God, but on his state towards the church. They are to determine, whether he is or is not eligible to answer the scriptural ends of such a society, and indeed of that particular church. For, as the circumstances of divers churches may be very different, there may be cases, where the same person may be eligible to one church, and not to another. In one church he may promote its welfare, in another hinder it. This may greatly depend on his peculiar tenets, and the zeal with which he may be disposed to maintain them. In one society he may be a source of disquiet and confusion, but in another the reverse. 16 Hence it is evident, that a visibility of saving grace, though it claims the christian love and respect of the church, does not in all cases constitute eligible qualifications. For, whatever has an evident tendency to produce disputes, animosities, and divisions in a church, ought to be kept out of it. But the admission of a person who appeared zealous for sentiments and customs opposite to those held by the church, would have this apparent tendency, notwithstanding his possessing a visibility of grace, on other accounts. Therefore, though a visibility of grace, in some cases, may be sufficiently plain, yet an apparent failure in other respects may be sufficient to show that a person is not qualified for full communion. In short, if the church have good reason to think, that his admission would do more harm than good, he should be deemed unqualified for membership in that society, though he may be entitled to a charitable opinion, or even christian love, on other accounts: and, on the contrary, if the church have good reason to think, that his admission would do more good than harm, he should be deemed qualified for membership—even though he may be less entitled to a charitable opinion of his state towards God, than the other. COROLLARIES 1. Any candidate who appears, in the charitable judgment of a christian church, likely to give a favourable representation of Christianity to the church and the world—to encourage the desirous, by his knowledge and tempers—and to give and receive christian edification in that communion—is, in the scripture sense, qualified for full communion. 2. Personal religion, in the sight of God, is to be deemed necessary only for the sake of enabling the candidate to answer such ends,—as far as membership is concerned; but, as final salvation is concerned, personal religion is indispensably necessary, this connexion being clearly revealed, as well as founded in the nature of things. 3. A christian minister may consistently exercise holy jealousy over some church-members, and warn them of the danger of hypocrisy, without threatening them with exclusion from their membership; because only their overt-acts (including sentiments, tempers, and conduct.) are the object of discipline, as they were of admission. 4. Some persons, though in a safe state towards God, may not answer the forementioned ends of membership, better than others who are not in such a state. 5. A person may be qualified for the society of heaven, while not qualified for full communion in a christian church; because the natures of the two societies are different, and consequently the scriptural ends of their admission into each. For infants, and idiots &c. may be qualified by grace for the society of heaven; but are totally unqualified for full communion in the church on earth. 6. Were christian churches to act always on these principles, much bitter strife and useless discussions would be avoided, in the admission and exclusion of members. For, in neither the one nor the other, would the church pronounce on the state of the persons towards God; for when any were admitted, no handle would be afforded to the presumption, that membership below is a qualification for heaven - and when any were excluded, no occasion would be given to the excommunicated person, or to the world, to pass the censure of uncharitableness on the church; for every voluntary society has a right to judge, according to its own appropriate rules, who is, and who is not, qualified to promote its welfare.—W.

[609] This is necessary to be remembered by the reader, in order to understand some chronological observations in the following work.

[610] Isa li. 8.

[611] Isa li. 8

[612] Isa li. 8.

[613] Isa li. 6.

[614] 1 Cor ii. 9

[615] Gen. iv. 26.

[616] Gen. iii. 15.

[617] Gen. iii. 15.

[618] Genesis 49:10

[619] Romans xi.30-32.

[620] Hebrews xii. 21.

[621] Deut. xviii. 18

[622] Joshua xiii. 8

[623] Isaiah vii. 2.

[624] Judges vii. 2.

[625] On the death of Alexander the Great, Ptolemy Lagus assumed the regal title in Egypt. He was succeeded by Ptolemy Philadelphus, Evergetes, and Philopater. This last, no doubt, is the person to whom our author here alludes. He was a cruel tyrant, revengeful and debauched. Having been at Jerusalem, during his expedition to Syria, and having been denied an entrance into the temple, he was greatly enraged against the whole body of the Jews. There were great numbers of them at Alexandria; these he degraded into slaves. The only condition by which a mark of disgrace with hot iron, and consequent slavery, could be avoided, was to offer sacrifice to his gods. Out of many thousands, only three hundred yielded by base compliance. These being excommunicated by their brethren, roused Philopater into greater fury He meditated nothing less than the utter ruin of the whole nation, beginning with those of Alexandria. He ordered them to be brought into the Hippodrome, an immense place without the city where the people usually assembled to see public races and diversions, and gave a peremptory injunction that five hundred elephants should be let loose upon them in that place. The first appointed day, the king, who was to have been present, overslept himself after a nocturnal debauch. The second passed by a similar disappointment. On the third day the king came to the Hippodrome, and the elephants were let loose upon the defenceless Jews.—But, by a wonderful providence, these animals turned upon the spectators and soldiers, and great numbers were killed by them. This, attended with some other circumstances of affright, induced the tyrant to desist from his cruel purpose.—W.

[626] Genesis ii. 17.

[627] Daniel ix. 27.

[628] Mark i. 22.

[629] Mark xiv. 33.

[630] Matthew xxvii. 40.

[631] Mark xv. 31.

[632] Heb. ix. 26.

[633] Matt. iii. 2.

[634] Rev. vi. 11.

[635] Isa. li. 8.

[636] Rev xvi. 10-11.

[637] Isa. li. 8.

[638] Isa. li. 8.

[639] Matt. xvi. 18.

[640] Dan. vii. 21.

[641] Rev. xvi. 14.

[642] Rev. xvi. 17.

[643] Rev. vi. 10.

[644] Rev. xiv. 8.

[645] Isa. xlv 23.

[646] Rev. xvi. 18.

[647] Rev. xxii. 7.

[648] 2 Thess. ii. 8.

[649] Rev. xi. 15.

[650] Rev. xi. 19.

[651] Matt. xxv. 34.

[652] Matt. xxv. 41.

[653] Viz. at Boston 1738.

[654] “Our Saviour compares his mystical body, that is his church, to a vine, which his Father, whom he compares to a husbandman, hath planted; John xv. 1 I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman. To represent to us the union that is betwixt Christ and all true Christians, and the influence of grace and spiritual life, which all that are united to him do derive and receive from him, he sets it forth to us by the resemblance of a vine and branches. As there is a natural vital union between the vine and the branches, so there is a spiritual union between Christ and true Christians: and this union is the cause of our fruitfulness in the works of obedience and a good life. There are some indeed that seem to be grafted into Christ by an outward profession of Christianity, who yet derive no influence from him, so as to bring forth fruit, because they are not vitally united to him”—Dr. Tillotson in his 3rd vol. of Serm., p. 307 By this it appears that the vital union between Christ and true Christians, which is much more of a mystery than the relative union, and necessarily implies it, was not thought an unreasonable doctrine by one of the greatest divines on the other side of the question in hand.

[655] The word “union,” in this connexion, is both more intelligible and more appropriate, than the word relation; since in this connexion the latter is the consequence of the former. As the doctrine of a vital union to Christ is fundamentally important in Christianity, and inseparable from the doctrine of justification; and as our author passes it over with so much brevity, a few observations upon it in this place may appear the more needful. 1. The Scriptures are not only full of the fact, but they abound with illustrations of it. The first part of John xv. is full and explicit to this purpose. 2. What the Scriptures assert, and illustrate, is abundantly corroborated by the reasonableness of the thing. To suppose the reality of vital religion without a corresponding vital union, is to suppose an important effect without as adequate cause, as shall be further shown 3. The question then is, What is the immediate cause of this vital union? Now as the union subsisting is between the Spirit of Christ, and man, the immediate cause must be in the one or the other of these, or in both at the same instant, or in neither. If the immediate cause be in man, he makes his approach to Christ either as a carnal or spiritual man, for these is no conceivable medium. But the idea of a carnal man uniting himself to Christ in order to form a vital union, is both unscriptural and unreasonable. It is unscriptural; for the scripture asserts that “The carnal mind is enmity against God;” how then can it be the cause of a vital union? “Of him are ye in Christ Jesus; ”—” and you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins; ”—it is not therefore the carnal man that unites himself to Christ, or quickens himself in order to effect it. It is also unreasonable; for it supposes a glorious effect without an adequate cause. The effect is spiritual, while the cause is carnal, which are not only different but even directly opposite. What ideas can be more contradictory, or sentiment more unreasonable? 4. The supposition of two simultaneous causes, the one being the Spirit of Christ, and the other the carnal man, involves the same inconsistency. For how can the mere circumstance of time, irrespective of causal influence, make any difference? If the carnal mind be adequate to unite itself to Christ at one time, why not at another time as well, except some causal influence makes the difference? For surely no one can suppose that some individual moment of time, as distinguished from others preceding, constitutes the cause of difference. powerful, the quickening, and uniting presence, the vital and 5 To suppose a spiritual man whether by the exercise of his faith or by any other mental act, in the cause of a vital union, is no less inconsistent than the former supposition. For how can he be a spiritual man, without a spiritual casual influence? But if such influence be admitted as a predisposing cause of his vital acts, it is incumbent on the objector to show that such casual influence may take place without vital union. This I am persuaded no one can do. It is contrary to all analogy, and to every sound principle of true philosophy. It is contrary to christian experience and revealed statements. What effect in physical nature can be produced, which does not imply a casual union? Does not the divine energy pervade all second causes in the way of union with them, in order to the production of their effects? and what miraculous effects have ever been produced without a present uniting causal influence to produce the change? For instance, when Lazarus came forth from death to life, was there not a uniting causual interest to produce the change? and if we appeal to an experienced intelligent Christian, will he not own, will he not maintain, according to his views of revealed truth, that the transforming energy of the Spirit of God or of Christ in him, was the cause of his own vitality? Nay, would he not be shocked to hear any one maintain the contrary? 6. Perhaps it may be thought, that—though in the great laboratory of physical nature, in the bowels of the earth and in the surrounding atmosphere, a causal union be necessary to produce chemical effects; and that though in all works of mechanism a causal union is requisite to the existence of mechanical effects; and that, moreover, though the sun by his light and heat produces an effect upon objects by a causal union with them; yet, what shall we say of one body affecting a change of situation in another, at an immense distance? Does not the sun powerfully attract all the planets that surround him, however distant? and how can this be by causal union? This objection admits of two answers. 7. First, it has never been proved, that there is no causal union between these bodies adequate to the effect; while on the contrary several philosophers have at least attempted to show its existence. The solar system, for ought we know, may be perfectly mechanical, though we should never be able to perceive the intermediate parts. 8. Secondly, as to the universe in general depends on the causal presence of the first cause, so must every part of it; Scripture and reason assure us that in god we live, and move, and have our being. Therefore, whether there be any intermediate cause of gravitation or not, between the effect and the first cause, a causal union is still necessary to the effect. What difference there is, lies against the objector. For if there be no intermediate cause of gravitation, the presence, the energy, the causal union of the first cause is proportionally the more immediate. 9. Having shown that neither the carnal man nor the spiritual man is the immediate cause of the union subsisting between Christ and the Christian, it remains to be ascertained, what else is the cause? If it be not man it must be the divine spirit, either as the Spirit of the Father or of Christ. In one view this difference is not very material, but in another it is of considerable importance. Allow it to be from the Holy Spirit, in either sense, it secures the great point of salvation by grace, in opposition to our own merit. But, as it respects the nature of Christ’s mediation, and particularly his federal headship and suretiship, it is of moment to ascertain, whether he or the Father, economically, be the immediate cause of the vital union. 10. The Scripture fully declares that the influence of the Spirit on the minds of men is from Christ. The Lord from heaven is a quickening Spirit—he quickeneth whom he will—he sends the Holy Ghost—he gives repentance, or the spirit of repentance—in him was life (without whom nothing was created,) and this life is the true light of men—he shines into the heart—his grace and strength constitute our sufficiency - &c. These and other passages innumerable show, that quickening influence proceeds from his fullness of life and grace. 11. That other passages ascribe spiritual effects to the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of God, is of no force, except with such as deny the divine nature of Christ, who are confuted on other grounds. But supposing his divine nature in union with humanity, the Spirit of God is the Spirit of Christ, and vice versa. And in the divine economy of grace, Christ is the head or source of influence to the church. It is he who gives gifts to the rebellious, who endows with the spirit of life, and who bestows the living water to which divine influence is compared. 12. And how beautifully consistent must this appear when we consider, that as a covenant head he is the surety of his chosen people! The office of a surety engages to perform what is requisite in behalf of a person or persons as required by another. Thus Jesus not only brought in an everlasting righteousness in behalf of his people as their federal perfection, in lieu of those who could never attain to it by any obedience of their own; but it also belonged to his office to secure for them a voluntary, penitential, believing obedience to the equitable requisitions of the divine Governor. This can be effected only by divine influence, and that influence must needs proceed from him as the immediate cause; otherwise we make the creditor and surety to be the very same. God, as governor, demands obedience from all the subjects of his government; and Christ, as the surety of those who were given him, enables them to comply with those demands, that is, to submit, to repent, to believe with the heart, to love God, and to walk with him. 13. From the premises it follows plainly, that the immediate cause of vital union is the spirit of christ, which he bestows in the exercise of his office as the federal head of influence, and in virtue of his suretiship for his church and people. He as the true vine communicates life to the branches, and as the head of his church brings dead souls to be his living members. Faith is a fruit of the Spirit, and not the cause of a spiritual existence. Yet, 14. We maintain that faith forms a consequent union. Man being a subject of moral government, and therefore a free agent, at liberty to choose his end and means of happiness for which he is accountable; and God in infinite mercy proposing Jesus as the way, the truth, and the life; the all-sufficient and only Saviour of sinners—in whom we are required to believe and to trust with confidence, and whom we are encouraged to receive into our hearts, that he may dwell there by faith—the regenerate soul, by believing, unites itself to this object. 15. The former union is the immediate effect of sovereign favour; the latter union is the immediate effect of exercised grace; in the performance of an incumbent duty, or the discharge of moral obligation. Now since men are exhorted, warned, directed, reasoned, and expostulated with, on the ground of what they ought to do or abstain from doing, the Scripture abounds with such addresses. But lest any false inferences should be drawn, derogatory from the honours of sovereign grace, we are assured that every good and perfect gift cometh from the Father of lights. When we have done all we are unprofitable servants. Work out your own salvation, says Paul, with fear and trembling; for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do of his own good pleasure. No one can come unto me except the Father who hath sent me draw him, that is, without divine influence; and whosoever cometh unto me, I will in no wise cast out. Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. Ye are saved by grace, through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God. Among many other parts of Scripture where grace and obligation are strikingly intermixed, and illustrative of the preceding remarks, the reader is particularly referred to the sixth and fifteenth chapters of St. John’s Gospel. 16. Coroll. The old mode, adopted by many orthodox divines, of distinguishing the vital union between Christ and his people, first, on his part, and secondly, on their part, is founded on Scripture and the reason of the thing; and the former is the cause of the latter. And therefore, as the cause must ever precede the effect, the first union not only may be prior to the second, as in the case of happy infants, but also must be so in the case of adults.–W

[656] John i. 12.

[657] John v. 40.

[658] The term here used, “moral congruity,” is not happily chosen. Indeed our author, in the next sentence, professes himself to be at a loss what terms to use which may clearly convey the necessary distinction. By “moral” congruity or fitness he seems to mean personal perfection, or a perfection of state personally considered, without relation to a surety, or the righteousness which God has provided. But this is an acceptation of the term “moral” so unusual as to throw great perplexity into the argument. Beside, when contrasted with believing, it leaves the reader to suppose that to believe is not a moral act. But the supposition that “believing with the heart unto righteousness” is not a moral act, as contradistinguished from a natural one, leads to an endless confusion of ideas. Surely, to believe God’s testimony concerning the Son and his righteousness is, if any thing be, a moral act of obedience to divine authority. How then can it be called a natural fitness only, as contrasted with what is moral? Nor is the distinction at all necessary in order to avoid the apprehended consequence of assigning to faith any merit of congruity. A few observations on this intricate subject may probably assist the reader in seeking scriptural and consistent notions. 1. Justification implies a charge, a plea, and a virtual declaration of approval. 2. The charge against Adam and all his posterity is twofold, including a breach of covenant, or a failure in federal perfection; and also disobedience in transgressing a divine rule. These considerations are perfectly distinct in their nature. A rule may be momentarily transgressed for a long series of years, as it was by Adam, and constantly is by his rebellious descendants, but a federal failure was, from the nature of perfect righteousness, the very first act of delinquency. 3. No plea can be valid against a federal delinquency, as was the case in Adam, but a participation of a federal perfection. Nothing less can answer the charge, and nothing more is requisite. This averts condemnation, and entitles to a virtual approval in reference to that part of the charge. 4. No plea can be valid against disobedience to divine authority, or the rule of moral government, but a personal, voluntary, actual compliance with that authoritative rule of government; which we find by divine revelation to be, in reference to fallen man, submission to the righteousness of God; or, as differently expressed, believing on the Son of God, receiving him as the Lord our righteousness, &c. 5. No man has possessed a federal perfection, except by imputation, beside the first Adam while he obeyed without failure, and the second Adam when he completed his work of humiliation. For no eminence of grace in a mere descendant of Adam could possibly attain to federal perfection, from the very nature of such perfection. Nor indeed can the perfect obedience of glorified saints rise higher than a conformity to the divine law as a rule; their federal perfection is still derived from their union to Christ, and a consequent imputation, which implies a virtual approval. Hence, 6. The federal perfection of Messiah is the proper and sole ground of an actual interest in reconciliation and justification. In other words, the righteousness of Christ, his perfect obedience unto death as our substitute, is that alone on account of which we can stand before God with acceptance, in reference to the charge of a federal failure in Adam. 7. An actual interest in this federal perfection is obtained only by a vital or an effectual union to the Lord our righteousness. This is plain from Scripture, and is perfectly rational. It is compared to the union of a vine and its branches, the head and members of the human body, &c. That a participation of nature between Christ and us, or an effectual union, is requisite for a ground of imputation is evident, not only from scriptural comparisons, and the rational consistence of such an idea, but also from the fact of the Saviour’s incarnation. Without this union to us, our sin could not have been imputed to him; and without a vital union, his righteousness could not be imputed to us. This is fairly and fully implied in many parts of Scripture, as might be shown if necessary.—From whence it is plain, that union is the indispensable ground of imputation. 8. Whoever is the subject of a vital union to Christ, is in a justified state, as partaker of a federal perfection, prior to the performance of any moral duty whatever. But in order to explain and prove this it is requisite to attend to the following particulars. 9. Union to Christ is of two kinds, on his part by his spirit; and on our part by faith, as explained in a preceding note. In the former, we are passive; and in the latter, we are active. In the one he acts as a sovereign dispenser of benefits; in the other we act as accountable creatures. 10. By the order both of nature and of time, the union begins with him who is a quickening Spirit; and that of faith is consequent upon the other, and is the proper effect of it. 11. By his uniting act, which may be termed effectual calling, the enmity of sin is destroyed in the soul, and the Spirit of Christ is imparted, which as occasion offers, will manifest itself as the Spirit of faith, or love, &c. Hence, 12. To the soul thus in Christ, whether infant or adult, there is no condemnation arising from federal delinquency; for this charge is answered by the union on his part; and righteousness is imputed. 13. From the premises it follows, that the generally received theological maxim is perfectly just and plain, viz. that justification and regeneration are simultaneous.—Union is the immediate cause of both; and because the one is a relative and the other a vital effect, there is no interference as to the order of time. Thus an union of a tree and a branch by ingrafture, is attended with two simultaneous effects, the one relative and the other vital; it is related to the tree as a branch, and at the same time partakes of the vital sap. The union, however, must precede both, as to nature and time. 14. But where two effects are both real, as distinguished from relative, the one must precede the other, both as to nature and time. Thus union precedes vitality, and this of necessity must precede vital acts; and regeneration, as the act of the Spirit of Christ, must necessarily precede believing, which is one mode by which a vital principle operates. For to suppose that the operation produces, or is prior to the principle, either in nature or in time, is a direct contradiction. 15. If the preceding steps of these remarks be thoroughly weighed, it will be found, that justification, according to Scripture, and just reasoning upon it, has for its foundation the federal perfection of Messiah, and takes place as the immediate result of union to him. 16. But since this union is twofold, the one as the effect of the other, that is, union by faith is the effect of union by the Spirit of Christ, and these, cause and effect, cannot possibly be simultaneous, there must necessarily be a twofold justification as the result of the corresponding unions. Though in that union which is first in the order of nature and of time, the person, whether infant or adult, is passive; the result however is the imputation of righteousness, which is Messiah’s federal perfection, and which entitles to life eternal. And by that union which is the effect of the other, and consequently posterior in it in the order both of nature and of time, (and of which infants cannot be partakers,) this is, by the union effected by believing, the result is the imputation of the same righteousness in circumstances totally different. 17. These two different circumstances, clearly perceived, will developed the seeming difficulty. In the first, the person, whether infant or adult, is the passive possessor of decreed benefits, union righteousness, and life; in the second circumstance, the adult person, as a free and accountable agent, is required to determine for himself on what to found his plea of acceptance with God. If he found his plea on his own obedience past or intended, whether moral, ceremonial, or both; he shows at once both ignorance and rebellion. Ignorance, that he supposes it even possible for him, by his own obedience, to attain to that federal perfection which is justly required by the righteous Governor; and also in that he does not perceive the love and wisdom, the super abounding grace and wonderful mercy, of God as a sovereign Benefactor in providing the needful remedy. Rebellion, in that he rejects the counsel of God, and resists, by obstinate unbelief, the divine authority requiring submission to this righteousness as the way to favour and life. Hence, 18. As all reasonings, expostulations, threats, promises and encouragements; all testimonies, declarations, appeals, inducements, and sanctions, are addressed to men as moral agents, with whom, in the business of accountability, it rests, what mode they will adopt for obtaining acceptance with God—whether by doing the work themselves, or by believing his testimony and receiving his gift—it fully accounts for justification by faith being the great point argued in the apostolic writings. 19. And it further appears, that justification by faith alone should be strenuously urged by all gospel ministers, while they have to do continually with persons whose inquiry is, “What shall we do to be saved?” To such as thus inquire after the way of salvation, who seek acceptance with God, who are about to choose for themselves “the way they will take,” what answer can be given, in effect, but what is contained in the apostle’s words? Romans 4:5 “To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.” The above statement not only agrees with these words, but also, as I humbly conceive, explains their import; and the embarrassment respecting the office and influence of faith in justification is removed, without expunging faith, or the act of believing, from the class of moral duties. 20. It may be objected, if there by any justification before believing, then an unbeliever may be justified; whereas the Scripture saith, “He that believeth not is condemned already.” This objecting arises from a mistaken notion of the true meaning of such passages of Scripture. Condemnation, in the real import of Scripture, is leveled against the rejecters of Christ, or of the divine testimony, and these only, considered as free agents in seeking acceptance with God and final happiness. These, not believing in Christ, while prevailingly devoted to Moses or Mahomet, moral obedience or ceremonies, or indeed any other object whatever, reject in fact the testimony of God and his righteousness, and expose themselves to a double condemnation. They are condemned as being destitute of a perfect righteousness, and also for their actual disobedience to the divine authority. The sentence of the law is against them both as a covenant and as a rule; and the gospel which they reject will be a witness to prove the wickedness of their heart. But this can never take place in one who is vitally united to Christ. All allow that infants not believing are not to be ranked with unbelievers. To them no testimony is proposed, and therefore no testimony is rejected by them. Nor does any adult united to Christ reject the divine testimony, even before he believes. Let but the object of faith be presented to him, and his vital union secures the exercise of the living principle towards the proposed object in proportion as the terms are understood. A testimony not presented, or one presented in an unknown tongue, cannot be believed, notwithstanding the principle of faith. The existence of a principle does not necessarily imply its exercise, whether it be sense, reason, or faith. Men are not necessarily conversant with the objects of sense, because they possess the senses requisite for these purposes; nor are they always exercising the powers of the mind, however essential these powers are to human nature. In like manner, not exercising faith is a very different thing from not possessing the principle. A vital union and the spirit of faith are inseparably and essentially connected; but a vital union and believing are connected secundum quid, in certain circumstances. Without the circumstances of adult age, or a capacity of understanding, believing is impracticable. But how absurd would it be to say, that a sinner cannot be justified because he has not arrived at a certain advanced portion of understanding, or has not learned some language; as if a title to heaven depended on age, or knowing a language! And equally absurd is it to suppose that Christ cannot effect a vital union because the sinner’s voluntary consent to it is wanting; as if God’s high sovereignty were bound by the human will! That God requires the sinner’s consent, as a matter of obligation, is a solemn fact; but God has not laid himself under any obligation that he will never unite a soul to Christ for justification of life but by the sinner’s previous consent. He has declared, however, that the continued unbeliever, who is properly a willful rejecter of Christ and his righteousness, shall be condemned. Hence it is evident, that to make believing essential to a vital union, on the part of Christ; and to make the exercise of faith on a divine testimony essential to its existence, are erroneous conclusions, derogatory to gospel grace, and founded on wrong notions of moral government. 21. To make this, if possible, still more plain, the gospel finds men, as apostatized with Adam, in a state of condemnation; infants and adults alike are under the condemnatory sentence which is the result of a breach of covenant. This evil can be removed, and a restoration to favour be effected, only by an act of sovereign grace, whereby Christ becomes vitally united to the soul. Without this vital union there is, there can be, no faith. This being the case, a vital union is formed before faith can have any ground of existence; and consequently a justification which is a necessary result of this union takes place. For to him who is thus in Christ Jesus there is no condemnation; but he is passed from death unto life, as an object of mere grace and mercy. In this respect, an adult and in infant are perfectly on a par, while justified and regenerated for the kingdom of God. But God, in the character of a moral governor, has a further claim on every free agent; he exhibits to the view, and solicits, yea demands, a voluntary compliance with the plan of mercy through the blessed Redeemer, who was delivered for our offences, and was raised again for our justification. The regenerate person that is capable of acting for him self, as the subject of commands and invitations, complies; he becomes an active recipient of the appointed righteousness, which he now pleads in opposition to all charges presented against him. By faith, or believing God’s testimony, he makes his appeal, and by faith alone he is justified. An investigation of the rationale of christian doctrines is not necessary for popular use, but may be peculiarly useful as a guard against inconsistencies, and a means of strengthening our attachment to those doctrines.—W.

[659] This order, however, is a law to us, and compliance with it necessarily imports moral obedience; though the object received is the obedience of another. No one has room to expect success in his endeavors, but by complying with the divine requisition; and that requisition is, that we submit to the perfection of Messiah. And an act of submission to the righteousness of faith may well be an act of moral excellence, though that excellence has nothing meritorious on account of which a perfect righteousness should be imputed. A thing may have moral goodness without moral perfection. But in order to deny to faith the latter, it is not necessary to deprive it of the former. If we consistently maintain, that the moral excellence of faith constitutes no part of our justifying righteousness, it is all that the argument requires, in order to establish the conclusion intended.—W

[660] That perfect obedience, is what is called righteousness in the New Testament, and that this righteousness, or perfect obedience, is by God’s fixed unalterable rule the condition of justification, is, from the plain evidence of truth, confessed by a certain great man, whom nobody will think to be blinded by prejudice in favour of the doctrine we are maintaining, and one who did not receive this doctrine. M. Locke, in his Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures, vol. 2 of his works, p. 474, writes thus: “To one that thus unbiased reads the Scripture, what Adam fell from, is visible, was the state of perfect obedience, which is called justice in the New Testament, though the word, which in the original signifies justice, be translated righteousness.” Ibid. p. 476, 477. “For righteousness, or an exact obedience to the law, seems by the Scripture to have a claim of right to eternal life; Rom. iv. 4. To him that worketh, i.e., does the works of the law, is the reward not reckoned of grace but of debt. – On the other side, it seems the unalterable purpose of divine justice, that no unrighteous person, no one that is guilty of any breach of the law, should be in paradise; but that the wages of sin should be to every man, as it was to Adam, an exclusion of him out of that happy state of immortality, and bring death upon him. And this is so conformable to the eternal and established law of right and wrong, that it is spoke of too as it could not be otherwise. – Here then we have the standing and fixed measures of life and death; immortality and bliss belong to the righteous. Those who have lived in an exact conformity to the law of God are out of the reach of death; but an exclusion from paradise and loss of immortality, is the portion of sinners, of all those who have any way broke that law, and failed of a complete obedience to it, by the guilt of any one transgression. And thus mankind, by the law, are put upon the issues of life or death, as they are righteous or unrighteous, just or unjust, i.e. exact performers or transgressors of the law.” Again, in p. 477. “The way of works then in short is, that law which requires perfect obedience, without any remission or abatement; so that by that law a man cannot be just or justified, without an exact performance of every tittle. Such a perfect obedience in the New Testament, is termed , which we translate righteousness.” In which last passage it is also to be noted, that Mr. Locke, by the law of works, does not understand the ceremonial law, but the covenant of works; as he more fully expresses himself in the next paragraph but one. “Where this law of works was to be found, the New Testament tells us, viz. in the law delivered by Moses; John i.17.The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. Chap. vii. 19. Did not Moses give you the law, says our Saviour, and yet none of you keep the law? And this is the law which he speaks of– verse 28. This do, and thou shalt live. This is that which St. Paul so often styles the law, without any other distinction; Rom. ii. 13.. Not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law are justified. It is needless to quote any more places, his epistles are all full of it, especially this to the Romans.”

[661] Thus Mr. Locke in his Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures, vol. 2d of his works, p. 478. “Nay, whatever God requires anywhere to be done, without making any allowance for faith, that is a part of the law of works. So that forbidding Adam to eat of the tree of knowledge, was part of the law of works. Only we must take notice here, that some of God’s positive commands being for peculiar ends, and suited to particular circumstances of times, places, and persons, have a limited and only temporary obligation, by virtue of God’s positive injunction: such was that part of Moses’s law which concerned the outward worship of political constitution of the Jews, and is called the ceremonial and judaical law. Again, p. 479. “Thus then, as in the law in short, the civil and ritual part of the law delivered by Moses obliges not Christians, though to the Jews it were a part of the law of works; it being a part of the law of nature, that men ought to obey every positive law of God, whenever he shall please to make any such addition to the law of his nature.”

[662] Agreeable to this is what Mr. Locke says in his second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. vol. ii. of his works. p. 630, 631. “The believing him therefore to be the Messiah is very often, with great reason, put both for faith and repentance too, which are sometimes set down singly, where on is put for both, as implying the other.”

[663] If repentance justifies, or be that by which we obtain pardon of sin any other way than this, it must be either as a virtue or righteousness, or something amiable in us; or else it must be, that our sorrow and condemning what is past, is accepted as some atonement for it; both which are equally contrary to the gospel-doctrine of justification by Christ.

[664] This distinction is just and scriptural as far as it goes, but it does not reach the bottom of the difficulty, since believing in order to justification is itself a part of obedience, and is expressly called “the obedience of faith.” Hence justification by faith, in comparison of what precedes it, is only manifestative. The tree must be good, that is, the person must be vitally united to Christ, as the adequate cause of believing, otherwise he would be still carnal. The faith of a man spiritually dead or carnal, must needs be a dead faith; but to suppose that such faith unites to Christ, has neither Scripture nor any plausible reason to support it. To him that is in Christ Jesus by a vital union, there is no condemnation; and as there is no medium between condemnation and justification, he who is in Christ is justified, or “accepted in the beloved” Saviour. That union which Christ effects by his quickening Spirit, makes the tree good, and believing with the heart, in order to receive the promised righteousness, is the fruit of a good tree. Therefore the justification which is received as the consequence of believing is only manifestative of union; even as justification by works, as asserted by St. James, is manifestative of a living faith. As without works there is no sufficient evidence of union to Christ on our part, so without faith in Christ as our complete righteousness, there is no sufficient evidence of union with him on his part. The true Christian’s works, are “works of faith and labours of love,” performed in obedience to God’s authority, directed to his glory, and inspired by gratitude for the blessings of his grace, and this is the first of all such works, called “the work of God,” even to believe on Jesus Christ in whom alone is righteousness and life. By believing we receive the divine testimony respecting a gratuitous righteousness, and renounce all hope of obtaining justification by any other way. The justifying righteousness is only one, but the appointed ways of becoming interested in it are divers. One way is by the will of God our Saviour, the other by the will of man the accountable agent, each in its own order. The will of God gives the fundamental interest, and the will of man the consequent and manifestative interest. In the first way, we are interested in Christ’s righteousness by one act continued, commencing with, and permanent as, the primary vital union; in the other way, it is by repeated acts, commencing with the first act of faith in Christ, and repeated with every succeeding reception of him. Among persons who have made any, even the smallest, progress in christian knowledge, there can be no dispute respecting the fundamental cause of justification. All such acknowledge, that the righteousness, or federal perfection of Jesus Christ, is that for the sake of which any of the fallen race of Adam can be justified. The difference of sentiment arises from the appointed method of obtaining an interest in this meritorious cause. For want of consideration, we too hastily infer, that if the Scripture states one appointed method, that it must be an exclusive appointment.—Hence one pleads from Scripture, and especially St. James’s epistle, that this appointed method is by works, that is, evangelical obedience, of which faith is a leading part. Another pleads from Scripture, that it is by faith, not as an act of moral obedience, but as a suitable bond of union, to the exclusion of all works. And a third, from the same Scripture, pleads, that we are justified by an eternal immanent act of God, and that faith only brings us to enjoy a privilege which belongs to the elect from eternity. Now each of these schemes overlooks the important truth, that the immediate ground of justification is the vital union between Christ and the soul. Justification from eternity precedes vital union; justification by works denies the fact of a vital union being an adequate ground of a justifying sentence; and justification by faith alone, or believing in Christ, to the exclusion of a prior vital union on the part of the Spirit, confounds the work of man and the work of God. This last being the most difficult part of the subject, I beg leave to make a few observations upon it. 1. The claims of God, in reference to justification, are twofold. In the first instance, he claims from a man a federal perfection; and in the second instance, he claims compliance with his method of bestowing an interest in it. The former claim may be answered by the surety, and in fact is answered by his act of a vital union on his part. For by this he gives an interest in himself to the soul he savingly adopts. Thus there is no condemnation to you that are in Christ Jesus. But the latter claim can be answered only by the believer himself, when he actually receives Christ as his righteousness, and so answers the divine requisition. Thus, he that believeth in Christ is justified from all things. In the first instance, Christ pleads his own righteousness in behalf of the adopted sinner; in the last instance, the believer pleads the same righteousness in his own behalf. 2. The obligations of man, in reference to justification, are also of two kinds. In the first place, he stands obliged to be conformed to the law as a covenant, which demands a sinless perfection; and, in the second place, he is obliged to conform to the law as a rule. Now whatever God enjoins as a duty, is a part of this rule; whether it be to hate sin, to love God, to believe in Christ, or to observe whatever Christ hath commanded. Our obligation to be conformed to the law as a covenant, is discharged by Christ only as our surety; and our ability to discharge our obligation of being conformed to the law as a rule is from him. We are obliged to believe on him as our justifying righteousness, under pain of God’s displeasure, but man will ever continue in unbelief until Christ slays his enmity, and enables him to believe. But to slay a sinner’s enmity, to change his nature, or to give him ability to believe, is the effect of a vital union; for as there is no such ability without gracious influence, so there is no gracious influence without union to the source of spiritual life. When thus enabled, man exercises repentance towards God, and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. Receiving him by faith alone, as our righteousness and life, the law is obeyed as the voice of God, requiring the obedience of faith. 3. The method of mercy, in reference to justification, includes the substitution of the Saviour, and our acceptance in him, without any works of righteousness on our part. In this respect, not by works of righteousness which we have done, whether faith, repentance, or any kind of obedience, but according to his mercy he saveth us—provides a Saviour and gives us a saving interest in him. Grace provides, and grace applies the remedy. Mercy imputes to Jesus our sins, and imputes to us his righteousness. He who knew no sin was by sovereign mercy made a sin-offering for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. Mercy laid the foundation, and placed us on it, that we might become living stones on him; and in consequence find him to be precious. 4. The rule of moral government, in reference to justification, is, that we believe on the Lord Jesus Christ as the end of the law for righteousness. For this end is the gospel proclaimed to all nations, even for “the obedience of faith.” This is the language of divine government, “He that believeth shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.” The unbeliever is condemned already, because he rejects the counsel of God, and neglects so great salvation. Mercy hath provided an adequate and all-sufficient remedy, and government requires our closing with it as the only ground of hope left us. An endeavour to set up our own obedience instead of the righteousness of Christ, is rebellion against the authority of God, and undervaluing his wisdom and grace. None deserve condemnation more than those who reject the only remedy. And even they who believe have no ground of boasting. For we are saved by grace, and justified by faith, and that is not of ourselves, but is the gift of God.—The influence of works in justification our author has well explained.—W

[665] “Our Saviour compares his mystical body, that is his church, to a vine, which his Father, whom he compares to a husbandman, hath planted; John xv. 1 I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman. To represent to us the union that is betwixt Christ and all true Christians, and the influence of grace and spiritual life, which all that are united to him do derive and receive from him, he sets it forth to us by the resemblance of a vine and branches. As there is a natural vital union between the vine and the branches, so there is a spiritual union between Christ and true Christians: and this union is the cause of our fruitfulness in the works of obedience and a good life. There are some indeed that seem to be grafted into Christ by an outward profession of Christianity, who yet derive no influence from him, so as to bring forth fruit, because they are not vitally united to him”—Dr. Tillotson in his 3rd vol. of Serm., p. 307 By this it appears that the vital union between Christ and true Christians, which is much more of a mystery than the relative union, and necessarily implies it, was not thought an unreasonable doctrine by one of the greatest divines on the other side of the question in hand.

[666] The word “union,” in this connexion, is both more intelligible and more appropriate, than the word relation; since in this connexion the latter is the consequence of the former. As the doctrine of a vital union to Christ is fundamentally important in Christianity, and inseparable from the doctrine of justification; and as our author passes it over with so much brevity, a few observations upon it in this place may appear the more needful. 1. The Scriptures are not only full of the fact, but they abound with illustrations of it. The first part of John xv. is full and explicit to this purpose. 2. What the Scriptures assert, and illustrate, is abundantly corroborated by the reasonableness of the thing. To suppose the reality of vital religion without a corresponding vital union, is to suppose an important effect without as adequate cause, as shall be further shown 3. The question then is, What is the immediate cause of this vital union? Now as the union subsisting is between the Spirit of Christ, and man, the immediate cause must be in the one or the other of these, or in both at the same instant, or in neither. If the immediate cause be in man, he makes his approach to Christ either as a carnal or spiritual man, for these is no conceivable medium. But the idea of a carnal man uniting himself to Christ in order to form a vital union, is both unscriptural and unreasonable. It is unscriptural; for the scripture asserts that “The carnal mind is enmity against God;” how then can it be the cause of a vital union? “Of him are ye in Christ Jesus; ”—” and you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins; ”—it is not therefore the carnal man that unites himself to Christ, or quickens himself in order to effect it. It is also unreasonable; for it supposes a glorious effect without an adequate cause. The effect is spiritual, while the cause is carnal, which are not only different but even directly opposite. What ideas can be more contradictory, or sentiment more unreasonable? 4. The supposition of two simultaneous causes, the one being the Spirit of Christ, and the other the carnal man, involves the same inconsistency. For how can the mere circumstance of time, irrespective of causal influence, make any difference? If the carnal mind be adequate to unite itself to Christ at one time, why not at another time as well, except some causal influence makes the difference? For surely no one can suppose that some individual moment of time, as distinguished from others preceding, constitutes the cause of difference. powerful, the quickening, and uniting presence, the vital and 5 To suppose a spiritual man whether by the exercise of his faith or by any other mental act, in the cause of a vital union, is no less inconsistent than the former supposition. For how can he be a spiritual man, without a spiritual casual influence? But if such influence be admitted as a predisposing cause of his vital acts, it is incumbent on the objector to show that such casual influence may take place without vital union. This I am persuaded no one can do. It is contrary to all analogy, and to every sound principle of true philosophy. It is contrary to christian experience and revealed statements. What effect in physical nature can be produced, which does not imply a casual union? Does not the divine energy pervade all second causes in the way of union with them, in order to the production of their effects? and what miraculous effects have ever been produced without a present uniting causal influence to produce the change? For instance, when Lazarus came forth from death to life, was there not a uniting causual interest to produce the change? and if we appeal to an experienced intelligent Christian, will he not own, will he not maintain, according to his views of revealed truth, that the transforming energy of the Spirit of God or of Christ in him, was the cause of his own vitality? Nay, would he not be shocked to hear any one maintain the contrary? 6. Perhaps it may be thought, that—though in the great laboratory of physical nature, in the bowels of the earth and in the surrounding atmosphere, a causal union be necessary to produce chemical effects; and that though in all works of mechanism a causal union is requisite to the existence of mechanical effects; and that, moreover, though the sun by his light and heat produces an effect upon objects by a causal union with them; yet, what shall we say of one body affecting a change of situation in another, at an immense distance? Does not the sun powerfully attract all the planets that surround him, however distant? and how can this be by causal union? This objection admits of two answers. 7. First, it has never been proved, that there is no causal union between these bodies adequate to the effect; while on the contrary several philosophers have at least attempted to show its existence. The solar system, for ought we know, may be perfectly mechanical, though we should never be able to perceive the intermediate parts. 8. Secondly, as to the universe in general depends on the causal presence of the first cause, so must every part of it; Scripture and reason assure us that in god we live, and move, and have our being. Therefore, whether there be any intermediate cause of gravitation or not, between the effect and the first cause, a causal union is still necessary to the effect. What difference there is, lies against the objector. For if there be no intermediate cause of gravitation, the presence, the energy, the causal union of the first cause is proportionally the more immediate. 9. Having shown that neither the carnal man nor the spiritual man is the immediate cause of the union subsisting between Christ and the Christian, it remains to be ascertained, what else is the cause? If it be not man it must be the divine spirit, either as the Spirit of the Father or of Christ. In one view this difference is not very material, but in another it is of considerable importance. Allow it to be from the Holy Spirit, in either sense, it secures the great point of salvation by grace, in opposition to our own merit. But, as it respects the nature of Christ’s mediation, and particularly his federal headship and suretiship, it is of moment to ascertain, whether he or the Father, economically, be the immediate cause of the vital union. 10. The Scripture fully declares that the influence of the Spirit on the minds of men is from Christ. The Lord from heaven is a quickening Spirit—he quickeneth whom he will—he sends the Holy Ghost—he gives repentance, or the spirit of repentance—in him was life (without whom nothing was created,) and this life is the true light of men—he shines into the heart—his grace and strength constitute our sufficiency - &c. These and other passages innumerable show, that quickening influence proceeds from his fullness of life and grace. 11. That other passages ascribe spiritual effects to the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of God, is of no force, except with such as deny the divine nature of Christ, who are confuted on other grounds. But supposing his divine nature in union with humanity, the Spirit of God is the Spirit of Christ, and vice versa. And in the divine economy of grace, Christ is the head or source of influence to the church. It is he who gives gifts to the rebellious, who endows with the spirit of life, and who bestows the living water to which divine influence is compared. 12. And how beautifully consistent must this appear when we consider, that as a covenant head he is the surety of his chosen people! The office of a surety engages to perform what is requisite in behalf of a person or persons as required by another. Thus Jesus not only brought in an everlasting righteousness in behalf of his people as their federal perfection, in lieu of those who could never attain to it by any obedience of their own; but it also belonged to his office to secure for them a voluntary, penitential, believing obedience to the equitable requisitions of the divine Governor. This can be effected only by divine influence, and that influence must needs proceed from him as the immediate cause; otherwise we make the creditor and surety to be the very same. God, as governor, demands obedience from all the subjects of his government; and Christ, as the surety of those who were given him, enables them to comply with those demands, that is, to submit, to repent, to believe with the heart, to love God, and to walk with him. 13. From the premises it follows plainly, that the immediate cause of vital union is the spirit of christ, which he bestows in the exercise of his office as the federal head of influence, and in virtue of his suretiship for his church and people. He as the true vine communicates life to the branches, and as the head of his church brings dead souls to be his living members. Faith is a fruit of the Spirit, and not the cause of a spiritual existence. Yet, 14. We maintain that faith forms a consequent union. Man being a subject of moral government, and therefore a free agent, at liberty to choose his end and means of happiness for which he is accountable; and God in infinite mercy proposing Jesus as the way, the truth, and the life; the all-sufficient and only Saviour of sinners—in whom we are required to believe and to trust with confidence, and whom we are encouraged to receive into our hearts, that he may dwell there by faith—the regenerate soul, by believing, unites itself to this object. 15. The former union is the immediate effect of sovereign favour; the latter union is the immediate effect of exercised grace; in the performance of an incumbent duty, or the discharge of moral obligation. Now since men are exhorted, warned, directed, reasoned, and expostulated with, on the ground of what they ought to do or abstain from doing, the Scripture abounds with such addresses. But lest any false inferences should be drawn, derogatory from the honours of sovereign grace, we are assured that every good and perfect gift cometh from the Father of lights. When we have done all we are unprofitable servants. Work out your own salvation, says Paul, with fear and trembling; for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do of his own good pleasure. No one can come unto me except the Father who hath sent me draw him, that is, without divine influence; and whosoever cometh unto me, I will in no wise cast out. Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. Ye are saved by grace, through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God. Among many other parts of Scripture where grace and obligation are strikingly intermixed, and illustrative of the preceding remarks, the reader is particularly referred to the sixth and fifteenth chapters of St. John’s Gospel. 16. Coroll. The old mode, adopted by many orthodox divines, of distinguishing the vital union between Christ and his people, first, on his part, and secondly, on their part, is founded on Scripture and the reason of the thing; and the former is the cause of the latter. And therefore, as the cause must ever precede the effect, the first union not only may be prior to the second, as in the case of happy infants, but also must be so in the case of adults.–W

[667] John i. 12.

[668] John v. 40.

[669] The term here used, “moral congruity,” is not happily chosen. Indeed our author, in the next sentence, professes himself to be at a loss what terms to use which may clearly convey the necessary distinction. By “moral” congruity or fitness he seems to mean personal perfection, or a perfection of state personally considered, without relation to a surety, or the righteousness which God has provided. But this is an acceptation of the term “moral” so unusual as to throw great perplexity into the argument. Beside, when contrasted with believing, it leaves the reader to suppose that to believe is not a moral act. But the supposition that “believing with the heart unto righteousness” is not a moral act, as contradistinguished from a natural one, leads to an endless confusion of ideas. Surely, to believe God’s testimony concerning the Son and his righteousness is, if any thing be, a moral act of obedience to divine authority. How then can it be called a natural fitness only, as contrasted with what is moral? Nor is the distinction at all necessary in order to avoid the apprehended consequence of assigning to faith any merit of congruity. A few observations on this intricate subject may probably assist the reader in seeking scriptural and consistent notions. 1. Justification implies a charge, a plea, and a virtual declaration of approval. 2. The charge against Adam and all his posterity is twofold, including a breach of covenant, or a failure in federal perfection; and also disobedience in transgressing a divine rule. These considerations are perfectly distinct in their nature. A rule may be momentarily transgressed for a long series of years, as it was by Adam, and constantly is by his rebellious descendants, but a federal failure was, from the nature of perfect righteousness, the very first act of delinquency. 3. No plea can be valid against a federal delinquency, as was the case in Adam, but a participation of a federal perfection. Nothing less can answer the charge, and nothing more is requisite. This averts condemnation, and entitles to a virtual approval in reference to that part of the charge. 4. No plea can be valid against disobedience to divine authority, or the rule of moral government, but a personal, voluntary, actual compliance with that authoritative rule of government; which we find by divine revelation to be, in reference to fallen man, submission to the righteousness of God; or, as differently expressed, believing on the Son of God, receiving him as the Lord our righteousness, &c. 5. No man has possessed a federal perfection, except by imputation, beside the first Adam while he obeyed without failure, and the second Adam when he completed his work of humiliation. For no eminence of grace in a mere descendant of Adam could possibly attain to federal perfection, from the very nature of such perfection. Nor indeed can the perfect obedience of glorified saints rise higher than a conformity to the divine law as a rule; their federal perfection is still derived from their union to Christ, and a consequent imputation, which implies a virtual approval. Hence, 6. The federal perfection of Messiah is the proper and sole ground of an actual interest in reconciliation and justification. In other words, the righteousness of Christ, his perfect obedience unto death as our substitute, is that alone on account of which we can stand before God with acceptance, in reference to the charge of a federal failure in Adam. 7. An actual interest in this federal perfection is obtained only by a vital or an effectual union to the Lord our righteousness. This is plain from Scripture, and is perfectly rational. It is compared to the union of a vine and its branches, the head and members of the human body, &c. That a participation of nature between Christ and us, or an effectual union, is requisite for a ground of imputation is evident, not only from scriptural comparisons, and the rational consistence of such an idea, but also from the fact of the Saviour’s incarnation. Without this union to us, our sin could not have been imputed to him; and without a vital union, his righteousness could not be imputed to us. This is fairly and fully implied in many parts of Scripture, as might be shown if necessary.—From whence it is plain, that union is the indispensable ground of imputation. 8. Whoever is the subject of a vital union to Christ, is in a justified state, as partaker of a federal perfection, prior to the performance of any moral duty whatever. But in order to explain and prove this it is requisite to attend to the following particulars. 9. Union to Christ is of two kinds, on his part by his spirit; and on our part by faith, as explained in a preceding note. In the former, we are passive; and in the latter, we are active. In the one he acts as a sovereign dispenser of benefits; in the other we act as accountable creatures. 10. By the order both of nature and of time, the union begins with him who is a quickening Spirit; and that of faith is consequent upon the other, and is the proper effect of it. 11. By his uniting act, which may be termed effectual calling, the enmity of sin is destroyed in the soul, and the Spirit of Christ is imparted, which as occasion offers, will manifest itself as the Spirit of faith, or love, &c. Hence, 12. To the soul thus in Christ, whether infant or adult, there is no condemnation arising from federal delinquency; for this charge is answered by the union on his part; and righteousness is imputed. 13. From the premises it follows, that the generally received theological maxim is perfectly just and plain, viz. that justification and regeneration are simultaneous.—Union is the immediate cause of both; and because the one is a relative and the other a vital effect, there is no interference as to the order of time. Thus an union of a tree and a branch by ingrafture, is attended with two simultaneous effects, the one relative and the other vital; it is related to the tree as a branch, and at the same time partakes of the vital sap. The union, however, must precede both, as to nature and time. 14. But where two effects are both real, as distinguished from relative, the one must precede the other, both as to nature and time. Thus union precedes vitality, and this of necessity must precede vital acts; and regeneration, as the act of the Spirit of Christ, must necessarily precede believing, which is one mode by which a vital principle operates. For to suppose that the operation produces, or is prior to the principle, either in nature or in time, is a direct contradiction. 15. If the preceding steps of these remarks be thoroughly weighed, it will be found, that justification, according to Scripture, and just reasoning upon it, has for its foundation the federal perfection of Messiah, and takes place as the immediate result of union to him. 16. But since this union is twofold, the one as the effect of the other, that is, union by faith is the effect of union by the Spirit of Christ, and these, cause and effect, cannot possibly be simultaneous, there must necessarily be a twofold justification as the result of the corresponding unions. Though in that union which is first in the order of nature and of time, the person, whether infant or adult, is passive; the result however is the imputation of righteousness, which is Messiah’s federal perfection, and which entitles to life eternal. And by that union which is the effect of the other, and consequently posterior in it in the order both of nature and of time, (and of which infants cannot be partakers,) this is, by the union effected by believing, the result is the imputation of the same righteousness in circumstances totally different. 17. These two different circumstances, clearly perceived, will developed the seeming difficulty. In the first, the person, whether infant or adult, is the passive possessor of decreed benefits, union righteousness, and life; in the second circumstance, the adult person, as a free and accountable agent, is required to determine for himself on what to found his plea of acceptance with God. If he found his plea on his own obedience past or intended, whether moral, ceremonial, or both; he shows at once both ignorance and rebellion. Ignorance, that he supposes it even possible for him, by his own obedience, to attain to that federal perfection which is justly required by the righteous Governor; and also in that he does not perceive the love and wisdom, the super abounding grace and wonderful mercy, of God as a sovereign Benefactor in providing the needful remedy. Rebellion, in that he rejects the counsel of God, and resists, by obstinate unbelief, the divine authority requiring submission to this righteousness as the way to favour and life. Hence, 18. As all reasonings, expostulations, threats, promises and encouragements; all testimonies, declarations, appeals, inducements, and sanctions, are addressed to men as moral agents, with whom, in the business of accountability, it rests, what mode they will adopt for obtaining acceptance with God—whether by doing the work themselves, or by believing his testimony and receiving his gift—it fully accounts for justification by faith being the great point argued in the apostolic writings. 19. And it further appears, that justification by faith alone should be strenuously urged by all gospel ministers, while they have to do continually with persons whose inquiry is, “What shall we do to be saved?” To such as thus inquire after the way of salvation, who seek acceptance with God, who are about to choose for themselves “the way they will take,” what answer can be given, in effect, but what is contained in the apostle’s words? Romans 4:5 “To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.” The above statement not only agrees with these words, but also, as I humbly conceive, explains their import; and the embarrassment respecting the office and influence of faith in justification is removed, without expunging faith, or the act of believing, from the class of moral duties. 20. It may be objected, if there by any justification before believing, then an unbeliever may be justified; whereas the Scripture saith, “He that believeth not is condemned already.” This objecting arises from a mistaken notion of the true meaning of such passages of Scripture. Condemnation, in the real import of Scripture, is leveled against the rejecters of Christ, or of the divine testimony, and these only, considered as free agents in seeking acceptance with God and final happiness. These, not believing in Christ, while prevailingly devoted to Moses or Mahomet, moral obedience or ceremonies, or indeed any other object whatever, reject in fact the testimony of God and his righteousness, and expose themselves to a double condemnation. They are condemned as being destitute of a perfect righteousness, and also for their actual disobedience to the divine authority. The sentence of the law is against them both as a covenant and as a rule; and the gospel which they reject will be a witness to prove the wickedness of their heart. But this can never take place in one who is vitally united to Christ. All allow that infants not believing are not to be ranked with unbelievers. To them no testimony is proposed, and therefore no testimony is rejected by them. Nor does any adult united to Christ reject the divine testimony, even before he believes. Let but the object of faith be presented to him, and his vital union secures the exercise of the living principle towards the proposed object in proportion as the terms are understood. A testimony not presented, or one presented in an unknown tongue, cannot be believed, notwithstanding the principle of faith. The existence of a principle does not necessarily imply its exercise, whether it be sense, reason, or faith. Men are not necessarily conversant with the objects of sense, because they possess the senses requisite for these purposes; nor are they always exercising the powers of the mind, however essential these powers are to human nature. In like manner, not exercising faith is a very different thing from not possessing the principle. A vital union and the spirit of faith are inseparably and essentially connected; but a vital union and believing are connected secundum quid, in certain circumstances. Without the circumstances of adult age, or a capacity of understanding, believing is impracticable. But how absurd would it be to say, that a sinner cannot be justified because he has not arrived at a certain advanced portion of understanding, or has not learned some language; as if a title to heaven depended on age, or knowing a language! And equally absurd is it to suppose that Christ cannot effect a vital union because the sinner’s voluntary consent to it is wanting; as if God’s high sovereignty were bound by the human will! That God requires the sinner’s consent, as a matter of obligation, is a solemn fact; but God has not laid himself under any obligation that he will never unite a soul to Christ for justification of life but by the sinner’s previous consent. He has declared, however, that the continued unbeliever, who is properly a willful rejecter of Christ and his righteousness, shall be condemned. Hence it is evident, that to make believing essential to a vital union, on the part of Christ; and to make the exercise of faith on a divine testimony essential to its existence, are erroneous conclusions, derogatory to gospel grace, and founded on wrong notions of moral government. 21. To make this, if possible, still more plain, the gospel finds men, as apostatized with Adam, in a state of condemnation; infants and adults alike are under the condemnatory sentence which is the result of a breach of covenant. This evil can be removed, and a restoration to favour be effected, only by an act of sovereign grace, whereby Christ becomes vitally united to the soul. Without this vital union there is, there can be, no faith. This being the case, a vital union is formed before faith can have any ground of existence; and consequently a justification which is a necessary result of this union takes place. For to him who is thus in Christ Jesus there is no condemnation; but he is passed from death unto life, as an object of mere grace and mercy. In this respect, an adult and in infant are perfectly on a par, while justified and regenerated for the kingdom of God. But God, in the character of a moral governor, has a further claim on every free agent; he exhibits to the view, and solicits, yea demands, a voluntary compliance with the plan of mercy through the blessed Redeemer, who was delivered for our offences, and was raised again for our justification. The regenerate person that is capable of acting for him self, as the subject of commands and invitations, complies; he becomes an active recipient of the appointed righteousness, which he now pleads in opposition to all charges presented against him. By faith, or believing God’s testimony, he makes his appeal, and by faith alone he is justified. An investigation of the rationale of christian doctrines is not necessary for popular use, but may be peculiarly useful as a guard against inconsistencies, and a means of strengthening our attachment to those doctrines.—W.

[670] This order, however, is a law to us, and compliance with it necessarily imports moral obedience; though the object received is the obedience of another. No one has room to expect success in his endeavors, but by complying with the divine requisition; and that requisition is, that we submit to the perfection of Messiah. And an act of submission to the righteousness of faith may well be an act of moral excellence, though that excellence has nothing meritorious on account of which a perfect righteousness should be imputed. A thing may have moral goodness without moral perfection. But in order to deny to faith the latter, it is not necessary to deprive it of the former. If we consistently maintain, that the moral excellence of faith constitutes no part of our justifying righteousness, it is all that the argument requires, in order to establish the conclusion intended.—W

[671] That perfect obedience, is what is called righteousness in the New Testament, and that this righteousness, or perfect obedience, is by God’s fixed unalterable rule the condition of justification, is, from the plain evidence of truth, confessed by a certain great man, whom nobody will think to be blinded by prejudice in favour of the doctrine we are maintaining, and one who did not receive this doctrine. M. Locke, in his Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures, vol. 2 of his works, p. 474, writes thus: “To one that thus unbiased reads the Scripture, what Adam fell from, is visible, was the state of perfect obedience, which is called justice in the New Testament, though the word, which in the original signifies justice, be translated righteousness.” Ibid. p. 476, 477. “For righteousness, or an exact obedience to the law, seems by the Scripture to have a claim of right to eternal life; Rom. iv. 4. To him that worketh, i.e., does the works of the law, is the reward not reckoned of grace but of debt. – On the other side, it seems the unalterable purpose of divine justice, that no unrighteous person, no one that is guilty of any breach of the law, should be in paradise; but that the wages of sin should be to every man, as it was to Adam, an exclusion of him out of that happy state of immortality, and bring death upon him. And this is so conformable to the eternal and established law of right and wrong, that it is spoke of too as it could not be otherwise. – Here then we have the standing and fixed measures of life and death; immortality and bliss belong to the righteous. Those who have lived in an exact conformity to the law of God are out of the reach of death; but an exclusion from paradise and loss of immortality, is the portion of sinners, of all those who have any way broke that law, and failed of a complete obedience to it, by the guilt of any one transgression. And thus mankind, by the law, are put upon the issues of life or death, as they are righteous or unrighteous, just or unjust, i.e. exact performers or transgressors of the law.” Again, in p. 477. “The way of works then in short is, that law which requires perfect obedience, without any remission or abatement; so that by that law a man cannot be just or justified, without an exact performance of every tittle. Such a perfect obedience in the New Testament, is termed , which we translate righteousness.” In which last passage it is also to be noted, that Mr. Locke, by the law of works, does not understand the ceremonial law, but the covenant of works; as he more fully expresses himself in the next paragraph but one. “Where this law of works was to be found, the New Testament tells us, viz. in the law delivered by Moses; John i.17.The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. Chap. vii. 19. Did not Moses give you the law, says our Saviour, and yet none of you keep the law? And this is the law which he speaks of– verse 28. This do, and thou shalt live. This is that which St. Paul so often styles the law, without any other distinction; Rom. ii. 13.. Not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law are justified. It is needless to quote any more places, his epistles are all full of it, especially this to the Romans.”

[672] Thus Mr. Locke in his Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures, vol. 2d of his works, p. 478. “Nay, whatever God requires anywhere to be done, without making any allowance for faith, that is a part of the law of works. So that forbidding Adam to eat of the tree of knowledge, was part of the law of works. Only we must take notice here, that some of God’s positive commands being for peculiar ends, and suited to particular circumstances of times, places, and persons, have a limited and only temporary obligation, by virtue of God’s positive injunction: such was that part of Moses’s law which concerned the outward worship of political constitution of the Jews, and is called the ceremonial and judaical law. Again, p. 479. “Thus then, as in the law in short, the civil and ritual part of the law delivered by Moses obliges not Christians, though to the Jews it were a part of the law of works; it being a part of the law of nature, that men ought to obey every positive law of God, whenever he shall please to make any such addition to the law of his nature.”

[673] Agreeable to this is what Mr. Locke says in his second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. vol. ii. of his works. p. 630, 631. “The believing him therefore to be the Messiah is very often, with great reason, put both for faith and repentance too, which are sometimes set down singly, where on is put for both, as implying the other.”

[674] If repentance justifies, or be that by which we obtain pardon of sin any other way than this, it must be either as a virtue or righteousness, or something amiable in us; or else it must be, that our sorrow and condemning what is past, is accepted as some atonement for it; both which are equally contrary to the gospel-doctrine of justification by Christ.

[675] This distinction is just and scriptural as far as it goes, but it does not reach the bottom of the difficulty, since believing in order to justification is itself a part of obedience, and is expressly called “the obedience of faith.” Hence justification by faith, in comparison of what precedes it, is only manifestative. The tree must be good, that is, the person must be vitally united to Christ, as the adequate cause of believing, otherwise he would be still carnal. The faith of a man spiritually dead or carnal, must needs be a dead faith; but to suppose that such faith unites to Christ, has neither Scripture nor any plausible reason to support it. To him that is in Christ Jesus by a vital union, there is no condemnation; and as there is no medium between condemnation and justification, he who is in Christ is justified, or “accepted in the beloved” Saviour. That union which Christ effects by his quickening Spirit, makes the tree good, and believing with the heart, in order to receive the promised righteousness, is the fruit of a good tree. Therefore the justification which is received as the consequence of believing is only manifestative of union; even as justification by works, as asserted by St. James, is manifestative of a living faith. As without works there is no sufficient evidence of union to Christ on our part, so without faith in Christ as our complete righteousness, there is no sufficient evidence of union with him on his part. The true Christian’s works, are “works of faith and labours of love,” performed in obedience to God’s authority, directed to his glory, and inspired by gratitude for the blessings of his grace, and this is the first of all such works, called “the work of God,” even to believe on Jesus Christ in whom alone is righteousness and life. By believing we receive the divine testimony respecting a gratuitous righteousness, and renounce all hope of obtaining justification by any other way. The justifying righteousness is only one, but the appointed ways of becoming interested in it are divers. One way is by the will of God our Saviour, the other by the will of man the accountable agent, each in its own order. The will of God gives the fundamental interest, and the will of man the consequent and manifestative interest. In the first way, we are interested in Christ’s righteousness by one act continued, commencing with, and permanent as, the primary vital union; in the other way, it is by repeated acts, commencing with the first act of faith in Christ, and repeated with every succeeding reception of him. Among persons who have made any, even the smallest, progress in christian knowledge, there can be no dispute respecting the fundamental cause of justification. All such acknowledge, that the righteousness, or federal perfection of Jesus Christ, is that for the sake of which any of the fallen race of Adam can be justified. The difference of sentiment arises from the appointed method of obtaining an interest in this meritorious cause. For want of consideration, we too hastily infer, that if the Scripture states one appointed method, that it must be an exclusive appointment.—Hence one pleads from Scripture, and especially St. James’s epistle, that this appointed method is by works, that is, evangelical obedience, of which faith is a leading part. Another pleads from Scripture, that it is by faith, not as an act of moral obedience, but as a suitable bond of union, to the exclusion of all works. And a third, from the same Scripture, pleads, that we are justified by an eternal immanent act of God, and that faith only brings us to enjoy a privilege which belongs to the elect from eternity. Now each of these schemes overlooks the important truth, that the immediate ground of justification is the vital union between Christ and the soul. Justification from eternity precedes vital union; justification by works denies the fact of a vital union being an adequate ground of a justifying sentence; and justification by faith alone, or believing in Christ, to the exclusion of a prior vital union on the part of the Spirit, confounds the work of man and the work of God. This last being the most difficult part of the subject, I beg leave to make a few observations upon it. 1. The claims of God, in reference to justification, are twofold. In the first instance, he claims from a man a federal perfection; and in the second instance, he claims compliance with his method of bestowing an interest in it. The former claim may be answered by the surety, and in fact is answered by his act of a vital union on his part. For by this he gives an interest in himself to the soul he savingly adopts. Thus there is no condemnation to you that are in Christ Jesus. But the latter claim can be answered only by the believer himself, when he actually receives Christ as his righteousness, and so answers the divine requisition. Thus, he that believeth in Christ is justified from all things. In the first instance, Christ pleads his own righteousness in behalf of the adopted sinner; in the last instance, the believer pleads the same righteousness in his own behalf. 2. The obligations of man, in reference to justification, are also of two kinds. In the first place, he stands obliged to be conformed to the law as a covenant, which demands a sinless perfection; and, in the second place, he is obliged to conform to the law as a rule. Now whatever God enjoins as a duty, is a part of this rule; whether it be to hate sin, to love God, to believe in Christ, or to observe whatever Christ hath commanded. Our obligation to be conformed to the law as a covenant, is discharged by Christ only as our surety; and our ability to discharge our obligation of being conformed to the law as a rule is from him. We are obliged to believe on him as our justifying righteousness, under pain of God’s displeasure, but man will ever continue in unbelief until Christ slays his enmity, and enables him to believe. But to slay a sinner’s enmity, to change his nature, or to give him ability to believe, is the effect of a vital union; for as there is no such ability without gracious influence, so there is no gracious influence without union to the source of spiritual life. When thus enabled, man exercises repentance towards God, and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. Receiving him by faith alone, as our righteousness and life, the law is obeyed as the voice of God, requiring the obedience of faith. 3. The method of mercy, in reference to justification, includes the substitution of the Saviour, and our acceptance in him, without any works of righteousness on our part. In this respect, not by works of righteousness which we have done, whether faith, repentance, or any kind of obedience, but according to his mercy he saveth us—provides a Saviour and gives us a saving interest in him. Grace provides, and grace applies the remedy. Mercy imputes to Jesus our sins, and imputes to us his righteousness. He who knew no sin was by sovereign mercy made a sin-offering for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. Mercy laid the foundation, and placed us on it, that we might become living stones on him; and in consequence find him to be precious. 4. The rule of moral government, in reference to justification, is, that we believe on the Lord Jesus Christ as the end of the law for righteousness. For this end is the gospel proclaimed to all nations, even for “the obedience of faith.” This is the language of divine government, “He that believeth shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.” The unbeliever is condemned already, because he rejects the counsel of God, and neglects so great salvation. Mercy hath provided an adequate and all-sufficient remedy, and government requires our closing with it as the only ground of hope left us. An endeavour to set up our own obedience instead of the righteousness of Christ, is rebellion against the authority of God, and undervaluing his wisdom and grace. None deserve condemnation more than those who reject the only remedy. And even they who believe have no ground of boasting. For we are saved by grace, and justified by faith, and that is not of ourselves, but is the gift of God.—The influence of works in justification our author has well explained.—W

[676] Joseph Clark’s wife, a young woman lately married, that died suddenly the week before this was delivered.